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ABSTRACT
“Political Beings: Sociopolitical Influence on
Federal District Court Judges’ Criminal
Sentencing Behavior.”

Scott Harris
Judicial scholars have long debated what factors influence judges’ decisionmaking. Several competing theories have offered relatively parsimonious
explanations for the motivations of appellate judges, but sources of influence for
trial judges are relatively understudied. One area ripe for testing potential
determinants of trial court behavior is the criminal sentencing behavior of federal
district court judges. Recent empirical research has examined federal district court
sentencing, but this research has often focused solely on the effects of legal policy
change and judges’ personal partisanship. These efforts are informative but ignore
other potentially important contextual determinants of sentencing behavior, such as
sentiment in the legal/judicial community, sentiment among the public, and
pertinent objective conditions, such as crime rates and incarceration rates. Using a
variety of methods in three different research designs, each emphasizing the
change in judicial behavior over time, I test the extent to which district judges’
sentencing decisions are impacted by broader social and political concerns.
Results from the dissertation are decidedly mixed, but they do suggest that
contextual influences are clearly an important component of sentencing behavior
for many district judges. Future research efforts should pay heed to the potential
impact of contextual factors on trial judge decision-making and seek to identify
conditions under which social or political characteristics are most likely to affect
judges.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal judges are appointed by the
President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate. Once appointed, these
judges hold their position for life, barring impeachment. One might suppose that given this type
of job security, judges might be largely immune from political influence. Indeed, in Federalist
78, Alexander Hamilton justified life appointment for judicial officers by invoking the principle
of a politically independent judiciary (Hamilton 2000). Hamilton argued that “the complete
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution” (2000,
497). The extent to which judges should ignore social and political considerations in a
representative democracy is an important normative question identified at least as early as the
Anti-Federalist response to Mr. Hamilton (Brutus 2003). Brutus argued that, while there should
be some degree of judicial independence, in a republic, judges should ultimately be responsible
to some body elected by the people.
From an empirical perspective, numerous scholars, inside and out of the legal field, have
rigorously examined and questioned the extent to which Hamilton’s principle of extreme federal
judicial independence has been followed in practice (Woodford 2014; Carrington & Cramton
2008; Ferejohn 2002; Spiller & Gelly 1992; Kaufman 1978; Cook 1973, 1977). Other scholars
have more narrowly focused on the extent to which public opinion impacts federal judges
(Casillas, et. al. 2011; Friedman 2009; Mishler & Sheehan 1993; Franklin & Kosaki 1989).
However, with some notable exceptions (See e.g. Kim 2009; Rowland & Carp 1996; Cook 1973,
1977), the vast majority of scholarship has focused on the appellate judges of the United States
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Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals.1 This asymmetry in research belies the
fact that the majority of Article III judges are in fact trial judges, called “federal district court
judges.”
Every federal district court judge sits in one of ninety2 different districts throughout the
United States. District court appointees are almost always long-time residents of the district to
which they are appointed (Rowland & Carp 1996; Silver & Shapiro 1984). One duty of district
court judges is to preside over criminal cases brought by the federal government against alleged
violators of federal law. A particularly important aspect of this judicial task is to sentence
criminal offenders once convicted. In the words of one former federal district court judge,
“criminal sentencing is the most important duty of a [district court] judge.3”
Given the importance of the task of criminal sentencing, the relative dearth of scholarship
on district judges, and the normative implications for the role of unelected judges, there is a
necessity for further inquiry into the link between district judges’ criminal sentencing behavior
and politics. Accordingly, the central question of this study is as follows: are federal district
court judges sensitive to social or political factors when sentencing convicted offenders?
The argument I develop in this dissertation is that district court judges’ sentencing
behavior is indeed influenced by these social and political factors to a greater degree than is
appreciated in the extant research.4 It is important to note that my argument focuses on

1

The federal judiciary is divided into three levels: ninety district courts, each underneath one of twelve court of
appeal circuit courts, all underneath the Supreme Court of the United States. *excluding US territories.
2

Excluding the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana Islands.
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Interview No. 12, January 21, 2016. See Chapter 4 for further details regarding these interviews.
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Throughout this dissertation, I use several different terms to describe these influences: “sociopolitical”;
“contextual”; “environmental”; “exogenous”, depending on the specific situation. Yet these terms can be thought of
as interchangeable with respect to my broader theoretical perspective. Namely: district judges’ decisions are shaped
by the environment in which they operate.
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exogenous influences, such as public and elite opinion and the objective conditions pertinent to
crime, rather than on district judges’ party or ideology. This is not to suggest that district judges’
political or personal preferences are irrelevant to their behavior, as they undoubtedly are.
Instead, this research focuses on exogenous contextual factors in order to highlight the
importance of context and demonstrate how much of district judge behavior is missed by
simplifying it to a simplistic partisan or “left-right” dimension.
In this Introduction, I first provide background on the history and mechanics of federal
sentencing policy and highlight the important role of district court judges in this arena. I then
summarize competing theories of judicial behavior and explore how they fit with the present
research. Next, I summarize recent empirical research on federal sentencing policy, and
highlight some unresolved questions. I then develop a model of judicial behavior that serves as
the theoretical underpinning of my argument for sociopolitical influence on district judge
sentencing. Finally, I present a road-map of the dissertation by outlining the three chapters used
to test my theoretical perspective.
Background
The Importance of Sentencing Policy and the Role of Judges
There are two reasons the present dissertation focuses on criminal sentencing, rather than
other areas of the law. First, one of the most important aspects of judicial power is the power of
the trial judge to sentence convicted criminals. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution grants the power to determine the guilt or innocence of accused criminals to an
impartial jury. However, dating back to British common law, the power to determine the
punishment for criminals upon conviction has traditionally been left within the authority of
judges (Mandiberg 2009).
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Beginning in the late 1980’s, the discretion afforded to district judges in sentencing
decisions was reduced significantly. Legislators, police and other law enforcement, attorneys,
probation officers, and other actors are all intimately involved in setting forth punitive policies
(Stith & Cabranes 1998). Furthermore, the past few decades have seen the growth of policies,
such as mandatory minimum sentences and/or implementation of sentencing guidelines, seeking
to restrict the sentencing authority of trial judges (USSC 2012). Even Attorney General Eric
Holder has acknowledged the increased role of federal prosecutors in higher incarceration rates
and has taken measures to curb mandatory minimum sentences for many nonviolent offenders
(Holder 2010). 5
Despite the multiple actors involved in sentencing policy, district court judges still have
to make important sentencing decisions in the majority of individual cases. And while district
judge sentencing discretion is no longer unfettered, the role of district court judges’ individual
preferences in determining sentencing outcomes has increased over the past decade (USSC
2012). Furthermore, as multiple studies have demonstrated the negative impact that mass
incarceration has on society (Alexander 2012; Travis, et. al. 2006; Pattillo, et. al. 2004; Braman
2002; Freudenberg 2002), it is an extremely important societal question to ask how/why district
judges arrive at these important sentencing decisions.
Aside from the theoretical appeal of a study of federal criminal sentencing, there is also a
practical matter that renders research on the subject pertinent and timely. The United States
Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) has developed and recorded a wealth of
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A substantial minority of federal offenders are convicted of offenses that carry these “mandatory minimum”
penalties. In these cases, district judges have no discretion to unilaterally sentence criminals to shorter sentences
than the proscribed statutory period. These “mandatory minimum” sentences have understandably garnered much
attention from criminal justice reform advocates. However, it is important to realize that these cases still make up
only 20-30% of all federal criminal cases, depending on the year (USSC 2011). In the remainder of cases, as will be
discussed in greater detail below, district judges have broader authority to arrive at their preferred sentence.
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data, documenting and coding every case of a federal criminal sentence, reported by the various
district courts. This objectively-coded data provides extraordinary opportunities for both
understanding relevant factors relevant to sentencing and for testing competing theories of
judicial behavior.
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that criminal sentencing is the only important
aspect of a federal district court judge’s role. Nor do I suggest criminal sentencing is necessarily
akin to other judicial tasks. However, given the above considerations, criminal sentencing is an
important and feasible policy area to test the theory of exogenous influences on judicial
behavior.
Sentencing Policy in US District Courts
In order to understand the role of the district judges on criminal sentencing, some history
and background on the mechanics of federal criminal sentencing is also required. Prior to the
late 1980’s, federal district court judges enjoyed relatively broad discretion in determining the
sentences of convicted criminals (Stith and Cabranes 1998). Upon conviction, either by jury
verdict or by plea agreement, judges were charged with the task of sentencing criminals within
relatively wide statutory penalty ranges. Two early-to-mid twentieth century United States
Supreme Court cases6 explicitly recognized this important distinction between determinations of
guilt and determinations of punishment and further expounded that trial judges should be granted
wide discretion in the latter area.
The era of discretionary sentencing in the federal court system would not last through the
final two decades of the century. The passage of the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)
fundamentally altered sentencing in the federal courts. Specifically, among other provisions, the
SRA provided for the creation of the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines for
6

U.S. v. Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Burns v. U.S., 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
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federal district court judges to follow in issuing sentences for those convicted of federal crimes.7
As a result, the Sentencing Commission was created as an independent agency of the judicial
branch, with its members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. Following its
creation, the Commission promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”),
which were placed into effect on November 1 1987. The Guidelines set forth relatively tight
ranges of sentences for criminal defendants based on the type of offense committed and the
offenders’ criminal history.
One primary motivation behind the SRA was to reduce disparity in federal sentencing
outcomes (Tiede 2009). In other words, the SRA sought to alleviate the problem of persons
being convicted of similar or identical crimes in similar circumstances being sentenced to
different punishments by different federal judges across the country. Whether and to what
extent the implementation of the Guidelines has achieved this goal of reduced disparity is subject
to some debate, although the weight of the evidence seems to suggest that inter-judge sentencing
disparity has indeed decreased under the Guidelines (See Waldfogel 1991; Payne 1997; Hofer,
et. al. 1999; Anderson, et. al. 1999; Tiede 2009). Regardless of the Guidelines’ effect on
sentencing disparity, it is undisputed that the Guidelines reduced trial judges’ sentencing
discretion from the pre-Guideline era (USSC 2012).
Still, despite policymakers’ initial intentions, uniform sentencing through strict
application of the Guidelines has also decreased markedly over time. The proportion of
offenders sentenced below the Guideline recommended range has more than tripled from 14.8%
in 1988 to 51.8% in 2014 (USSC 1995-2014). Crucially, this trend began well before 2005 when
the Supreme Court ruled that application of the Sentencing Guidelines was merely “advisory”
rather than mandatory (US v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, (2005)). In fact, as will be discussed at
7

18 U.S.C. §§ 351-386.

6

length throughout this dissertation, this trend of an increasing percentage of below-Guideline
sentences has continued since Booker was decided in 2005 (USSC 1995-2014). But if formal
changes in judicial policy with respect to the application of the Guidelines cannot fully explain
the above-noted trend, are there other explanations? More fundamentally, what factors
determine federal district court judicial sentencing behavior over time?
A primary objective of this research is to provide a more comprehensive explanation of
federal district court sentencing behavior than is offered by the current literature. A secondary
objective is to improve understanding of judicial behavior more generally. While the focus of
the dissertation is on sentencing policy in federal courts, it is possible that significant
determinants can be expanded to test other areas of law and/or aspects of judicial behavior.
Judicial Behavior and Sentencing Policy: A Brief Overview
General Theories of Judicial Behavior
Scholars of judicial behavior have emphasized a variety of different motivations affecting
judicial decisions. In general, these scholars can be divided into four major schools: legal,
attitudinal, strategic, and audience-based. While a comprehensive summary of each of these
models is outside the scope of this work, a brief overview is necessary to emphasize the major
positions and disagreements regarding what motivates judges and how many of these accounts
may be unable to fully explain district judge sentencing behavior.
The traditional legal model essentially states that the judge’s role is to use case-facts and
apply those facts to the law, which can be discovered through both reason and application of
precedent (Weinrib 1988). The attitudinal model proposed by Segal and Spaeth (2002) argues
that the legal model does not conform to empirical reality and that the decisions of judges,
especially Supreme Court justices, are driven almost entirely by their ideology. The strategic
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model espoused by Epstein & Knight (1997) posits that justices do not simply vote their
preference, but instead adjust their preferences based on the anticipated actions of other actors to
arrive at the ultimate position closest to their preferences. Finally, Baum (2006) argues that the
strategic and attitudinal models explain a great deal of judicial behavior, but they fail to account
for the fact that judges are not perfect utility-seeking robots and have personal audiences whom
they seek to please, such as other judges and the legal community.
While each of these models, excepting Baum’s (2006), serve as an extremely
parsimonious account of judicial behavior, they are generally tested by analyzing Supreme Court
or other appellate court decisions. The attitudinal model, for example, has been extremely
successful in predicting Supreme Court votes (Segal & Spaeth 2002). Yet given their direct
exposure to case-facts, along with their distinct hierarchy of goals, it is extremely likely that trial
judges are less motivated by ideological and strategic considerations than appellate judges (Kim
2009; Baum 1997; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995; Church, et. al. 1978). Indeed, several examinations
of federal district courts have shown the importance of a variety of other factors outside the
scope of the attitudinal/strategic models (See e.g. Zorn & Bowie 2010; Swenson 2004; Sisk, et.
al. 1998; Rowland & Carp 1996; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995; Kritzer 1978; Peltason 1971; Vines
1964; But See Sisk & Heise 2012).
For example, one such factor deemed influential on district judges is the local political
culture. As stated by two prominent scholars of district judges,
“the sociological impact of the community, in combination with an appointment process
that tends to ensure that judges are representative of the local political culture, causes us
to believe district judges are (at least somewhat) representative of their respective
communities”
Rowland & Carp (1996, 74-75).
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There is long-standing support for the notion that federal district court judges are
influenced by their communities as Peltason (1971) and Vines (1964) found that Southern
district justices following Brown v. Board did not enforce de-segregation, because of the judges’
concern over their standing in their southern, elite communities. The importance of these works
to the present dissertation is that they provide evidence that dominant appellate models of
judicial behavior, such as the attitudinal model, offer an incomplete understanding of trial judge
behavior. Baum’s (2006) audience based framework is potentially more helpful, yet he offers no
empirical test of this model, especially at lower-level courts.
Specific Research on Federal Sentencing Behavior
Moving beyond general studies of judicial behavior, there has also been a substantial
amount of research done specifically on federal district court criminal sentencing. Historically,
scholars conducting research in the pre-Guideline era of federal sentencing policy sought to
determine whether political factors, both local and national, would affect the sentences of “draftdodgers” in federal courts. Specifically, Cook (1973) and Kritzer (1978) both analyzed the
extent to which local and national opinion about the Vietnam War affected judges’ sentences for
convicted “draft dodgers.”
Cook (1973, 1977) found the local political environment (both elite local opinion and
public local opinion) influenced the sentences handed down to the “draft dodgers” by federal
judges. Kritzer (1978) conducted a similar test that sought to improve on the explanatory power
of Cook’s model. Importantly, Kritzer found variables related to the political environment (both
local and national) were the most important factors in explaining the sentencing decisions of
federal district court judges, as opposed to judge-based characteristics or case-specific facts.
Several more recent empirical efforts have been aimed at modeling judicial discretion under the
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Guidelines. Indeed, these recent empirical efforts have conducted studies directly related to the
determinants of judicial sentencing and what factors influence departure from the Guidelines
(Lynch and Omori 2014; Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Tiede 2009;
Wu and Spohn 2010; Schanzenbach & Tiller 2007).
These research efforts have identified several factors that may affect district judge
sentencing behavior. These factors include: levels of discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2012; Fischman
& Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartmann 2010); the partisan composition of district judges
in particular judicial districts (Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011); the partisan composition of
circuit judges in the appellate court of appeals above the applicable district court (Epstein, et. al.
2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Schanzenbach & Tiller 2007); and the prevalence of
mandatory minimum prosecutions within districts (Lynch and Omori 2014). Other recent
research has attempted to explain inter-district variation in sentencing, but has focused broadly
on ultimate outcomes, rather than on determinants of district judges’ behavior (Wu and Spohn
2010;Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002).
The Missing Link? Contextual Conditions
The above referenced studies generally focus on two variables: partisanship and legalpolicy change affecting district judge discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and
Schanzenbach 2011). Stated in terms of the general models of judicial behavior, these works
rely almost exclusively on strategic and attitudinal models of judicial behavior. Absent from
these studies is an explanation for how different judges might alter their sentencing behavior in
the face of changing conditions.
My argument with regards to district judge sentencing behavior is simple: context
matters. District court judges are members of local communities. They live and work within
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specific geographic areas, and the relevant conditions in these communities pertinent to crime
and punishment vary greatly both across the country and over time. As I will argue in more
detail below, many district judges also care both about their reputations in these communities
and the policy consequences of their sentencing decisions in these communities. Accordingly,
given this premise, it is unlikely that most district judges ignore pertinent conditions in their
community when making their sentencing decisions.
To add some specificity to this general argument, I posit that two types of contextual
variables potentially influence sentencing decisions: objective conditions and societal
punitiveness. Pertinent objective conditions include factors such as crime rates and incarceration
rates. Societal punitiveness involves mass and elite opinion regarding crime and punishment.
Intuitions aside, one might legitimately ask what evidence exists that suggests district judges are
influenced by these contextual variables.
As to objective conditions, high crime rates could lead judges to pursue more punitive
courses of action, as a means of incapacitating convicted criminals or deterring future criminals.
There is some support for the crime rate hypothesis as Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that
Pennsylvania judges in counties with higher crime rates tended to render more punitive
sentences. Gibson (1980) made a similar finding regarding Iowa judges. Gibson’s findings are
especially interesting, because Iowa state-judges travel across counties. Thus, Gibson finds that
the same judges sentence criminals more severely in areas with higher crime rates. While there
might be reasons to think that the Ulmer & Bradley and Gibson results would not hold for
unelected judges, their finding at least merits testing of whether the crime-rate impacts federal
sentencing.
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Additionally, high incarceration rates resulting from the Guidelines (Stith and Cabranes
1998) might both signal to district judges that the Guidelines are not desirable or simply that the
cost of implementing them is too great. There is scant past empirical work8 on the influence of
incarceration rates on judges’ sentencing behavior. However the notion that many judges care
about good public policy independent of their partisanship (Baum 1997, 2006; Posner 2010)
coupled with the facts that the skyrocketing federal incarceration rate observed since the
implementation of the Guidelines has been mitigated by district judges in recent years (US DOJ
2015; USSC 2012; USSC 1995-2014) make it intuitively plausible that incarceration rates affect
judicial application of the Guidelines.
As to societal punitiveness, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that judges care about
elite opinion of themselves. Posner (1993) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) characterize reputation in
the legal community as part of a judge’s “utility function.” Baum (2006) similarly argues many
judges care about their ratings in law reviews and their standing among their judicial peers.
Judges themselves have alluded to the influence of their peers on their behavior. As stated by
one prominent federal judge, “we are impressed with each other, and strive to enhance the level
of work of all of us.” (Weinstein 1994, 555). Thus, to the extent the legal community and other
elites have certain views regarding crime and criminal sentencing, we would expect district
judges’ sentencing decisions to be influenced by those views, in lieu of gaining a poor
reputation.
Finally, there is also evidence that public opinion affects sentencing behavior. As noted
above Kritzer (1978) and Cook (1973) both find that evidence that that lower levels of public
support for the Vietnam War were associated with lower sentences for “draft-dodgers” by federal
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Although Ulmer and Johnson (2004) do find a positive relationship between jail capacity and odds of incarceration
in Pennsylvania, which is a related, if not identical, argument
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district courts. There is additional support for public influence over sentencing decisions as
Kuklinski and Stanga (1979) find that California state courts reduced their sentences in
marijuana cases after California public opinion shifted in a liberal direction. Furthermore,
Gibson (1980) interprets his crime-rate finding regarding Iowa judges as indirect support of the
notion that public opinion influences judicial behavior, as he assumes that higher crime rates are
associated with more punitive attitudes by the public.
To be fair, there are also certainly reasons to be skeptical that unelected judges would
care deeply about public opinion. Evidence from state supreme courts suggests electoral
calculations drive the effect of public opinion on judges’ death penalty case decisions (Brace and
Boyea, 2008). However, some studies have shown the sociological impact of a community
shapes9 federal district court judge behavior (Rowland & Carp 1996; Kritzer, et. al. 1993).
Furthermore, recent research on macro-politics implies that the public’s punitive attitudes
prompted both elected and unelected policymakers to incarcerate more individuals for longer
periods (Enns 2014; Nicholson Crotty, et. al. 2009). Finally, given the specific findings of
Kritzer (1978) and Cook (1973) that public and elite opinion factors affected federal district
courts in criminal sentencing cases of draft-dodgers, the inclusion of public opinion variables to
test the hypothesis more generally is certainly worthwhile.

9

There is perhaps a more problematic issue with inferring a causal relationship between public opinion and judicial
behavior. Epstein, et. al. (2013) and Segal & Spaeth (2002) both note the difficulty of assuming that public opinion
has a direct, causal effect simply because public opinion changes correspond with changes in judicial behavior.
After all, judges are also members of the public, and they may simply be responding concomitantly to the same
stimuli affecting the public at large. However, some recent scholars using temporal methods have argued that direct
influence exists (Enns 2014; Mishler and Sheehan 1993). As I will discuss in greater detail throughout this
dissertation, the debate over whether public influence is direct or indirect is important; but in my view, this inquiry
is secondary to the more general question of whether judges concern themselves with exogenous contextual factors.
Regardless of whether the influence of public or elite opinion is direct or indirect, it is most important to understand
why the policy considerations of the public should matter to unelected judges who are, in theory, supposed to
divorce themselves form extralegal considerations.
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A Conceptual Framework of Judicial Behavior
The main contribution of this work is not necessarily to develop a novel theory but
instead to broaden understanding of trial-judge behavior and provide a more comprehensive
empirical examination of district judge sentencing behavior. Still, the present dissertation has
two general theoretical frameworks. First, I argue that district judges engaged in sentencing
decisions are actors who are influenced by a multiplicity of influences (Rowland & Carp 1996;
Kritzer 1978). These influences lead judges to have an ideal preference for each sentence he/she
gives. These ideal preferences are constrained by legal policy or other institutions, which
influence, but cannot totally shape, the final sentencing decision (Kritzer 1978).
The causal diagram of my basic argument for judicial sentencing behavior is displayed in
Figure 1 below.
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 is a modified version of Kritzer’s (1978) similar diagram of federal judges’
decisions. Like Kritzer (1978), I posit that judges’ sentencing decisions are complex and are
ultimately the result of many different influences. Figure 1 is also consistent with the theoretical
framework of Baum’s (1997, 2006) audience-based perspective, which also emphasizes the
multiplicity of influences on judges. Importantly, the model is very much a simplified
typology10, as some categories surely overlap (Reputational Factors could be considered an
aspect of Judge Characteristics). The model is categorized in this way simply, because it is a
convenient heuristic for breaking down categories of potentially relevant variables that affect
sentencing policy.

10

I also acknowledge the above model may not precisely replicate the process of how human beings make political
decisions and that such decisions often involve a more complex two-step process (See Fiske and Taylor 1991;
Conover and Feldman 1984). Instead, the model is simply intended as a simplification of how multiple influences
may influence final sentencing decisions.
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As noted above, this model should not be necessarily viewed as a marked departure from
prior understandings of district judge behavior. There seems to be scholarly consensus that no
simplistic models would explain little of district judge behavior (See Rowland & Carp 1996;
Kritzer 1978). However, this more complex framework of multiple judicial influences has not
been comprehensively tested in recent studies of district court criminal sentencing behavior (See
Epstein, at. al 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Freeborn and Hartmann, 2010).
In relation to Figure 1, these recent studies seem to assume that “Judge Characteristics”
are the only factor that influences ideal sentencing behavior, and that legal policy changes then
allow/restrict judges’ ability to transfer that ideal point into their decisions. Yet, as discussed in
greater detail above, there is both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting other contextual
factors influence sentencing behavior of trial judges (Tiede 2009; Ulmer & Bradley 2006; Kautt
2002; Gibson 1980; Kritzer 1978). Furthermore, there is evidence that the legal factors
associated with the Guidelines cannot completely constrain judicial sentencing decisions (Lynch
and Omori 2014). After all, there were still significant departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines long before the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines were not mandatory in 2005 (See
USSC 1995-2014).
It is of course true, that environment and context have not been entirely ignored in studies
of federal sentencing. Many scholars from the field of criminology have attempted to explain the
causes of district variation in sentencing outcomes and have concluded that different district
practices, especially those implemented in different U.S. attorneys’ offices, can result in
substantial variation in sentences for offenders (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010;
Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002). However, as discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, there is
still marked inter-district variation in how often judges choose to initiate departures from the
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Guidelines, independent of any differences in prosecutorial practices (USSC 1995-2014). This
suggests that exogenous factors affect district judges’ sentencing decisions, independent of any
institutional differences amongst districts and their legal practices. Moreover, these studies
focusing on regional variability in sentence-length tend to skirt theoretical question of why
judges might behave differently in different districts.11 Accordingly, there is still a deficiency in
understanding why district judges behave differently in different social and political contexts.
In summary, my general theoretical perspective, like Baum’s (2006) audience based
perspective, emphasizes complexity and sacrifices parsimony for explanatory power. This
tradeoff should not be taken lightly as parsimony is surely a valuable trait for any research
endeavor. However, the dominant parsimonious models tend to leave unexplained variance in
district judge behavior (Zorn & Bowie 2010; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995). If the inclusion of these
additional factors identified in the bottom two boxes of Figure 1 can substantially improve our
understanding of judicial behavior, this more complex model is a worthwhile endeavor.
In addition to the importance of studying multiple inputs, another theme present
throughout this work is that district judge sentencing behavior is best studied over time. Because
of low turnover in the federal judiciary, the difficulties in determining causal ordering in crosssectional work, and the substantial variation in sentencing behavior observed over time, this
project is particularly suited for longitudinal analysis. While recent empirical works assuredly
take into account trends in sentencing behavior, too often general trends are conflated with onetime changes to legal policy. In other words, these authors often assume that one time changes
legal policy have lasting effects years after their adoption, irrespective of broader trends
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartman 2010).
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See Note 8, above.
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I argue that this assumption is simply not proper. The trend in increased departures from
the Guidelines began well before Booker, or other legal policy changes, occurred (USSC 19952014). Furthermore, the trend continued after Booker and can be observed in the most recent
2014 data (USSC 1995-2014). It is simply not reasonable to assume that these trends are solely
the product of legal policy change that occurred in 2005. My expectation is that the contextual
variables identified above will help explain the more general trend and provide a better
understanding of how district judges altered their sentencing behavior over time.
A Road-Map of the Work
The present work aims to improve on the past literature by incorporating previously
untested variables and studying district court sentencing behavior at different levels of analysis.
Each chapter also employs different methods. These different approaches are useful as both a
robustness check of any potential findings as well as for explaining the potentially conditional
nature of some explanatory variables. The common themes throughout all three empirical
chapters are the importance of different social and political conditions and the change in district
judge sentencing behavior over time.
Chapter 2: The National Level
Chapter 2 is a time-series analysis of trends in national-level sentencing. The primary
contribution of Chapter 2 is to determine whether nationwide changes in: the partisanship of the
judiciary; public punitive preferences; crime rates; and incarceration rates explain trends in the
sentencing behavior of federal judges. More generally, this chapter seeks to probe different
causes of judicial behavior by comparing and analyzing multiple time series, each linked in some
way to different theories of judicial behavior.
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One might query why a theory focused on contextual influence would model the
aggregate sentencing decisions of all district judges throughout the country. One answer to this
query is that the nationwide analysis of this chapter is focused on the effect that “time” has on
sentencing decisions rather than “place”. Yet the national level time-series design allows no
room for variation among different judicial districts nor for variation among different judges.
Obviously, such a model is overly simplistic, as we know from past studies that different types of
judges in different parts of the country behave differently (Tiede 2009; Wu and Spohn 2010;
Kautt 2002; Rowland and Carp 1996). Furthermore, the nationwide data is unable to tap into
potentially relevant considerations for judges who must make sentencing decisions, such as
regional/local reputational factors.
However, there are certain distinct advantages for including a nationwide model of
sentencing decisions. First, a macro-analysis allows for potentially more parsimonious
explanations of district judges’ sentencing behavior. While the theoretical framework of the
present work generally trades parsimony for explanatory power, this chapter potentially allows
for results that carry less conditions and caveats than region-specific levels of analysis. In
addition, the nationwide analysis allows for comparisons of whether district judges respond to
national trends or localized trends. While my conception of district judges would expect
stronger local influence, the conclusion chapter will discuss how the results from Chapter 2
suggest some district judges might respond to different constituencies.
Chapter 3: The District Level
Chapter 3 employs a panel design, by examining annual Guideline Departure rates in
every federal district court from 1996-2011. Several of the same variables employed in Chapter
2 are used in Chapter 3, but they are measured at state (or when possible district) levels. The
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major contribution of Chapter 3 is that it improves on past designs related to Guideline
departures by including additional community-level variables that potentially impact district
judges’ sentencing behavior over time. As set forth above, many of these variables have been
postulated in past theoretical work, but empirical testing has been limited.
Moreover, Chapter 3 allows for the inclusion of localized/geographic concerns that were
ignored in Chapter 2. As argued above, and as noted by other scholars (Rowland and Carp 1996;
Kritzer, et. al. 1993), district judges identify with other members of both their social and
geographic communities. Thus, it would be surprising to find that judges are not sensitive to the
concerns of these communities.
Third, although one focus of the second empirical chapter is intra-district change over
time, separate “random effects” models also analyze differences between districts. Different
districts throughout the country have different crime types. Thus, judges in different districts deal
with different types of cases and offenders, so comparisons between districts should be used with
some caution. Still, certain models in Chapter 2 attempt to account for these differences and
parse out why/how certain judges in certain districts apply the Guidelines differently.
Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis of Four Districts
The final empirical chapter of the present work is a more in-depth study of sentencing
practice within four selected federal districts. The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess
whether the suggested explanatory variables from the models in Chapters 1 and 2 are supported
by a more in-depth investigation into the actual behavior of district court judges over the relevant
time period. Unlike the two previous chapters, which are primarily quantitative, this chapter
involves thick description and qualitative methods.
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In particular, Chapter 4 presents results obtained from interviews with federal district
court judges, former federal district court judges, federal public defenders, United States
attorneys, and private practice criminal defense attorneys experienced in federal sentencing.
The interviews probe sources of influence on federal district court judges’ sentencing
determinations by discussing federal sentencing with both judges themselves and with attorneys
who have experience observing, and potentially impacting, sentencing decisions.
This final interview-based empirical chapter adds significant value to the dissertation. In
addition to the previously stated goal of providing potential corroboration for the quantitative
studies, this interview-grounded chapter provides more detail and description of federal district
court judges’ sentencing decisions. This description is valuable by supplementing any facts
gleaned in the prior two quantitative chapters with relevant interpretations of how and why those
facts are influential on judges (Geertz 1973).
Yet another strength of using these qualitative interviews is they provide insight into the
process by which district court judges changed their sentencing practices throughout the policy
changes that occurred over the past two decades (See George and Bennet 2005; Tansey 2007).
As discussed previously, there is no doubt that federal sentencing has changed dramatically in
recent years. It is beneficial to understand how and why this change came about by soliciting
perspectives from persons directly responsible for and/or observing this change.
Finally, the interview chapter is also beneficial for testing competing theories of district
court behavior. Chapter 4 includes not only quotes and interpretations but also descriptive
statistics and other qualitative methods used in hypothesis-testing. Though the use of these
methods do not allow for strong causal statements, the results will still be beneficial for facial
validity testing (See MacDonald 2007). In other words, it would be difficult to maintain any
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theory of district court judge sentencing behavior (attitudinal, contextual, etc.) if strong
majorities of experienced federal sentencing actors, including judges themselves, are
resoundingly dismissive of this theory. On the other hand, strong and broad support for a given
theory by the interview subjects would further bolster that theory’s case and provide impetus for
further empirical testing.
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research
After the third empirical chapter, I conclude the dissertation with a chapter summarizing
the results. In this concluding chapter, I discuss in which ways my theoretical perspective of
contextual/sociopolitical influence has been supported, and in which ways it has shown to be
limited. I also discuss implications of this research and suggest areas for further study.
A More Complete Picture of Judicial Behavior & Federal Criminal Sentencing
Criminal sentencing is one of the most socially important activities of the federal
judiciary. The United States incarceration rate stands as a dramatic outlier to the rest of the
democratic world (Walmsley 2013). This high rate of incarceration can, at least in part, be
attributed to application of the US Sentencing Guidelines in the federal judiciary (Stith and
Cabranes 1998). This dissertation will lead to a better understanding of why and how district
judges choose to apply the Guidelines or ignore them. Understanding district judges’ use and
application of the Guidelines over time can also allow us to assess more accurately the factors
that affect judicial decision-making, regarding the socially important act of incarceration.
This dissertation will also provide additional insight into judicial behavior generally.
Using a variety of different methods and techniques, I test the extent to which district judges are
influenced by contextual factors, personal factors, and legal constraints. The relative weight
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each of these variables has on judicial decision-making is fundamentally important to
understanding the role of an unelected federal judiciary in our democracy.
Finally, the dissertation also provides a more comprehensive examination of district
judges’ sentencing decisions. While past scholarship has examined the sentencing behavior of
district judges under the Guidelines, I argue these approaches have been unduly limited in scope.
In order to improve upon past research, this dissertation expands the scope of explanatory
variables, uses multiple different methods, and accounts for longer-term trends in sentencing
policy. Thus, irrespective of results as to specific sources of influence, the broader framework of
this dissertation will improve understandings of both district judge behavior and federal criminal
sentencing.
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Figure 1: Causal Diagram of the Determinants of Federal District Court Judges
Sentencing Decisions

Legal Constraints:
-Guideline
recommended range,
mandatory/advisory
nature of Guidelines,
standard of review for
appellate court

Judge Characteristics:
-demographics, partisanship, ideology
etc.
Case Facts:
-defendant characteristics, seriousness
of the offense, etc.
Reputational Factors:
-opinion among: judicial community,
legal community, general public

Judge’s Ideal Sentence

Objective Conditions:
policy evaluation, crime rates,
incarceration rates, recidivism rates,
etc.

26

Judge’s Sentencing
Decision

CHAPTER 2:
“Not Like the Good Old Days: Judicial
Departures From the US Sentencing
Guidelines Over Time.”

Abstract:
Recent scholars in sentencing policy have identified several factors that have affected
federal district court judges’ sentencing decisions under the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
While this research has advanced our understanding of both sentencing policy and judicial
behavior, they have not fully explained the extreme change in judicial adherence to the
Guidelines since they were implemented in 1987. The present chapter posits that district judges
are attentive to both public views and the objective failures or successes of criminal justice
policy. This article employs a time-series ARIMAx model to test the potential effects of three
possible causes of judicial sentencing behavior consistent with this theoretical perspective: the
punitive attitudes of the general public, the crime rate, and the incarceration rate. Results do
not support the hypotheses that either higher crime rates or the punitive attitudes of the public
are associated with judicial sentencing behavior. However, results offer limited support for the
hypothesis that higher incarceration rates lead sentencing judges to mete out more lenient
sentences. In total, while not strongly supportive of the present hypotheses, the findings do
suggest that future research should utilize different methods and incorporate new variables to
improve upon models of the sentencing behavior of district judges.
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Introduction
An important open question in federal sentencing policy is what factors federal district
court judges consider when making sentencing decisions under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (hereafter “the Guidelines”)? To be sure, substantial research has been conducted on
federal sentencing during the Guideline era (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach,
2011; Tiede, 2009; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007; Mustard, 2001). These studies have made
important contributions and have provided evidence that district judges may be influenced by
changes in judicial policy (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011), partisan
factors (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Stidham and Carp 1988), and
the demographics of the offender (USSC 2012; Mustard, 2001) when making sentencing
decisions.
Despite these contributions, these pieces of research are limited in that they do not
incorporate many potentially influential contextual and environmental variables into their
studies. Scholars of judicial behavior have found that judges, especially at lower levels of the
judiciary, respond to multiple inputs when making decisions and are generally representative of
their communities (Sisk. et. al., 1998; Baum 1997; Rowland & Carp, 1996; Kritzer 1978). Given
these findings, pertinent sociopolitical factors such as public sentiment regarding crime, the
crime rate, and the incarceration rate could all potentially influence judicial decision-making.
Another limitation of past federal sentencing research is its tests cannot fully account for
the dramatic changes to district judge adherence to the Guidelines over time (USSC 1995-2014).
As argued more thoroughly below, district judges no longer apply the Guidelines at rates
remotely comparable to the rates when they were first implemented, and this trend cannot be
solely attributed to the effect of legal changes on judges’ discretion. Thus, regardless of the
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potential effects of the above mentioned exogenous variables, more comprehensive testing of
district judge sentencing behavior over time is warranted.
In this chapter, I first provide some background information regarding federal sentencing.
Next, I survey some past efforts at examining judicial sentencing under the Guidelines. Third, I
explain some of the broader theories of judicial behavior and how they might fit in with the
framework of district judge criminal sentencing. Fourth, I develop the argument that public
attitudes and objective conditions are potentially important, but largely untested, factors
influencing district judge sentencing behavior. Fifth, I execute the research design and provide
the empirical results. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications.
Background
As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 1, federal district court judges had a significant
amount of discretion in sentencing federal criminal offenders prior to 1987. However, beginning
on November 1, 1987 with the implementation of the Guidelines, district judges were forced to
calculate a recommended sentence for each offender. Guideline recommended sentences are
primarily based on two variables: 1) the seriousness of the offense (as quantitatively defined by
the Sentencing Commission); and 2) the criminal history of the offender (passed upon a “points
system”). Table 1, below, is an example of the Guidelines sentencing matrix from 2012.
[Table 1 about here]
As can be seen in Table 1, the vertical axis of the matrix ascribes each federal offense
with a “level,” and the horizontal axis of the matrix depends on how many “criminal history
points” the offender has. As can also be gleaned from Table 1, application of the matrix results
in relatively tight ranges of sentences, measured in units of monthly imprisonment (e.g. 21-27
months). Although there are procedures within the Guidelines framework that allow for
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adjustments to sentences in a limited number of circumstances, most sentences are calculated
using solely these two deterministic quantitative variables. In fact, federal probation officers,
rather than district judges, are responsible for calculating the Guideline sentence for each
offender. (Stith and Cabranes 1998). Given the fact district judges enjoyed relatively uninhibited
judicial discretion in sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ adoption, an important question to ask is
how district judges responded to this dramatic change?
The raw data presents a somewhat complex and era-dependent answer to this question.
When the Guidelines first took effect in fiscal year12 (hereafter “FY”) 1988, the percentage of
sentences within the proscribed Guideline range was 82.3% (USSC 1995-2014). By FY 2014,
the percentage of within-Guideline sentences was only 46%, and the vast majority of these
deviant sentences outside the Guideline range (95.9%) were below, rather than above, the
Guideline recommended range (USCC 1995-2014). In other words, the Guidelines are not
applied nearly as strictly as they used to be.
A well-studied explanation for this dramatic trend relates to changes in legal rules/policy
pertinent to the Guidelines. Two such changes of import were portions of the 2003 PROTECT
Act13 enacted by Congress and the 2005 Supreme Court case of US. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005) (“Booker”). These two policy changes had opposing effects. The PROTECT Act
constrained district judges’ ability to depart from the Guidelines by allowing appellate courts to
review sentencing decisions without deference to the original decision of the sentencing district
judge. On the other hand, Booker augmented judicial discretion by holding that the Guideline
ranges must be merely “advisory,” rather than mandatory. The Supreme Court further clarified
12

The Federal Fiscal year runs from October 1 of the prior year to September 30 of the corresponding calendar year.
Thus, for example, FY 2014 includes all cases from October 1, 2013-September 30, 2014.
13

Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 650
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in Booker that district court judges could legally “depart” from the Guidelines’ recommended
range so long as the departure was “reasonable.” However, as will be evidenced in more detail
below, neither the PROTECT ACT nor Booker tell the complete story of Guideline adherence.
Figure 1, below, provides graphical representation of the annual percentage of offenders
receiving below-Guideline sentences since 1988.
[Figure 1 about here]
As can be seen from Figure 1, the trend in increased below-Guideline sentence-ranges
began well before the PROTECT Act was passed 200314, and said trend has continued after
Booker was decided through FY 2014 (USCC 1995-2014). Thus, it does not appear as if these
policy changes are solely responsible for the increasing trend of below-Guideline sentences.
To be sure, part of the explanation for the clear trend can be attributed to factors outside
the purview of judges. The Sentencing Commission has noted that increased government
recommendations for below-guideline sentences helps explain the increased departure rate
(USSC 2012). However, the Sentencing Commission has also acknowledged these extra-judicial
factors do not tell the whole story and have noted that non-government sponsored downward
departures have increased in recent years (USSC 2012). Furthermore, rates of below-Guideline
sentences have increased across all major offenses, including the three most common nonimmigration federal offenses: drug trafficking, unlawful firearms possession/use, and fraud
(USSC 1995-2014). Thus, there remain unanswered questions about why district judges are
increasingly less apt to apply Guideline-recommended sentences to offenders. The fundamental
question of this chapter is what other factors might be responsible for this trend?

14

Although this trend did stall and reverse course after the passage of the PROTECT ACT in 2003.
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Past Federal Judge Sentencing Research
Social science research on how federal judges sentence criminals began at least forty
years ago. Cook (1973, 1977) and Kritzer (1978) both sought to examine what factors
influenced federal judges sentencing “draft dodgers” of the Vietnam War. One key finding from
both scholars was that the local political environment influenced the sentences handed down to
the draft dodgers by federal judges (Cook 1973, 1977; Kritzer 1978). In other words, district
judges did not appear to be making their decisions independently of the local and elite sentiment
in the community towards the Vietnam War, which changed drastically over the course of the
1960’s. Of particular importance, Kritzer found that the political environment factors were most
important in explaining the sentencing decisions of district judges, when compared to
characteristics of judges or case-specific facts.
Building upon the findings of Cook (1973, 1977) and Kritzer (1978), Silver and Shapiro
(1984) conducted a more thorough test of the “representational model” of judicial behavior,
which posits that judges’ behavior reflects public sentiment. Applying this model to the district
judges’ role in sentencing, Silver and Shapiro found that federal judges were less likely to
sentence criminals to probation, as popular sentiment for harsher penalties rose. Silver and
Shapiro similarly found that increasing levels of public support for marijuana decriminalization
and legalization were correlated with shorter sentences. However, Silver and Shapiro also found
that judges were actually more likely to imprison offenders as opposed to probation, even as
public support for legalization increased. Ultimately, Silver and Shapiro interpreted their mixed
results as grounds for reappraising the representational model and posited that factors such as
crime rates, incarceration rates, and issue salience should be included in examining the public
opinion/sentencing connection.
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Despite the future research avenues laid out by Silver and Shapiro (1984), little recent
federal sentencing scholarship has subjected the representational model to further testing.15
Instead, the recent scholarship on district judge behavior under the Guidelines has primarily
focused on whether judges’ partisan preferences or changes in judicial-discretion policy (e.g.
pre- or post-Booker) have affected district judge’s adherence to the Guidelines. Specifically,
Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) find that the 2003 PROTECT Act provisions which allowed
appellate courts to review district court judge departures from the Guidelines without giving any
deference to the district court judge, increased district court adherence to the Guidelines.
Fischman and Schanzenbach also find that the Booker decision, which invalidated this portion of
the PROTECT Act and further rendered the Guidelines “advisory,” resulted in decreased district
judge adherence to the Guidelines. Similarly, in a recent study, Epstein, et. al. (2013) found that
the rate of departures from the Guidelines has increased substantially in the post-Booker era.
Both Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) also detected strategic and
partisan influences on sentencing behavior. In particular, both found that higher proportions of
Republican circuit judges on the Court of Appeals sitting above the sentencing district court were
associated with lower probabilities of Guideline departures by district judges.
This finding perhaps suggests that district judges are somewhat strategic when making
sentencing decision and consider the odds their sentence will be overturned on appeal when
making sentencing decisions. On the other hand, the finding could simply be reflective of the
15

To be fair, one likely reason that recent research on judicial sentencing has not tested the “representational model”
as thoroughly as older studies is simply that the representational model has not held up very well when subjected to
empirical testing in other contexts. In their study of Supreme Court justice behavior, Segal and Spaeth (2002), find
virtually no support for the notion that popular opinion influences justice decision-making. Even scholars
propounding the notion that public opinion is relevant to Supreme Court decision-making are extremely cautious
and conditional regarding their conclusions (Mishler and Sheehan 1993). On the other hand, other scholars find a
strong connection between public influence and trial judge behavior (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979; Gibson 1980).
Moreover, some recent research has promisingly examined the effect of public attitudes on sentencing policy in
particular, and found evidence that sentencing outcomes (certainly not solely attributable to judges) are responsive
to the public’s punitive attitudes (Enns, 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al., 2009)
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ideological composition of circuits and district courts. Past research finds a relationship between
the liberalness of circuit judges and the liberalness of their home-state Senators (Songer 1982).
In addition, there is evidence that, unlike district judges, circuit judges retire strategically by
waiting for a President to be elected who more closely resembles their ideological perspective so
that a similar policy-minded jurist will replace them (Spriggs & Wahlbeck 1995). This research
suggests that perhaps the observed relationship between circuit judge ideology/partisanship and
district judge departure rates (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011) is actually
the result of relatively liberal areas of the country preferring less punitive policies. This
interpretation is more aligned with the representational model of judicial behavior, as discussed
above, as opposed to any sort of strategic behavior by district judges seeking to avoid reversal on
appeal.
Aside from attitudinal effects, other researches have emphasized demographics of
offenders as a key component to understanding why/how judges arrive at their sentences
(Mustard 2001; USSC 2010). In a study of over 70,000 offenders since the implementation of
the Guidelines, Mustard (2001) finds that African-Americans, males, and offenders with lower
socio-economic status are generally sentenced more severely under the Guidelines. The
Sentencing Commission has reached similar conclusions based on analyses of the average and
median sentences for all demographic groups (USSC 2010). Several analyses have also
addressed the degree to which increases in judicial discretion post-Booker exacerbated or
mitigated racial biases in sentencing. While the Sentencing Commission finds that the increased
discretion given to district judges has resulted in increased biases and undue sentencing disparity
(USSC 2012), several studies have questioned this finding and argue that increased unwarranted
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disparities post-Booker are mostly due to prosecutorial behavior (Lynch & Omori 2014; Rehavi
& Starr 2012).
Reviving the Past: The Representational Model applied to the Post-Guideline Sentencing
Era.
The literature discussed above has advanced our understanding of how offender
demographics, legal policies, and partisanship affect district judges’ sentencing behavior in the
post-Guideline era. However, most of this recent scholarship tests relatively narrow questions,
and with the exception of studies on the effect of judges’ partisanship, little attention is paid to
larger theories about how district judges arrive at their sentencing decisions. Furthermore, none
of these studies seem to offer nuanced explanations for why below-Guideline sentences
continually increased after the Booker decision.
Perhaps the lack of attention to alternative influences on district judge decisions is a
byproduct of the success of more parsimonious theories of appellate judicial behavior.16 The
most prominent of these theories are likely the attitudinal theory holding that justices/judges are
motivated by their personal ideology (Segal and Spaeth 2002), and the strategic theory holding
that justices don’t purely follow preferences but adjust their decisions based on the actions or
likely actions of other actors to arrive at the optimal outcome (Epstein & Knight 1998). Both of
these theories are incorporated into recent studies on district judge sentencing, at least to the
extent judges’ partisanship (as deduced by the party of the President appointing them) is
reflective of their ideology (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). 17

16

See Chapter 1 for a more comprehensive explanation of trial judge/appellate judge differences.
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Needless to say this assumption may not hold, and some scholars of judicial behavior prefer “common space
score” measures of judicial ideology, which incorporates measures of ideology from both the appointing presidents
and the judges’ home-state senators as an alternative to simple partisanship (See Giles, et. al. 2001).
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Yet there is some evidence that the attitudinal and strategic models do not have the same
explanatory value when applied to district judges. Rowland and Carp (1996), perhaps the
leading authorities on federal district court judges, argue these judges are often influenced by a
multiplicity of influences that do not fit squarely within parsimonious attitudinal models.
Similarly, Kritzer (1978) posits that several factors, including judge characteristics, case facts,
and legal constraints, affect how district court judges make decisions.18 Baum (2006) claims that
judges of all kinds take into account their audiences when making decisions and that the
attitudinal and strategic models portrait of judges as “single-minded utility seekers” is overly
simplistic.
In addition, several scholars have noted that district court judges’ are generally
representative of their communities (Rowland and Carp 1996; Kritzer & Zemans 1993; Peltason
1971; Vines 1964). It is an open question whether this representative nature of district judges
applies to Guideline-era criminal sentencing, and if so, whether the relationship is causal or
simply the result of judges being members of these communities (See Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973,
1977). However, some recent evidence suggests there is a causal relationship between public
attitudes on crime and punishment and criminal justice policy outputs (Nicholson-Crotty, et. al.
2009; Enns 2014).
Finally, in addition to any representational factors, certain judicial behavior scholars
maintain that some judges care about making the “right” decision and making “good public
policy,” independent of partisanship or ideology (Baum 1997; Posner 1993). In relation to
criminal justice policy, district judges’ conception of “good public policy” could potentially be
influenced by sociopolitical conditions such as crime rates and incarceration rates. Scholars of
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See Chapter 1, Figure 1 for a diagram of my own theoretical perspective on district judge decision-making, which
is similar in many respects to Kritzer (1978).
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state judges have indeed found that higher crime rates are correlated with judges meting out
harsher sentences (Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980). There is also some evidence,
however, that the crime rate bears little impact on district judges.19 It is perhaps possible that
district judges are not as sensitive to crime-rate concerns because of the lack of an electoral
connection. Elected state court judges may simply be issuing harsher sentences in higher crime
areas in order to increase their electoral prospects with a public who desire tough-on-crime
judges (Gibson 1980). Yet as discussed above, most scholarship on district judge behavior finds
them susceptible to community influences, despite the lack of any electoral connection (Rowland
and Carp 1996, Kritzer & Zemans 1993; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964). Thus, it is worth further
examining the relationship between crime rates and district judges’ sentencing.
Incarceration rates also represent a plausible contextual factor district judges might
consider in their sentencing decisions. While there is little research on the effect incarceration
rates have on judges’ sentencing habits, exploding incarceration within the federal system is a
potential explanation for the trend observed in Figure 1. The logic of this theory is based upon
the initial premise that district judges’ preferences can change in the face of changing contexts.
As more and more people were incarcerated in the post-Guideline era, especially for non-violent
drug offenses, district judges may have viewed Guideline sentences as too punitive. As a result,
I argue district judges began sentencing offenders to shorter sentences.
In summary, I aim to build upon recent studies on district judge sentencing practices
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011) by reviving tests of the representational
model of judicial behavior examined by researchers in the 1970s and 1980s (Silver and Shapiro
1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973). In addition, I choose to assess the impact relevant objective
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See Johnson, et. al. (2008) for a null finding of crime rate influence on district judges. The findings of Johnson,
et. al. (2008) regarding the crime rate are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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conditions, such crime rates and incarceration rates, might also have on district judges’
sentencing decisions. It is quite plausible that an examination of these previously untested
variables might explain the drastic change in district judge sentencing behavior that is depicted in
Figure 1.
Research Design
Hypotheses
Consistent with my theory of contextual influences20 I posit three testable hypotheses.
First, the “representational hypothesis” is: there will be a positive relationship between the
public’s punitive preferences and district judges’ punitiveness in sentencing. Second, the “crime
rate hypothesis” is: there will be a positive relationship between the crime rate and district
judges’ punitiveness in sentencing. Finally, the “incarceration rate hypothesis” is: there will be a
negative relationship between the incarceration rate and district judges’ punitiveness in
sentencing.
Dependent Variable
District Judge Punitiveness

To measure the primary dependent variable of interest, district judge sentencing behavior,
I use the proportions of offenders receiving two different types of below-Guideline sentences,
also known as “departures,” in fiscal years 1988 to 2013.21 The first measure is the proportion of
all offenders who receive any below-Guideline sentences (“Total Downward Departures”). The
second measure is the same proportion, except that all offenders who receive below-Guideline
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For a more thorough discussion of the theoretical justification for these hypotheses, please see above and Chapter

1.
21

Although data from Fiscal Year 2014 is available, this year was excluded from this analysis due to lack of data
availability for certain exogenous covariates.
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sentences based upon providing “substantial assistance” to the government are excluded from the
proportion (“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”).
The purpose of using two different departures measures is that some departures from the
Guidelines are actually recommended and/or agreed to by the government or prosecution as part
of a plea bargain. The majority22 of these government-sponsored departure cases throughout the
series are these “substantial assistance” departures wherein the government makes a motion that
the offender has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed a crime (See Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statement 5K1.1).
Essentially, these substantial assistance cases are cases where Guideline departures are
recommended by the government because the offender provides law enforcement with
information that allows them to resolve more serious cases. This distinction between total
departures and substantial assistance departures sponsored by the government is possibly
relevant, as there is some question as to whether Guideline departures recommended by the
government should be included in an analysis of “judicial behavior.”
On balance, I argue the Total Downward Departure measure is probably a more valid
measure of district judge punitiveness. Even if recommended by the government, district judges
still must approve below-Guideline sentences and are free to ignore the government’s
recommendation. Additionally, there is negative correlation between substantial assistance
departure rates and non-substantial departure rates among different districts (Weinstein 1998;
USSC 1995-2014), which suggests that district judges are not beholden to the government’s
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Some government sponsored departures are not “substantial assistance” downward departures and include
government-sponsored departure for other reasons. Unfortunately the Sentencing Commission did not begin coding
all other “government sponsored departures” until 2003. Thus, the data does not allow for examination of only nongovernment sponsored departures for the full series. Still, given the “substantial assistance” departures are, by far,
the most common government-sponsored departure, the measure of departures that excludes these cases should
provide a fairly strong proxy for all non-government sponsored departures.
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recommendations. Moreover, other recent studies of district judge sentencing examine total
departure rates, rather than any subset of departures (See e.g. Epstein, et. al. 2013). All of this
evidence suggests that the Total Downward Departure measure is preferable. However, as a
robustness check, and to ensure substantial assistance cases are not driving results, I also include
the secondary measure of Judge-Initiated Downward Departures.
Setting aside the two alternative measures of departures, one might also question why the
use of downward departure rates in general is an appropriate proxy for district judge
punitiveness.23 The justification for using downward departure rates, as opposed to measures
such as median length of sentence, is that laws, prosecutorial practices, and the Guidelines
themselves change over time (USSC 2012). There also are changes to the types of cases
prosecuted over time, as is evidenced by the increasing proportion of immigration offenders in
recent years (USSC 1995-2014). Thus measuring Guideline downward departure rates more
appropriately24 isolates the behavior of district judges than measuring mean or median sentence
length.
In spite of the foregoing, two points merit discussion regarding the downward departure
measures of judicial sentencing behavior. First, the measures do not include “upward
departures” or occasions when the sentencing judge sentences the offender to a penalty that is
more harsh that the penalty recommended by the Guidelines. The reasons for excluding upward
departures from the analysis are both that upward departures are rare (an average of 1.6% of
cases from FY 1988-2014) and they do not appear to exhibit coherent trends over time.
Conversely, downward departures are fairly common (an average of 32.2% of all cases in from
23

Note also that lower values of the departure measure imply more punitive behavior by district judges.
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Notably this measure of Guideline downward departures follows past research studying judicial sentencing
behavior (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartmann 2010; Schanzenbach &
Tiller, 2007).
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FY 1988-2014) and exhibit relatively strong stability from one year to the next, with clear trends
over the course of the series.
The second point regarding the downward departure measures is that they are not the
only potential measures for whether district judges are treating criminals harshly. In addition to
rates of Guideline departure, one alternative measure is the average Guideline minimum
imprisonment sentence for all offenses in a given year compared to the average imprisonment
sentence actually imposed in a given year (USSC 2012). The logic of this “average difference”
measure is that if average sentences become relatively shorter/longer than average guideline
minimums over time, then we have some evidence that judges are shifting to a less/more punitive
direction.

This alternative measure has the advantage of incorporating sentence length into the

analysis and controlling for above-mentioned problems with average/median sentence length
measures, such as changes to the Guidelines over time.
Despite these advantages, the “average difference” measure also has two key
disadvantages. First, the average difference measure is susceptible to outliers. A few judges’
decisions to give offenders the maximum Guideline-range, or above maximum Guideline-range
sentence could greatly affect average difference. Overall departure rates present a more accurate
overall picture of how punitive district judges’ preferences are in a given year.
Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission only has data on this measure beginning in
1996, rather than 1988, which eliminates nearly 30% of the observations. For these reasons, I
opt for the downward departure measures. Still, the average difference measure may be
appropriate in some contexts, and future tests and research should investigate whether this
measure produces different results from the departure rate measure used in this design.
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Input Variables
Policy Change

Variables related to the two major policy changes in Guideline application that occurred
will be incorporated through adjusted dummy variables. A “1” is coded for each fiscal year that
the PROTECT Act was fully in effect, which limited judicial discretion, with a corresponding
“0” for fiscal years when the PROTECT Act was not in effect. Similarly a “1” is coded for each
year after US v. Booker was decided, which expanded judicial discretion, and a “0” coded for
years prior to the decision. As neither Booker nor the PROTECT Act were placed into, or taken
out of, effect at the exact beginning or end of fiscal years, I calculate the proportion of cases in
the year the policy was in effect for those fiscal years.25 For example, since U.S. v. Booker was
in effect for approximately 76% of all cases with departure data in FY 2005, I code FY 2005 as a
“0.76” for Booker.
Public Sentiment Regarding Crime

A new measure for public punitiveness has recently been developed by Enns (2014). The
measure incorporates responses to 33 survey questions related to treatment of criminals and
seeks to capture the general level of public punitiveness over time.26 For the years of 1988-2010,
I simply use the gross measure utilized by Enns (2014). However, since the Enns (2014)
measure is only constructed through 2010, I employ an estimated measure for public
punitiveness, updated for the years of 2011 and 2012. Specifically, I utilize more recent data
from survey questions to construct estimates of the same public punitiveness measure for the
years of 2011 and 2012. To construct these estimates, I use survey questions that: 1) Enns
25

As the Sentencing Commission does not have separate information for before and after the PROTECT Act was
placed into effect, I instead use the proportion of the number of days that the PROTECT Act was in effect out of the
entire fiscal year. This measure assumes that there is an even distribution of cases throughout the Fiscal Year.
26

For a more detailed discussion of how the measure is constructed, see Enns (2014).
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himself incorporated into his measure in earlier years; 2) exhibit a strong correlation with Enns’
aggregated measure of public punitiveness (.75 or higher); and, 3) and have available response
data for the years of 2011 and 2012.27 Assuming that the strong correlations between the
particular survey questions and the gross measure of public punitiveness hold for recent years,
this procedure should produce valid estimates of Enns (2014) public punitiveness measure for
the updated years of 2011 and 2012.28
Federal Incarceration Rate

As discussed above, it is also plausible that district judges tend to depart from the
Guidelines more often when the incarceration rate is high. The logic here is that judges are
directly observing the deleterious effects of placing more federal offenders into prison, so they
adjust their sentencing behavior to mitigate this problem. Since this reasoning relates to judges’
direct impact and exposure to the problem and consequences of over-incarceration, the federal
incarceration rate is a preferable measure to the overall incarceration rate.29

The federal

incarceration rate from 1988-2012, is taken from the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice
Statistics (U.S. DOJ 2015).

27

Specifically, three survey questions from Gallup and the General Social Survey (GSS) meet the above criteria for
2011 and 2012. Two of these questions concerning support for the death penalty and one question concerns
whether the courts treat criminals too harsh or not harsh enough. To compute the measure, I take any percentage
change in the ratio of punitive responses from the older survey questions, used in Enns (2014) measure, to the newer
survey questions, and then incorporate that change into my 2011 and 2012 estimates for public punitiveness. I then
repeat this procedure for every question with available data that meets the above criteria.
28

In fact, the resultant procedure yields a 2.7% decrease in the overall public punitiveness measure from 2010 to
2011, which is consistent with the recent trend, and no change in the public punitiveness measure from 2011 to
2012.
29

Despite the strengths of the federal measure, to the extent federal judges are able to internalize the incarceration
problem that exists in the community beyond the federal system, it is possible that overall incarcerations also have
some effect on their decisions.
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Crime Rate

As to changing objective conditions, the crime rate measure is taken using annual data
published by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports from 1988-2012 for the country. Notably, this
measure assumes that district judges are able to recognize and internalize changes to the crime
rate. Due to district judges’ pervasive, if indirect, exposure to crime through their role as
criminal case adjudicators, I argue this is a reasonable assumption.
One potential issue with the crime rate measure is the fact that huge variation exists in
crime rate trends across different parts of the country. Since district judges are assigned to a
specific geographic area, it is possible that they are sensitive to the local crime rate but not the
national crime rate. Despite this possibility, due to the fact that all other variables are measured
at the national level, this design30 assumes that the annual crime-rates measure will average out
any diverging and regional trends.
Another issue regarding the crime rate, incarceration rate, and public punitiveness
measures merits brief discussion. For all three variables, annual data is compiled in calendar
years as opposed to fiscal years. The federal government’s fiscal year operates from October 1September 30, and as such, the Sentencing Commission publishes its annual data and reports
based upon sentences issued during this time period. This mismatch in annual data creates a
potential difficulty when making causal inference in time-series analysis (Skog 2003).
In the present models, I chose to correspond the fiscal-year variables with the previous
calendar year variables. Although this decision creates only a three month overlap for
corresponding variables, as opposed to a nine month overlap, it is preferable for two reasons.
First, it prevents the inclusion of elements of input variables that occur after district judges issue

30

For a test of whether state/local crime rates impacts district judges’ sentencing decisions, see Chapters 3-4.
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sentences. Obviously, it makes no theoretical sense that the independent variables of crime,
incarceration, or public opinion could be affecting district judges, if the trends in these
independent variables have not yet occurred when sentencing decisions are made.
This first reason for this decision is closely related to the second reason. Namely, the
logic of this theory is that as district judges begin to become sensitive to the public sentiment or
pertinent objective conditions surrounding them, they alter their individual sentencing decisions.
It is implausible that this reaction would occur immediately with no lag time. Accordingly,
corresponding the preceding calendar year for these input variables with the remaining variables
is the better option than corresponding the same fiscal and calendar years.
Partisanship of District Judges

Although my theoretical perspective de-emphasizes ideology and party, sentencing
preferences are potentially related to partisanship of the judges (Fischman & Schanzenbach
2011). If this is the case, we would expect the proportion of district judges appointed by
Democratic presidents to correspond with downward Guideline departures. To measure this
series, I calculate the proportion of active federal district judges appointed by a Democratic
President for each year from 1988-2013. In order to account for judges appointed/retiring within
the year in question, I calculate this proportion at the halfway-point through each fiscal year
(April 1). Note this measure assumes both that there are roughly equal sentencing decisions
made in each half of the fiscal year and that there are no partisan differences in whether judges
retire in the first or second half of the fiscal year.31

31

The sentencing data (USCC 1995-2014) , in addition to past research evidencing that district judges do not retire
strategically (Yoon 2006), suggest these are both reasonable assumptions.
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Partisanship of Circuit Judges

There is also the possibility that district judges make sentencing decisions strategically
and avoid deviating from the Guidelines when it is likely they will be overturned on appeal.
Both Epstein, et. al. (2013) and Fischman & Schanzenbach (2011) find that the proportion of
Democrat-appointees sitting on the court of appeals circuit with appellate jurisdiction over the
sentencing district judge was positively associated with downward departure rates. As discussed
above, this finding may be evidence of strategic behavior of district judges who do not want their
sentences to be overturned or it may simply be reflective of the observed relationship between
circuit court ideology and region.
To provide insight into these alternative theories, I also include a partisan variable for
circuit court judges who do not make initial sentencing decisions. This variable is measured
simply as the proportion of circuit judges appointed by a Democratic President in each fiscal
year from 1988-2013, as of April 1.32 If strategic behavior is truly the driving factor behind the
circuit partisanship/departure rate relationship, we should expect to find that changes to the
aggregate partisan proportion of appellate judges affects aggregate district judge sentencing
behavior over time.
Methods
To test determinants of Guideline departures over time, I employ an autoregressive
integrated moving average with exogenous variables (ARIMAx) model.33 An ARIMAx model is
similar to the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average Model (ARIMA) of Box and Jenkins
(1970), except that it allows for the inclusion of additional exogenous covariates based upon
32

As with the annual measure of the partisanship of the district courts, above, this proportion is calculated on April
1 of each year, because it is the halfway point of the federal fiscal year.
33

Also sometimes referred to as “dynamic regression” Pankratz (2012).
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cross-correlations between these covariates and the response series. (Andrews, et. al. 2013; Lee,
et. al. 2013).
There are several factors that make an ARIMAx dynamic regression model appropriate in
this case. First, a simple multiple linear regression model of judicial departure rates from the
Guidelines, with the above-referenced independent variables included, results in positively
correlated residuals, which violates assumptions of the linear regression model.34 An ARIMAx
model is similar to a multiple linear regression model, except that it includes one or more
autoregressive (AR) terms or moving average (MA) terms. Inclusion of these terms can be used
to ensure that the correlated residuals of a time series model can be translated into white noise.
Secondly, the Guideline departure rate series exhibits substantial variation over time (See
Figure 1) with many different plausible exogenous input variables explaining this trend (See
above). These are the type of situations when ARIMAx models can potentially be utilized
(Grillezoni 1993). Furthermore, ARIMAx models allow for both lagged and decaying effects of
covariates (Feng, et. al. 2013; Lee, et. al. 2013; Clavijo 1994). As we would not expect any
effects of the input variables to be either immediate or permanent on district judges, this
inclusion of lagged and decaying effects is also appropriate. Finally, due to the limited number
of observations in the time series, a more complex model, such as a vector auto regressive
(VAR) model, which uses multiple equations to estimate the effect of separate series at various
lags, is inappropriate (Rautava 2004).
Modeling with ARMA parameters requires that the modeled series be stationary, with a
constant mean and variance over time (Copertwait & Metcalfe 2009). However, as can be
34

More specifically, a simple linear regression model of total departure rates, with all of the above noted variables
included, results in a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.55., suggesting strong, positive serial correlation in the residuals.
Accordingly, a simple linear model of departure rates does not comport with the assumption of linear regression of
independently distributed residuals.
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clearly seen from Figure 1, the Guideline departure rate series is not stationary, as it exhibits
substantial drift upwards over time. Indeed, it is this drift that the present model seeks to
explain. To address this issue, the departure rate series is differenced so that the series reflects
annual changes in departure rates rather than annual levels of departure rates. The first
differencing technique of the departure rate successfully creates a stationary time-series, which
allows for ARIMA modeling. As is advisable for ARIMAx model-building, the input variables
are also differenced using the same method as was used on the dependent variable (Andrews, et.
al., 2013). Thus, the model represents the effects of changes in the input variables on changes in
judicial departure rates at various lags.
One disadvantage of the ARIMAx models is that, because the value of the dependent
variable is dependent on prior values of the dependent variable, the coefficients of the input
variables cannot be interpreted intuitively as a one unit change in the input variable producing a
one-unit change in the dependent variable (Enders 2008). However, as these models are
exploratory, seeking to test the effect of previously untested variables on judicial behavior, the
significance tests themselves are worthwhile endeavors.
Results
Recall that two different series are used as a measure of district judge punitiveness: Total
Departures and Judge-Initiated Downward Departures. Results from two different ARIMAx
model specifications for the Total Downward Departures series are first presented in Table 2
below. The first column of Table 2 includes a model specification with only the policy
change/partisanship of the judiciary input variables included. The second column of the model
represents the full specification, which adds the hypothesized variables: annual change in the
incarceration rate, the annual change in the crime rate, and the annual change in the Enns (2014)
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measure of public punitiveness. Both models represent the best fitting ARIMA model order, or
the one with the lowest AIC (Akaikie Information Criteria).35
Before examining the effect of the input variables, note that the differenced series
modeled in Table 2 include two significant moving average parameters, which are required to
make the residuals of the series white noise. After these parameters are included, the auto
correlation function plots for the models produce no significant autocorrelation at any lags for
the selected series, and each of the Ljung-Box Tests resulted in a failure to reject the null
hypothesis of independently distributed residuals.36 Thus, the observed serial correlation in the
residuals of the simple linear regression model is no longer present.
[Table 2 about here]
Turning to the effect of the input series on below-Guideline sentences, there is some
evidence for the hypothesis that increased levels of federal incarceration are associated with
higher rates of downward departures. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the
incarceration rate in the second column of Table 2 suggests that increase in the incarceration rate
leads to increases in downward departures from the Guidelines.
Despite the evidence supporting the effect of incarceration rates, results do not support
the hypotheses that either the crime rate or public punitiveness are negatively associated with
rates of below-Guideline sentences. As can be seen from Table 2, the negative coefficient for the
crime rate variable is in the expected direction but fails to obtain statistical significance.
Additionally, contrary to expectations, the coefficient for public punitiveness is positive.

35

See Bozdogan (1987) for a full discussion of AIC and how it works well as a test of model strength in ARIMA
models.
36

The p values for the Ljung Box Test are: 0.80, 0.34 for the two models respectively. Thus, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of independently distributed residuals.
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Not surprisingly, we do observe negative, significant coefficients for the legal policy
change of the enactment of the PROTECT Act. This finding is consistent with past research
regarding district judge adherence to the Guidelines and suggests that the PROTECT Act
constrained district judges’ ability to depart from the Guidelines, (Tiede 2009, Fischman &
Schanzenbach, 2011). On the other hand, neither model finds that Booker significantly increased
proportions of below-Guideline sentences, which is contrary to expectations (See Epstein, et. al.,
2013).
The results in Table 2 are also somewhat mixed as to the effect the partisanship of the
judiciary has on downward departure rates. While the more parsimonious model has a
significant positive coefficient for the proportion of Democratic-appointees on the district court,
this statistical significance disappears in the full model. Neither model finds a significant
relationship between Democratic-appointees on the circuit court and departure rates.
In comparing the two models, the inclusion of the newly added input variables does
nominally improve the strength of the model. The AIC in the second column is lower than the
AIC in first column, which suggests that the additional parameters add explanatory power to
predicting changes in departure rates. The AIC measure of model strength is parameter
efficient, so even after being “penalized” for including the additional variables, the model
improves (Bozdogan 1987).
Table 3 represents a similar set of models, but this time the dependent variable excludes
downward departures based on “substantial assistance” to the government. Recall that this series
excludes certain downward departures from the Guidelines, wherein the prosecution
recommends and sponsors a below-Guideline sentence due to the offender providing information
to the government related to other criminals. Thus, in contrast to Table 2, Table 3 does not
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represent the full gamut of judicial guideline application but instead excludes a sizable minority
of cases wherein the government recommends a reduced sentence to the judge based on the
offender’s substantial assistance.
As with the models of in Table 2, both ARIMAx models in Table 3 of Judge-Initiated
Downward Departures are free of autocorrelation. The autocorrelation function plots of the
models’ residuals show no significant lags and results of the Ljung-Box tests provide no
evidence of correlated residuals.37
[Table 3 about here]
The two models of Judge-Initiated Downward Departures presented in Table 3 produce
similar results to those observed in Table 2. As with the Total Departure Model presented in
Table 2, the positive and significant coefficient for the incarceration rate suggests that higher
levels of incarceration are associated with district judges issuing more below-Guideline
sentences. The other two input variables of interest (public punitiveness and the crime rate),
however, fail to reach statistical significance.
One difference between the models of the Total Downward Departure series presented in
Table 2 and the Judge-Initiated Downward Departure series in Table 3 is that the Booker
coefficient is positive and significant in Table 3. This is consistent with past research suggesting
that judges increased their proportion of below-Guideline sentences in response to the increased
discretion they received after Booker (Epstein, et. al. 2013).
Discussion
The results of the models presented above provide some support for the incarceration rate
hypothesis suggesting increased incarceration is associated with more lenient district judge
37

The p values for the Ljung Box Test are: 0.77 and 0.89 for the two models respectively. Thus, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis of independently distributed residuals.
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sentencing. The incarceration rate variable reaches statistical significance in both the Total
Downward Departure model in Table 2 and the Judge-Initiated Downward Departure model in
Table 3. Thus, there is some preliminary evidence that increased federal incarceration has
softened the sentencing behavior of district court judges over time.
However, when viewed overall, the results are certainly not strongly supportive of the
theoretical perspective of contextual influence. Specifically, results did not support the
hypotheses that either the crime rate or public punitiveness are positively associated with
punitive judicial behavior. Overall, there is little to no support for the “representational model”
of judicial behavior suggesting that judges’ decisions are representative of the people (Silver and
Shapiro 1984; Gibson 1980; Vines 1960).
While it is quite possible that the expected variables simply do not influence judicial
behavior as theorized, it should be noted that there are other potential explanations for the failure
of the above tests to provide strong results. First, the limited number of observations in the
series makes the results susceptible to data from a single variable in a single year. This problem
is exacerbated by the policy changes that occurred in the early 2000’s (the PROTECT Act and
Booker) that impacted departure rates. To address the small sample size issue, Chapter 3
employs a panel design, utilizing data from different US district courts throughout the country in
different years. This method vastly increases the sample size and could perhaps lead to different
results.
Second, it is possible that district judges do respond to crime rates and public punitive
attitudes, but they are concerned with crime and opinion at the local level only. Indeed, this
finding may be what would be expected by scholars of district court behavior who note their
connection local communities (Kritzer & Zemans1993). If this is the case, and changes in public
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punitiveness and the crime rate vary throughout the country, the results from these national-level
models will not be able to fully capture these variables’ import. Once again, to test whether this
is the case, models presented in Chapter 3 will test the potential impact of localized crime rates
and local public preferences, as opposed to any national-level changes.
Finally, the results do indirectly support one aspect of my theoretical perspective. While
failing to strongly support the specific hypotheses, the results do tacitly suggest that district
judge behavior is complex and cannot be easily captured by a handful of variables. Stated
differently, minimal change in judicial sentencing behavior over the past few decades was
explained by the partisan and policy-change variables. However, and notably, the inclusion of
the additional contextual variables into models of departure rates resulted in improvements in the
models’ explanatory power. This model-strength improvement implies that the hypothesized
contextual variables should be subjected to future testing using alternative methods to better
determine their possible relationship with district judges’ sentencing behavior.
In sum, the results of this test were somewhat disappointing but do lay some initial
groundwork for future empirical testing. Notwithstanding some promising results regarding the
effect of incarceration rates, the most reasonable interpretation of the findings is that the strong
trend exhibited in Figure 1 remains largely unexplained. Accordingly, future scholars should
follow the advice of Silver and Shapiro (1984) and continue to use new methods and probe
additional variables that may help explain causes of district judges’ sentencing decisions.
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Table 1: FY 2012 Sentencing Table
*Source: USSC

Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense
I (0 or 1) II (2 or 3)
Level

Zone A

Zone B
Zone C

Zone D

III (4, 5,
6)

IV (7, 8, 9)

V (10, 11,
12)

VI (13 or
more)

0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
1-7

0-6
0-6
0-6
2-8
4-10

0-6
0-6
2-8
4-10
6-12

0-6
1-7
3-9
6-12
9-15

1
2
3
4
5

0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6

6

0-6

1-7

2-8

6-12

9-15

12-18

7
8
9

0-6
0-6
4-10

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
8-14

8-14
10-16
12-18

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

10

6-12

8-14

10-16

15-21

21-27

24-30

11

8-14

10-16

12-18

18-24

24-30

27-33

12

10-16

12-18

15-21

21-27

27-33

30-37

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
life

15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
life

18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life
life

24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
life

30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
120-150
130-162
140-175
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
life

33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
120-150
130-162
140-175
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
360-life
life
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Figure 1: Percentage of Offenders Sentenced Below Guideline Recommended
Range: 1988-2014
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Table 2: Dynamic Regression Determinants of Total Downward Departure
Rates (FY 1988-2013)
Variable

(1)

(2)

Booker

3.95
(4.01)

0.87
(4.73)

PROTECT Act

-5.88**
(2.14)

-4.28*
(2.35)

DemDist %

0.19**
(0.06)

0.10
(.12)

DemCirc %

-0.04
(0.09)

0.12
(0.12)

Incarc. Rate

-

0.44*
(0.23)

Crime Rate

-

-0.03
(0.14)

Public Punitiveness

-

0.20
(0.10)

ARIMA Order (p,d,q)

(0,1,2)

(0,1,2)

MA(1)

0.62**
(0.18)

0.98**
(0.31)

MA(2)

1.00**
(0.19)

1.00**
(0.20)

MSE
(Mean Squared Error)

1.07

0.80

Degrees of Freedom

19

16

AIC

86.93

86.07

Note: standard errors in parentheses *p<.05 ** p<.01 (one-tailed tests)
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Table 3: Dynamic Regression Determinants of Judge-Initiated Departure Rates
(FY 1988-2013)
Variable

(1)

(2)

Booker

6.95*
(3.52)

4.38
(3.69)

PROTECT Act

-2.62
(1.95)

-1.53
(2.18)

DemDist %

0.00
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.06)

DemCirc. %

0.02
(0.07)

0.16*
(0.08)

Incarc. Rate

-

0.41*
(0.15)

Crime Rate

-

-0.01
(0.01)

Public Punitiveness

-

0.10
(0.07)

ARIMA Order (p,d,q)

(0,1,2)

(0,1,2)

MA(1)

0.75**
(0.16)

1.11**
(0.30)

MA(2)

1.00**
(0.20)

1.00**
(0.21)

MSE
(Mean Squared Error)

0.76

0.60

Degrees of Freedom

19

16

AIC

78.78

78.5

Note: standard errors in parentheses *p<.05 ** p<.01 (one-tailed tests)
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Chapter 3:
“Of Time and Space: How Localized and
Temporal Factors Influence Federal Judges’
Criminal Sentencing Decisions.”
Abstract:

Recent research on sentencing outcomes in federal district courts suggests
that sentencing practice is complex and contingent upon the location of the federal
district. While researchers have identified several sources of this inter-district
variation, potentially relevant sociopolitical characteristics have not been fully
explored. I argue that district court judges, despite being unelected, are likely to
be sensitive to salient sociopolitical inputs. Using a panel-design, pooling data
from ninety (90) federal districts across sixteen (16) years, this paper tests whether
two such sociopolitical variables: 1) the state crime rate and 2) state citizen
ideology, affect the harshness of sentences through judicial application of the US
Sentencing Guidelines. Results suggest that both the crime rate and the ideology
of the citizens are associated with judicial departures from the Guidelines. Results
further suggest that while there is substantial inter-district variation in judicial
behavior, sociopolitical factors have an effect over-time within districts. Broadly,
these findings suggest that federal district court judges may be accounting for
broader sociopolitical factors in their individual decisions.
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Introduction
Trial judges are members of communities. Trial judges in many state-court systems in
the United States are directly elected by the people of these communities. In the federal system,
trial judges, or “district court judges,” are instead appointed by the President and confirmed by
the US Senate. Despite this lack of an electoral connection to their communities, district court
judges are often long-time residents of the geographical areas to which they are appointed (Sivler
and Shapiro 1984). The federal judiciary is divided into ninety distinct geographic districts
within the fifty U.S. States and the District of Columbia.38 Accordingly, federal district court
judges are political actors both within a nationwide federal system and within much smaller
geographic areas.
For obvious reasons, a substantial body of research on Congress has focused on the
extent to which members differ and/or are reflective of the views of the district or state they
represent (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; Bartels 1991; Clinton 2006).
Yet, while these questions have been explored by federal judicial scholars, especially in prior
decades (Rosenberg 1991; Silver and Shapiro 1984; Cook 1973, 1971; Vines 1964), there have
been comparatively fewer attempts to explain whether national variation in federal district judge
behavior is explained by social and political qualities of the location where the judges sit.39
Accordingly, the broader question of this chapter is: to the extent that we observe
national variation in district court judicial behavior, how much of said variation can be explained

38

There are also four (4) additional districts for the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and
the North Mariana Islands.
39

Criminologists and Criminal Justice scholars interested in sentencing practice have more thoroughly examined
national variation. See Johnson, et. al. (2008); Wu and Spohn (2010). However, as explained much more
thoroughly, infra, there is a need to update and build upon these studies.
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by district or statewide features of the community? Thus, rather than attempting to understand
judicial behavior by focusing on national or case-specific factors, this paper takes a less-utilized
“middle” approach and focuses on qualities of states and districts. I argue these more localized,
but not necessarily case-specific, factors are influential on federal district judge behavior. It is of
course true that we would expect social and political characteristics of states and districts to
affect elected political actors, such as members of Congress, more than unelected political actors,
such as federal district court judges. Still, district judges are a unique type of policymaker in that
they operate within a national political system, but exercise jurisdiction over only a
geographically defined area. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the potential impact
characteristics of these local areas have on district judges.
Criminal sentencing, as a policy area, may provide unique and powerful insight into how
characteristics of a local area might impact district judges. First, the United States Sentencing
Commission (“USSC”) has kept a wealth of data on the sentencing practices of each federal
judicial district This data provides researchers with a rare opportunity to compare judicial
decisions in different districts using objectively coded data.
Second, cursory examination of the raw sentencing data reveals extreme inter-district
variation with respect to how criminals are sentenced throughout the country. This variation is
certainly not solely the product of differences in judicial behavior, as different areas of the
country have differing profiles of both crimes committed and types of offenders (USSC 2012).
Still, recent research has observed variation even when controlling for some or all of these
conflating factors (Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002). Moreover, the considerable
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size of the variation in different areas of the country is itself grounds for examination of the
potential effect of geographic-specific sociopolitical factors on judicial sentencing practices.40
Finally, criminal sentencing is an incredibly important duty of federal district court
judges. The rise of the federal prison population through approximately the last twenty five
years is striking. In 1988 federal prisons held approximately 50,000 inmates. By 2012, that
number had nearly quadrupled to over 196,000 inmates. The rates of federal incarceration have
also risen markedly from roughly 20 inmates per 100,000 US residents to more than 60 per
100,000 (US DOJ 2015). While several factors outside of judicial control, such as increased
prevalence of mandatory minimum sentencing, are largely responsible for the upward trend in
incarceration, district judges possess some power to either exacerbate or mitigate these effects
(Lynch and Omori 2014; USSC 2012). To the extent we believe high levels of incarceration are
a societal problem, the potential effects of localized sociopolitical variables on either
contributing to or alleviating this problem is certainly a worthwhile inquiry.
In this chapter, I focus on two state-level sociopolitical variables that may impact
sentencing decisions on judges within those states: (1) the crime rate; and (2) the ideology of the
citizens of the state. These two factors provide potentially important explanations for interdistrict sentencing variation. Testing potential effects of the crime rate is predicated upon the
notion that judges are sensitive to relevant environmental conditions occurring in their
community when ruling on cases (Kritzer 1978). Accordingly, judges who live and work in
higher crime areas are likely to seek to address this crime problem by punishing criminal

40

The size of the variation can perhaps best be illustrated by an example from the distribution of judge-initiated
departure rates amongst districts in FY 2013. At the 25 th percentile, or a typically Guideline-adherent district,
offenders received a judge-initiated downward departure approximately 15% of the time. At the 75th percentile, in a
typically Guideline-resistant district, offenders received a judge-initiated departure 27% of the time. Thus, offenders
are almost twice as likely to receive a judge-initiated downward departure in a Guideline-resistant district than a
Guideline-adherent district.
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offenders with longer sentences. Moreover, irrespective of the lack of evidence that long
sentences deter crimes in the future, district judges are probably more likely to be receptive to
the general deterrence justification for sentencing, when the crime problem is severe. Finally,
there is some qualified support for the proposition that higher crime rates cause judges to issue
harsher sentences, albeit for elected judges (Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980).
The logic underlying state citizen ideology is based upon the “representational model” of
judicial behavior suggesting that judges are reflections of the communities in which they sit
(Rowland & Carp 1996; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Silver and Shapiro 1984; Peltason 1971;
Vines 1964).41 Although the question of public influence on unelected judges is far from settled,
and general ideology is by no means a perfect proxy for treatment towards criminals, some
recent evidence suggests that unelected officials in the criminal justice system may be responsive
to public opinion (Enns 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009; Johnson, et. al. 2008).
It is worth noting at the outset that these two variables are not thought to be exclusive of
other geographic-specific effects on judicial sentencing. Other potentially relevant factors may
include economic factors (Johnson, et. al. 2008) or local sentiment in the legal community
regarding crime and punishment (Kautt 2002; Posner 1993; Baum 2006).42 Still, the crime rate
and citizen ideology are measurable factors that vary widely across states. They provide an
excellent starting point for testing whether and to what extent federal judges respond to
sociopolitical factors when making decisions in individualized cases.
The outline of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I develop the theoretical
framework of why district judges may be sensitive to environmental conditions. Second, I give a
necessary background of sentencing policy and procedures in the United States. Third, I
41

For a more thorough discussion of the “representational model”, see Chapter 2.

42

This latter factor is examined in Chapter 4.
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examine recent research on federal judicial sentencing and explain how the present model builds
and improves upon said research. Fourth, I set forth testable hypotheses derived both from my
theoretical perspective and important prior findings. Fifth, I construct a model to empirically test
these hypotheses. Finally, I examine the results of the model and discuss the results.
Location and District Court Behavior
Many early researchers of judicial behavior sought to examine the influence of contextual
factors on district court decision-making. As set forth in the prior chapters, several scholars have
found a link between local communities and the behavior of federal judges (Peltason 1971; Vines
1964; Cook 1973, 1971; Kritzer 1978; Kuklinski and Stanka 1979; Rowland and Carp 1996). 43
While these studies provide some preliminary support for community-based influence on
appellate behavior, empirical testing of public influence on unelected appellate judges has also
produced several null or highly conditional results. (Brace and Boyea 2008; Segal and Spaeth
2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).
To reconcile the foregoing findings, I argue that trial judges, as opposed to appellate
judges, are fundamentally more likely to be responsive to local contextual factors. First, trial
judges deal directly with people in their community on a daily basis. Whether it is civil litigants,
criminal defendants, or jurors, federal district court judges are directly exposed to many different
members of their district that appellate judges simply are not. This fact alone could make these
trial judges more sensitive to environmental factors than their appellate brethren. Moreover, trial
judges are less driven by their personal ideological orientation than judges at higher levels of the
judiciary (Posner 1993; Epstein, et. al. 2013). Thus, it is plausible that if judges’ personal
ideologies are less influential, then other factors, either case-specific or environmental, have
greater import.
43

For a more thorough discussion of these pieces of research, please see Chapter 1.
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The idea that trial judges are fundamentally different than appellate judges is certainly
not a novel argument. One federal Court of Appeals judge compared the difference between trial
judges and appellate judges to watching Gone with the Wind vs. reading a TV Guide description
of the film (Batchelder 1993). Goldman and Sarat (1978) point to several differences between
trial court judges and appellate court judges, including direct interaction with litigants. Baum
(1994) argues that since district court judges live in their district, they may be particularly
sensitive to environmental factors, because their rulings may affect judges’ standings among
their friends and associates in the district.
Aside from trial/appellate judge differences, there is also some recent indirect evidence
that public opinion is influential on criminal justice policy generally. Nicholson-Crotty, et. al.
(2009) find that, over time, federal criminal justice policy is responsive to a dimension of public
mood. Enns (2014) similarly finds increasing public punitiveness is a contributing factor to the
rising incarceration rate over the past approximately fifty years. While these studies were
conducted on a national level and do not isolate only judicial behavior, the results intimate the
influence public sentiment, whether local or national, may have on unelected criminal justice
decision makers.
In summary, while the results regarding contextual influences on federal district court
judges is somewhat mixed, there is certainly sufficient anecdotal and empirical support to
warrant further study. Federal district court judges are often long-time residents of their districts
(Silver and Shapiro 1984). They also directly interact with citizens and observe first-hand
certain social and political characteristics of their community through their work on the bench.
Thus, it would be surprising indeed to find that sociopolitical factors do not affect district judge
decision-making.
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Sentencing in Federal Courts
Prior to discussing specific studies on federal sentencing, it is necessary to understand the
historical background of modern federal sentencing practice. For the purposes of this chapter, it
is necessary to understand that there are different “eras” of judicial sentencing under the
sentencing Guidelines. The different legal rules and/or standards associated with each era are set
forth below:44
[Figure 1 about here]
To summarize, the amount of discretion that district court judges have enjoyed in their
sentencing practices has varied over time. There is little doubt that judges in recent years have
enjoyed the greatest amount of discretion in their sentencing decisions. By 2014, more than half
of offenders were sentenced below the range recommended by the Guidelines. The Sentencing
Commission and several recent researchers of sentencing under the Guidelines have analyzed
this trend in depth and noted the strong effect that policy consequences, such as the PROTECT
Act and Booker, had on district court sentencing practices (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011;
Epstein, et. al. 2013; USSC 2012). More specifically, this research, as well as the raw data,
provides strong evidence that district judges are more willing to make departures from Guideline
recommended ranges in recent years, which have been characterized by greater judicial
discretion.
The focus of this chapter however, is not simply to analyze how these national-level
policy changes to discretion have affected judges, but instead to examine inter-district
differences within the country. These differences can be substantial. For example, in FY 2014,
the Eastern District of Wisconsin sentenced only 20.6% of offenders to a sentence within the
recommended Guideline Range, while the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced 67.2% of
44

For a more detailed background on federal sentencing over time, please see Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation.
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offenders within the recommended range (USSC 1995-2014). It is worth reiterating that state
and local sociopolitical conditions are certainly not expected to be the sole explanation for this
disparity, as differing prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010;
Bibas 2005), as well as crimes committed (USSC 2012), are also contributing factors. Still, the
size of the disparity is further indication that district judges in different parts of the country may
have vastly different views regarding criminal sentencing.
Before proceeding with a discussion of prior scholarship on federal sentencing, two
additional facts regarding judicial discretion and federal sentencing practice merit brief
discussion. First, a substantial proportion of offenders, especially drug offenders, are subject to
mandatory minimum sentences. In these cases, judges are not permitted to depart from the
Guidelines. The increased use of mandatory minimum sentences in recent years has had the
effect of mitigating any judicial departures on average imprisonment length (USSC 2012).
Second, an important distinction should be made between Guideline departures that are
sponsored by the government and Guideline departures that are not sponsored by the
government. The most utilized of government sponsored departures are known as 5K1.1
“substantial assistance” departures, wherein the government or prosecution moves the Court to
grant the offender a below-range sentence based upon his/her assistance in the prosecution of
another individual. Essentially, substantial assistance departures give offenders or potential
offenders an incentive to give the government valuable information regarding more serious
criminals. While the use of substantial assistance departures has declined over time, coinciding
with increased levels of judicial discretion allowing judges to depart on their own, it is still a
relatively prevalent policy, occurring in 12.8% of cases in FY 2014.
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The prevalence of both mandatory minimum sentencing and substantial assistance
Guideline departures are key background facts necessary to understanding federal sentencing
practice. Like departures themselves, there is great inter-district variation in the prevalence that
these two methods are employed throughout the country. To the extent this variation may have
an impact on disparity in sentence length or judicial departures, both factors must be accounted
for.
Past Federal Judge Sentencing Research
Some of the earliest research on federal district court sentencing addressed the question
of whether district court judges were sensitive to contextual influences, such as public sentiment
(Cook 1973, 1977; Kritzer 1978; Silver and Shapiro 1984). While the findings of these scholars
showed evidence of community-based influences on federal district court judges, more recent
research on federal sentencing has focused on different variables. Specifically, recent
scholarship on district judge behavior under the US Sentencing Guidelines has primarily focused
on whether or not changes in policy have affected judge’s adherence to the Guidelines.
Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) find the 2003 PROTECT Act provisions that allowed
appellate courts to review district court judge departures from the Guidelines without giving any
deference to the district court judge, increased district judge adherence to the Guidelines.
Similarly, in a recent study, Epstein, et. al. (2013) found the rate of departures from the
Guidelines has increased substantially in the post-Booker era. Both Fischman and Schanzenbach
(2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) also detected strategic and partisan influences on sentencing
behavior, as both found that as the number of Republican judges on the Court of Appeals sitting
above the district court judge increased, the less likely the sentencing district judge was to depart
from the Guidelines.
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While a great bulk of the research on federal sentencing has focused on the effect of
nationwide policy change in discretion, recent research has examined the causes and
consequences of sentencing disparity among similarly situated offenders throughout the country.
The Sentencing Commission has attributed increased disparity to the increased discretion that
resulted from the post-Booker Era (USSC 2012). But Tiede (2009) finds that whether or not
Booker increased or decreased disparity varied greatly based on region of the country. Ulmer, et.
al. (2011) and Lynch and Omori (2014) also question the Sentencing Commission’s conclusions
regarding the effect of Booker and argue that increased disparity after Booker has much to do
with adapted prosecutorial practice.
Specific causes of the sources of inter-district sentencing variation has also been
examined, if less thoroughly. Kautt (2002) attributes much of inter-district variation in
sentencing practice to local legal culture. Wu and Spohn (2010) find differences in the
prevalence of “substantial assistance” tactics by prosecutors can result in sentencing inequities
between districts. Ulmer (2005) examines variation in Sentencing Practices and finds that
differing interpretations of Guideline terms and parlance can lead to disparate outcomes. In their
analysis of federal drug trafficking cases, Lynch and Omori (2014) find the use of mandatory
minimum sentencing greatly impacted sentencing disparity between districts. Of particular
relevance, Lynch and Omori found there was much greater variation in average drug trafficking
sentence length between districts than within districts (2014, 430).
Still, most of these studies do not address “political environment” factors emphasized by
earlier researchers, such as Cook (1971) and Kritzer (1978). Johnson, et. al.’s (2008) study
represents an important exception, as these researchers specifically examined the extent to which
certain environmental effects, such as crime rates, caseload pressures, and the liberalness of
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districts affected sentence length. Johnson, et. al. (2008) find little relationship between the
crime rate and judicial behavior.45 However, they do find that districts with higher levels of
liberalism, measured by interest group ratings of the US Senators of the applicable state, exhibit
more lenient sentencing practices.
There are several reasons why the findings of Johnson, et. al. (2008) should be subjected
to further empirical analysis. All of these reasons relate to the relatively narrow time period
covered by Johnson, et. al. (2008), namely FY 1997-2000. First, as a result of this window, it is
difficult to draw conclusions about how changes in sociopolitical variables within the same
district may alter judicial behavior over time. As discussed throughout this dissertation, this
dynamic analysis is particularly useful in drawing causal conclusions, and many variables of
interest (departure rates, the crime rate, and liberalness) have all varied substantially within
districts over time. Secondly, as all of the cases analyzed by Johnson, et. al. (2008) are prior to
either the enactment of the PROTECT Act (which reduced judicial discretion) or the Booker
decision (which expanded judicial discretion), we are unable to draw conclusions about how
different judges in different areas of the country respond to different periods of judicial
discretion. Yet the findings of Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013)
suggest these policy changes dramatically altered sentencing practice, and the findings of Tiede
(2009) suggest judges in different areas of the country may respond quite differently to increases
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However, Johnson, et. al. (2008) do find that increases in the crime rate result in increased the length of
substantial assistance departures. They interpret this result as possible evidence of judges working with prosecutors
to address the crime problem by allowing departures for less serious offenders while aiding the prosecution of more
serious offenders.
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or decreases in their discretion. Accordingly, a renewed focus on sociopolitical factors
incorporating these differing levels of discretion over time is worthwhile.46
In summary, the findings of Kautt (2002), Wu and Spohn (2010), Ulmer (2005), Tiede
(2009), Johnson, et. al. (2008), and Lynch and Omori (2014) all support the same general
conclusion: sentencing in federal district courts depends heavily on the location of the sentencing
district court. Despite this conclusion, with the notable exception of Johnson, et. al. (2008), there
has been less direct research on the question of whether localized sociopolitical factors impact
said localized difference. Given the extent of the variation, and the findings of Johnson, et. al.
(2008) over a limited period of time, further inquiries into these factors is clearly warranted.
Hypotheses
Given the foregoing I submit two testable hypotheses regarding the influence local
contexts may have on district judges’ sentencing decisions. The first such hypothesis involves
the crime rate.47 Specifically:
H1: District judges within states/years with relatively high crime rates will sentence
offenders less leniently than district judges in states/years with relatively low crime rates.
The logic of the crime rate Hypothesis is that district judges living and working in
environments with high crime will be less sympathetic to criminals. In addition, as judges from
higher crime areas will likely see crime as a larger social problem, they will be more likely to
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It is also worth noting that the measure of state-level political liberalism used by Johnson, et. al. (2008) (US
Senator, interest group ratings for the state) has been critiqued and potentially improved upon in recent years (See
Enns and Koch 2013).
47

Ideally, I would also test of the effect of the incarceration rate on interdistrict sentencing variance. However, there
is not such variation in the federal incarceration rate, which is reported nationwide. Further, unlike the crime rate,
the incarceration rate at the state level is heavily dependent on the state criminal justice system outside exercised
completely outside of the jurisdiction of district court judges. Indeed, over 80% of incarcerated individuals are
sentenced through the state-court system rather than the federal court system (DOJ 2015). As a result, it is unlikely
that state variability in incarceration rates is internalized by federal judges in any way that would affect their
sentencing decisions.
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attempt to deter future individuals from committing crimes through longer sentences.48 There is
some qualified support for H1 as Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that Pennsylvania judges in
counties with higher crime rates tended to render more punitive sentences. Gibson (1980) made
a similar finding regarding Iowa judges. Gibson’s (1980) findings are especially interesting,
because Iowa state judges travel across counties. Thus, Gibson (1980) finds the same judges
sentence criminals more severely in areas with higher crime rates. While there might be reasons
to think that the Ulmer & Bradley (2006) and Gibson (1980) results would not hold for unelected
federal judges, their findings at least merit the inclusion of the crime-rate variable in models of
sentencing behavior.
H2: District judges within states/years with relatively liberal ideologies will sentence
offenders more leniently than district judges in states/years with relatively conservative
ideologies.
The state ideology hypothesis is consistent with a view of political behavior that judges
are reflections of their community (Goldman and Sarat 1978; Rowland and Carp 1996).49 It
should be noted that while general liberal/conservative ideology is by no means a perfect proxy
for treatment towards criminals, there has historically been a strong correlation between
conservative ideology and harsher treatment towards criminals (Enns 2014).50 Further, H2 will
serve as a replication for the finding of Johnson, et. al. (2008) regarding citizen ideology, who
found that judges in districts with more liberal ideologies have more lenient sentencing practices.
Replication of this finding is prudent, as that study focused on a relatively narrow time period
48

For a more detailed justification for the crime rate hypothesis, see Chapters 2 and 4.

49

H2 is not necessarily meant to suggest that public ideology is directly influencing judges to sentence a certain
way. While public influence is a possibility, it is also likely that judges within states share the same ideological
orientation as citizens of the state (See Segal and Spaeth 2002; Kritzer 1978). Issues of endogenity and causality
will be discussed further in the Discussion Section, below.
50

Although this may be changing. See Act, et. al. (2015) and a further discussion of the possibly weakening
relationship between ideology and punitive preferences discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 4-5.
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and used a somewhat limited measure of state ideology (Johnson, et. al. 2008). For these
reasons, it is possible that the Johnson, et. al. (2008) model underestimated the influence that
state ideology has on federal district court sentencing.
Design, Methods and Measures
To test the above-stated hypotheses, I employ a panel design, incorporating all available
sentencing departure data from ninety (90) federal districts in the US States and the District of
Colombia from 1996-2011.51 This time period was slightly condensed due to data availability,
but the study still encompasses a relatively long time period that spans varying levels of judicial
discretion. Rather than focus on a single offense or set of offenses and conduct a micro-analysis
(See e.g. Lynch and Omori 2014), the present analysis seeks to present a broad picture of
sentencing practice across multiple offenses at the district level.
The Dependent Variable
To measure the primary dependent variable of interest, harshness/lenience in federal
district court sentencing, I use two separate measures: 1) the proportion of all sentences that were
downward departures from the Guideline-recommended range in a given district/year (“Total
Downward Departures”); and 2) after excluding substantial assistance departures, the proportion
of remaining sentences that were judge-initiated downward departures from the Guidelinerecommended range in a given district/year (“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”).
The basis for using two separate measures of departures is to ensure that the model truly
captures judicial behavior. There has been some discussion in the literature as to whether
51

Notably, this study differs from several other sentencing studies, as it analyzes sentencing data at the district-level
rather than at the individual case level. This approach is not to diminish the importance of well-established casespecific facts, such as the race of the offender (Ulmer, et. al. 2011), the gender of the offender (Mustard 2001), or
whether the offender is convicted by trial or plea agreement (Ulmer, et. al. 2010). Instead, as the present study
seeks to test only sociopolitical effects, all of such effects should be incorporated into district-level averages. To
ensure that sociopolitical factors and case-specific factors are not conflating, I control for offender demographics
and plea rates, as explained below.
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government-sponsored departures, especially those based on “substantial assistance” to law
enforcement, should be included in models of judicial sentencing behavior (See Fischman and
Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn and Hartmann 2010; Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2007). These
departures require a motion from the government. As such, they are not solely left to the
discretion of the judges. On the other hand, there is some evidence of a negative correlation
between substantial assistance departures (the most widely-cited government sponsored
departure) and unilateral judicial departures across federal districts (Weinstein 1998). This
finding perhaps suggests that judges may be compensating by departing from the Guidelines
more often in districts wherein prosecutors file a relatively small number of substantial
assistance motions (Weinstein 1998). Furthermore, the judge still has the discretion to grant or
deny government-sponsored departure motions. Therefore, both measures of departures are
presented as a general robustness check of any findings.
The justification for using Guideline downward departures rates as a measure of judicial
punitiveness in general, as opposed to median or mean sentence imprisonment length, is that
both laws and the Guidelines themselves change over time (USSC 2012). There also may be
changes to the criminal-history and type-of cases prosecuted over time. Measuring Guideline
departures best isolates the behavior of the judge. Importantly, this measure of Guideline
departures also follows past research studying judicial sentencing behavior (Epstein, et. al., 2013;
Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011, Freeborn and Hartmann, 2010; Schanzenbach and Tiller,
2007).52

Independent Variables
52

See Chapter 2 for a more thorough discussion of the departure measure, as well as alternative measures.
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To measure the various crime rates, I take the reported violent crime rates for each state
in a given year. The state crime rate data comes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting
Statistics and is measured as the number of violent crimes in the state per 100,000 citizens.
To measure citizen ideology, I use a recently developed measure calculated by Enns and
Koch (2013). The measure is developed by pooling ideological self-identification survey
responses from several different surveys by citizens in every state to develop a measure of
liberalness in each state of each year. The measure is an improvement upon interest-group
ratings measures of state citizen ideology as it is not dependent on congressional behavior and
exhibits more year-to-year stability (Enns and Koch 2013).53
Two important assumptions should be mentioned at this juncture. First, as discussed in
Chapter 2, the state crime rate and state citizen ideology measures are calculated on a calendar
year basis, while the sentencing data is presented on a fiscal year basis (October 1-September
30). Thus, for a panel design, the researcher must choose whether to correlate fiscal years and
annual years or correlate prior calendar years with subsequent fiscal years. Given that it makes
no intuitive sense to ascribe judicial response to factors that have not occurred yet and given that
we might expect some unspecified lag in judicial responsiveness, I adopt the latter option (e.g.
the state crime rate from January 1, 2012-December 31, 2012 corresponds with total downward
departures from October 1, 2012-September 30, 2013). To ensure that these do not produce
biased results, I shall also run models matching fiscal year with annual years (e.g. January 1,
2013-December 31, 2013 corresponding with October 1, 2012-September 30, 2013).54
Second, it is noteworthy that, in some cases, the level of analysis for the independent
variables (measured at the state level) does not match the level of analysis for the dependent
53
54

For a full discussion of the measure, see Enns and Koch (2013).
See Appendix E
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variable (measured at the district level). While twenty six states and the District of Columbia
have only one federal district, the remaining twenty four states, generally higher population
states, are divided into multiple districts (from two to four). Accordingly, for each multi-district
state, I am forced to utilize the statewide data for all districts within that state. Given the
localized focus of my theoretical perspective, this is certainly a limitation of my design.
However, there are several factors that alleviate this limitation.
First, I will create a control variable for the number of districts within states to ensure that
the results are not substantially different from states with single districts. Second, this method of
using state-level inputs to measure federal district sentencing behavior has been utilized by
recent researchers (Johnson, et. al. 2008). Finally, and most importantly, any bias to the results
created by this issue would certainly be in the conservative direction. Stated differently, if
localized social and political factors are impacting judges, we would expect using state-level data
as opposed to district-level data to weaken, rather than strengthen, any results.
Control Variables
Several control variables will also be utilized to ensure any results related to the
independent variables are not reflective of other district characteristics. The percentage of
African American and Hispanic offenders in each district for each year will be incorporated into
the model as there is evidence that African Americans and Hispanics are less likely to receive
Guideline departures than white offenders (Mustard 2001; Johnson 2003; Ulmer, et. al. 2011).
Additionally, the proportion of female offenders will also be included as there is evidence that
females are more likely to receive Guideline departures (Mustard 2001). The proportion of four
general offense types are also controlled for: drug trafficking offenses, firearm offenses, fraud
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offenses, and immigration offenses55, to ensure that differences in departure rates are not simply
due to different types of crimes. The size of each district is controlled for by the population and
number of judges in each district. There is also great inter-district variability in the caseload perjudge, so this factor is also included in the models.
District-specific prosecutorial practices also need to be accounted for. The percentage of
sentences that were reached by plea agreement will be incorporated, as there is a welldocumented sentence “penalty” for offenders convicted after going to trial (Ulmer, et. al. 2011).
The proportion of mandatory minimum sentences in the district is also included, as mandatory
minimum practice varies widely and its prevalence restricts judge-initiated departures (Lynch
and Omori 2014). Furthermore, for the models that exclude substantial assistance departure
(“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”), substantial assistance departure rates will be included
as an independent variable.
There are also some districts that are especially unique for historical reasons and/or the
type of cases they hear. The five “border districts” with Mexico deal with huge caseload
pressures and are faced with a disproportionate share of immigration cases. 56 As such, these
districts are given a dummy variable. Additionally, districts located in Southern States, as
defined by the US Census Bureau, are controlled for using a dummy variable, as these districts
are associated with higher punitiveness. While it is possible that this variable may capture some
of the effects of the “State Citizen Ideology” variable, it is worth examining whether there is

55

Together, these four offenses comprise over 90% of all federal sentences. Thus, remaining offenses (e.g.
kidnapping), will serve as the reference category.
56

These districts are the Southern District of California, the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, the
Western District of Texas, and the Southern District of Texas.
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some especially unique effect of sentencing behavior in the South, independent of simple
conservative ideology.
To account for changes to judicial discretion in making Guideline departures over time, I
use dummy variables for the short time period the PROTECT Act was in effect and for the time
period Booker was in effect.57 This control ensures that any observed effects in the contextual
variables of interest are not simply the result of different periods of judicial discretion. Finally,
as to the judges themselves, the proportion of judges on the court who were appointed by
Democratic Presidents in a given fiscal year is also a control, as we would expect “Democratic”
judges to depart downward from the Guidelines more often (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011;
Epstein, et. al. 2013). 58 Incorporating this control into the model ensures that inter-district
variation in judicial departures is not simply based on the partisan composition of the bench in
each district. As each criminal case is randomly assigned a judge within a district, it is reasonable
to assume that no individual judges sentence a highly disproportionate share of offenders within
their district. For reference, a table with complete descriptions of the measurement of all
variables is provided in Appendix A.
Methods
As set forth above, I employ a panel design with ninety (90) federal districts over the
course of sixteen (16) years (1996-2011). To analyze relationships in this panel design, I utilize
both a fixed- effect estimator (which control for each individual district) and a random effects
estimator (which assumes all pertinent differences between districts are captured by the variables

57

For FY 2003 and 2005, wherein each era of discretion was partially in effect, I take the proportion of cases that
each particular policy was in effect and substitute this proportion for the dummy variable.
58

For a more precise explanation of how this measure accounted for judges commissioned or retired partially
through a fiscal year, see Appendix A.
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in the model). 59 Both since my theory is based upon localized factors and because the number of
districts (90) is larger than the number of years (16), using only a random-effects model might
seem initially attractive. However, the fixed-effects models allow for analysis of the same
district over time. This within-case analysis is also of-interest theoretically, as it will allow for
drawing inferences regarding whether or not changes to the variables of interest are associated
with within-district changes in judges’ sentencing behavior. For this reason, both types of models
are utilized.
Similar to the national-level data analyzed in Chapter 2, the error structure of a simple
linear model of departure rates at the district level is both serially correlated and heteroskedastic.
In addition, as is often the case with panel data of states or countries, it is likely improper to
assume the cross-sections (districts) are entirely independent from one another.60 Thus, to correct
for these issues, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are utilized in both sets of models, wherein the
error structure of the model is assumed to be heteroskedastic, serially correlated, and correlated
across districts (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). 61

59

Note that use of a random effects model assumes that any uncaptured differences between cross sections are
uncorrelated with the independent variables. The Hausman (1978) test comparing the coefficients of the random
effects and fixed effects models, tests this assumption. Results from the Hausman test for the departure series yield
a statistic of 20.30 and a p value of .21. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is
valid.
60

For example, we might expect correlations between districts within the same state, between districts in
neighboring states, and between districts with similar demographics.
61

While use of Driscoll and Kray standard errors can often produce somewhat optimistic standard errors, this
procedure is still less optimistic than other methods of estimating standard errors when there is both cross-sectional
and temporal correlation (Hoechle 2007). For instance, technically both feasible Generalized Least Squared (GLS)
and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors estimates are expected to be imprecise in cross-sectional dominant
models (when N is large relative to T), as in the present case (Hoechle 2007). However, in order to show the
robustness of any results, alternative methods were used to examine relationships, including GLS, fixed effects
estimators with clustered standard errors, and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (See Appendices C-D).
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Results
Results from the models are presented in Table 1 below. The four columns represent two
fixed effects and two random effects models, for both Total Downward Departure Rates and
Judge-Initiated Downward Departure Rates. As can be seen from Table 1, the coefficients for
both primary variables of interest are in the expected direction and statistically significant at
conventional levels across all four models. In support of the crime rate hypothesis (H1), higher
crime rates are associated with lower rates of both total downward departures and Judge-Initiated
downward departures. Similarly, in support of the state citizen ideology hypothesis (H2),
districts within states exhibiting relatively liberal ideologies are associated with higher levels of
both types of downward departures. The results are fairly robust and hold across several
different specifications.62
[Table 1 about here]
The fit for each of the models is reasonable. The fixed-effects models (columns 1 and 3)
both explain approximately 62% of within-district variance over the sixteen year period. As to
the random-effects models, the model presented in column 4, which excludes substantial
assistance departures, performs better than the specification presented in column 2, as the Root
Mean Squared Error is reduced from 10.3 to 8.5. This is not surprising as we would expect the
use of substantial assistance departures to be highly dependent on idiosyncratic differences in the
policies/strategies of various U.S. Attorneys throughout the country. Therefore it makes some
sense that the variables in the model more successfully explain judge-initiated departures than
total departures.

62

See Appendices C-F for alternative specifications.
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Turning again to the sociopolitical variables of interest, the effect-sizes for the state
liberalism variable are comparatively larger for the random-effects models than the fixed-effects
models. This finding is expected as the fixed-effects models are essentially analyses of intradistrict differences over time. Accordingly, we would expect greater inter-district differences in
state ideology throughout the country than changes in citizen ideology within a single district
over a limited time period. Despite this decreased magnitude, the fact that the state liberalism
variable retains significance in the fixed-effect models is of particular interest. Specifically, this
result demonstrates that not all causes of sentencing-variation are due to district-specific
prosecutorial practices or other district-specific idiosyncrasies (See Lynch and Omori 2014; Bibi
2005). Columns 1 and 3 in Table 1 provide evidence that increasing liberalness
[conservativeness] of a state over time is associated with higher [lower] rates of downward
departures in districts within that state.
As to the crime rate, the state crime rate coefficient is highly significant across all
models. As an additional robustness check, year-specific dummies were also added in separate
models to ensure that the state crime-rate findings were not solely the product of the general
decreasing crime rate over time matching spuriously with the increasing departure rate over time.
Even after utilizing the year-specific dummies, the state crime rate variable remains significant
across all four models, although the magnitude of the effect is weakened. (See Appendix F).
Despite the general robustness and high significance-levels of the variables of interest,
the effect sizes for both variables are relatively small. Based upon the model in column 4, the
best fitting fixed-effect model, a one standard deviation change in the crime rate is expected to
alter departure rates by 2.8%. A one standard deviation change in state citizen ideology is
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expected to alter downward departure rates by 1.7%. While these are by no means large effectsizes, they can have enormous practical consequences for convicted offenders.
Figure 2, below, provides a graphic example of the effect-sizes of fixed-effect judgeinitiated departure rates (column 4). Specifically, the left side of Figure 2 compares expected
levels of judge-initiated departure rates based upon two hypothetical district/years with high vs
low crime rates, with all other variables held at their means. Similarly, the right side of Figure 2
demonstrates the same comparison, but instead compares a relatively conservative hypothetical
district/year with a relatively liberal hypothetical district/year. In Figure 2, “Q1” and “Q3” of
both input variables are used as proxies for relatively high/low state crime rates or liberal district
years.
[Figure 2 about here]
As can be seen from Figure 2, a district in a year with relatively high crime is expected to
have an overall downward departure rate of approximately 18.9%, while the same district in a
relatively low-crime year is expected to have a downward departure rate approximately 22.1% of
the time. Stated differently, the odds of an offender receiving a downward departure decrease by
about 15% when a given district changes from having relatively low crime to having relatively
high crime, holding all other variables constant. The effects for state-citizen ideology are
slightly more muted, but a hypothetical district shift from being relatively conservative to
relatively liberal increases a convicted offender’s downward departure odds by 10%, holding
other variables constant These estimations are meant to be exemplary only, but they present a
more intuitive picture of the degree to which sociopolitical variables can potentially influence
downward departure rates.

84

Aside from the primary variables of interest, there are other interesting takeaways from
the results presented in the four models of Table 1. First, the results in columns 1 and 2, which
include all downward departures, are extremely similar to the results in columns 3 and 4, which
include only judge- initiated downward departures. Aside from some interesting findings
regarding prosecutorial practice discussed below, the inclusion or exclusion of substantial
assistance cases does not seem to alter the results substantially.
In addition, results from Table 1 replicate many prior findings of past researchers of
federal sentencing data. The PROTECT Act period of limited judicial discretion is associated
with lower rates of downward departures (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Freeborn and
Hartmann 2010; Tiede 2009), while the Booker period of expanded judicial discretion is
associated with higher rates of downward departures (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Tiede 2009).
Southern Districts are associated with much lower rates of downward departures (Lynch and
Omori 2014). Border Districts, due to a high proportion of immigration cases and the ability to
use “fast track” departures unavailable in other districts, are associated with much higher rates of
departure (USSC 2012; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). Districts with a greater proportion
of Democratic judges are significantly associated with higher rates of downward departures in
three of the four specifications presented in Table 1 (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).
Finally, two results support recent findings in the literature regarding prosecutorial
practice. The negative and significant coefficients for “% mandatory minimum” in columns 3
and 4 support the Lynch and Omori (2014) conclusion that districts with high rates of mandatory
minimum sentences restrict judicial departures. The negative and significant coefficients for “%
substantial assistance” support the Weinstein (1998) conclusion that judges in districts that do
not utilize substantial assistance will compensate by initiating departures themselves more often.
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Taken together, these findings support recent findings that prosecutorial practices are influential
on judge-initiated departure rates.
Discussion, Limitations, and Implications
This chapter sought to build and improve upon recent research in federal sentencing to
account for contextual sociopolitical factors. Specifically, the present design examined the
potential effects state citizen ideology and state crime rates had on district judge sentencing
decisions. After conducting the test, there is fairly strong support for the argument that these two
factors are indeed associated with federal district court judge sentencing decisions. More
specifically, the results provide broad support for both H1, predicting a negative relationship
between crime rates and lenient sentences, and H2, predicting a positive relationship between
liberal citizen ideology and lenient sentences.
Despite the foregoing, the present study has some clear limitations. First, there is the
issue of matching state-level inputs with district-level sentencing data. As explained above, to
the extent this issue is problematic, the problem should weaken the foregoing results rather than
strengthen them. However, there is no question that a more precise model would utilize districtspecific sociopolitical variables. Future designs may attempt to obtain measures, perhaps
through county-level crime rate data or voting data from state legislative or congressional
districts.
A further limitation of the model, due to the district level of analysis, is the inability to
determine under what conditions judges pay heed to broader social factors. It is obviously
extremely unlikely that all district judges are influenced by these contextual factors to the same
degree in all types of cases. Indeed, it is possible that certain district judges consider
community conditions as a vital component of their general sentencing philosophy, while other
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judges strongly believe these conditions should play no role in determining appropriate sentences
for individual offenders. Future research should attempt to conduct case-studies or gather judgespecific data to determine if only particular judges are sensitive to these broader societal inputs.
Limitations aside, the present research provides support for at least five propositions that
build and improve upon present understandings of sentencing practice and federal district court
behavior. First, there is fairly strong evidence that some federal district court judges incorporate
contextual factors into their sentencing decisions. This general finding serves as a basis to
replicate these findings using different models and methods and incorporating different
contextual variables. For example, future research designs could examine the potential effect of
local legal community sentiment or incarceration rates on sentencing practice.
Second, the “representational model” of judicial behavior should be reevaluated and
retested in both the sentencing context and in other contexts (See Silver and Shapiro 1984). This
research provides evidence that district court departure rates are associated with the citizen
ideology of the state the district lies in. I stop short of arguing that judges are responsive to
citizen ideology. As argued by Kritzer (1978), Segal and Spaeth (2002), and other scholars of
the effect public opinion may have on the judiciary, judges are members of the public, not
necessarily agents of the public. The observed correlation between state citizen ideology and
judicial behavior may simply be due to the fact that federal district court judges themselves are
citizens of their states.
Despite this possibility, there is some theoretical basis to suspect trial judges may be
responsive to what the public thinks/believes. Trial judges, unlike appellate judges, have
everyday dealings with citizens whose views may directly or indirectly enter their courtrooms.
Moreover, recent research indicates that criminal justice policy in general is responsive to citizen
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punitive attitudes (Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009; Enns 2014). Future designs, perhaps modeled
after the elected-official responsiveness literature (See Edwards and Wood 1999), should attempt
to sort out this causal issue and further examine whether judges are responding to the public or
moving in-step with them.
Third, the potential effect of crime rates on sentencing practice should be further
scrutinized. This study’s findings with respect to the crime rate are particularly intriguing. The
effect of the state crime rate was highly significant, even when controlling for other factors such
as plea rates and differing periods of judicial discretion. These findings support state-court
analyses, such as Gibson (1980) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) but are somewhat contrary to the
findings of Johnson, et. al.(2008) regarding federal district court judges. Johnson, et. al. (2008)
found little impact of higher crime rates, and their sole significant conclusion was that higher
crime rates were associated with longer substantial assistance departures. The fact that the
findings herein do not square with Johnson, et. al. (2008) is possibly the result of the more
restrictive time period of the Johnson, et. al. (2008) design. More specifically, it may be that
increased levels of judicial discretion in recent years not covered by the Johnson, et. al. (2008)
study have allowed judges to better account for sociopolitical factors, such as the crime rate.63 In
any case, the crime rate variable should be retested using different research designs to determine
if it is in fact impacting judicial sentencing decisions
Fourth, this research supports but modifies recent findings emphasizing the differences of
federal judges based upon location (Lynch and Omori 2014; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002). As stated
by one recent scholar “while the districts that make up the federal system operate under the same
formal law, the system as a whole should not be treated as a single, unified entity that responds

63

But See Ulmer, et. al. (2011) concluding that increased levels of judicial discretion are not associated with
increased inter-district disparity.
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lockstep to policy mandates” (Lynch and Omori 2014, 438). This research underscores this
sentiment, but adds a temporal element. Not only does place matter, but time matters also. The
fixed-effects models provide strong evidence that changing conditions within districts can alter
the behavior of judges. Whether these changes in behavior are a result of turnover within
districts or adapting behavior of the same judges should be subjected to empirical testing.
Finally, the evidence of the effects of two state-level variables on judges in the criminal
sentencing context should lead researchers to test contextual effects on judges in other contexts
and policy areas. For example, does income inequality make it more likely that district court
judges would render summary judgment against wealthy litigants? Do natural disasters in
districts cause judges to be less favorable to insurance litigants in their rulings? The list of
potential inquiries is long, and the answers to said inquires could provide a much better
understanding of both judicial behavior and the justice system generally.
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Figure 1: Periods of Judicial Discretion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Uncertainty
Period

Increasing
Discretion

Reduced
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November 1, 1987June 12, 1996:

June 13, 1996-April
29, 2003:
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-District Court
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“Advisory” to
District Court
Judges

-Guideline
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Review Restored
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Table 1: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward Departure
% and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 1996-2011)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Total
Judge-Initiated
Judge-Initiated
Downward
Downward
Downward
Downward
Departure %
Departure %
Departure %
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)
(Random Effects)
(Fixed Effects)
(Random Effects)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate
-.011***
-.007***
-.010***
-.005***
(.002)
(.001)
(.002)
(.001)
State Liberalism

.20*
(.09)

.52***
(.06)

.32*
(.17)

.41***
(.08)

Booker

9.18***
(2.56)

6.59***
(0.15)

13.21***
(3.06)

13.18***
(2.34)

PROTECT Act

-5.04***
(1.22)

-7.76***
(1.61)

-6.07***
(1.78)

-6.80***
(1.75)

% Democrat
Judges

.06***
(.01)

.00
(.05)

.07***
(.01)

.04**
(.01)

# of Districts
In State

-

1.76***
(.35)

-

.81*
(.39)

# of Judges in District

-.43
(-0.66)

.19**
(.07)

-.70
(.41)

.09
(.08)

% African-American
Offenders

-.07**
(.03)

.03
(.03)

-.04*
(.03)

-.003
(.02)

% Hispanic
Offenders

-.12**
(.05)

-.05*
(.03)

-.05
(.06)

.04
(.04)

% Firearm

-.27***
(.08)

-.13*
(.08)

-.21**
(.08)

-.24***
(.04)

% Plea

.47**
(.18)

.58***
(.16)

.21
(.17)

.18
(.21)

% Mandatory
Minimum

-.07
(.16)

-.04
(.12)

-.25*
(.15)

-.33***
(.09)

% Substantial
Assistance

-

-

.01
(.02)

-.07**
(-.03)

Caseload

.015
(.010)

.010
(.011)

.01
(.01)

-.001
(.008)

% Above
Median Sentence

.28*
(.14)

.22
(.15)

.38**
(.15)

.43**
(.14)

Border District

-

16.89***
(1.47)

-

22.84***
(2.43)

Southern District

-

-7.18***
(.74)

-

-5.79***
(.32)

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2 (within R2 for FE models)
.626
.407
.623
.655
Root Mean2 Error
10.29
8.47
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
n=1440
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)
Note: Driscoll Kray standard errors in parentheses,
** % Male Offenders, %Immigration, and %Drug Trafficking, and %Fraud omitted from Table 1 due to lack of significance in any model.
See Appendix B for full table.
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Figure 2: Expected Rates of Judge-Initiated Departures based upon Q1 and
Q3 levels of State Crime Rates and State Liberalism, Respectively
25.0%
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20.0%

21.5%

15.0%
10.0%
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Q1: 13.8
State
Liberalism
Score

Q3: 637
Violent
Crimes
Per 100k

*Note: Fixed-Effect Model, All Other Variables Held at Means.
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Q3: 20
State
Liberalism
Score

Appendix A: Description and Coding of Variables
State Crime Rate

# of Violent Crimes per 100,000 citizens in each U.S. State in each calendar year

State Liberalism

Enns and Koch (2013) Measure of Liberalism for Every State from 1996-2010
Dummy variable coded based on the proportion of each Fiscal Year that US v. Booker was in effect.

Booker

*Note: all Fiscal Years prior to FY2005 were coded 0, all Fiscal Years after FY2005 were coded 1. FY2005
was coded as .745 reflecting the proportion of sentences after US v. Booker was decided*
Dummy variable coded based on the proportion of the Fiscal Year that the PROTECT Act was in effect.

PROTECT Act

*Note: all Fiscal Years prior to 2003 were coded 0, all Fiscal Years after 2005 were coded 1. FY2003 was
coded .417 reflecting the proportion of sentences in FY2003 after the PROTECT Act was enacted. FY2005
was coded as .255 reflecting the proportion of sentences after the PROTECT Act was partially overturned by
US v. Booker.*
# of active, full-time District Court Judges in Each District and Fiscal Year.

# of Judges

*Note: Judges must be active full-time for more than (50%) of a Fiscal Year to be included in measure
**Note: “Senior Status” judges, with significantly reduced caseloads were excluded (See Fischman and
Schanzenbach 2011)

% Democrat
Judges

% of “# of Judges” Appointed by a Democratic President in each District and Fiscal Year.

# of Districts Per State
% Male
Offenders
% African-Americans
Offenders

Total # of Federal Districts per State
% Male Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year
% African-Americans Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Hispanic
Offenders

% Hispanic Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Drug
Trafficking

% of Total Offenses that were Classified as Drug Trafficking by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Firearm

% of Total Offenses that were Classified as Firearms by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Immigration
% Fraud
% Plea

% of Total Offenses that were Classified as Immigration by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year
% of Total Offenses that were Classified as Fraud by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year
% of Sentences that Followed Conviction by Plea agreement, as Opposed to Conviction by Trial in Each
District and Fiscal Year

% Mandatory
Minimum

% of Sentences Subject to a Statutory Mandatory Minimum Penalty in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Substantial
Assistance

% Of Sentences That Received 5.K 1.1 Departures From The Guideline Range Based Upon Providing
“Substantial Assistance” To The Government in the Prosecution of Another in Each District And Fiscal Year

Caseload

# of Criminal Findings per Authorized Judgeship in Each District and Fiscal Year

% Above
Median Sentence

% of Sentences in Each District and Fiscal Year that fell above the Median Sentence for that same Fiscal Year
across the United States

Border District

Dummy Variable Coded 1 for the Southern District of California, Arizona, New Mexico, the Western District
of Texas, and the Southern District of California and Coded 0 for all Other Districts.
Dummy Variable Coded 1 for all districts within the US Census Bureau Identified “South”, and coded “0” for
all other districts

Southern District

*Note: This includes all districts within Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia,
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, Maryland, and
Delaware*
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Appendix B: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward Departure %
and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 1996-2011) (Full Model)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)
(1)

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)
(2)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effects)
(3)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)
(4)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate
-.011***
-.007***
-.010***
-.005***
(.002)
(.001)
(.002)
(.001)

State Liberalism

.20*
(.09)

.52***
(.06)

.32*
(.17)

.41***
(.08)

Booker

9.18***
(2.56)

6.59***
(0.15)

13.21***
(3.06)

13.18***
(2.34)

PROTECT Act

-5.04***
(1.22)

-7.76***
(1.61)

-6.07***
(1.78)

-6.80***
(1.75)

% Democrat
Judges

06***
(.01)

.002
(.054)

.07***
(.01)

.04**
(.01)

# of Districts
In State

-

1.76***
(.35)

-

.81*
(.39)

# of Judges

-.43
(-0.66)

.19**
(.07)

-.70
(.41)

.09
(.08)

% Male
Offenders

-.09
(.09)

.13
(.10)

.17
(.07)

.07
(.08)

% African-American
Offenders

-.07**
(.03)

.03
(.03)

-.04*
(.03)

-.003
(.02)

% Hispanic
Offenders

-.12**
(.05)

-.05*
(.03)

-.05
(.06)

.04
(.04)

% Drug
Trafficking

.24*
(.13)

.10
(0.15)

.02
(.11)

-.01
(.07)

% Firearm

-.27***
(.08)

-.13*
(.08)

-.21**
(.08)

-.24***
(.04)

% Immigration

.06
(.06)

.05
(.06)

.02
(.07)

.03
(.06)

% Fraud

.03
(.06)

.12
(.08)

.02
(.06)

.02
(.07)

% Plea

.47**
(.18)

.58***
(.16)

.21
(.17)

.18
(.21)

% Mandatory
Minimum

-.07
(.16)

-.04
(.12)

-.25*
(.15)

-.33***
(.09)

% Substantial
Assistance

-

-

.01
(.02)

-.07**
(.03)

Caseload

.015
(.010)

.010
(.011)

.01
(.01)

-.001
(.008)

% Above
Median Sentence

.28*
(.14)

.22
(.15)

.38**
(.15)

.43**
(.14)

Border District

-

Southern District

-

16.89***
(1.47)

-

22.84***
(2.43)

-7.18***
-5.79***
(.74)
(.32)
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2 (within R2 for FE models)
.626
.407
.623
.655
Root Mean2 Error
10.29
8.47
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Driscoll Kray standard errors in parentheses,
n=1440
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)
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Appendix C: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total
Downward Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90
districts (FY 1996-2011)
*Utilizing GLS Estimator (For Random Effects Models) and Fixed Effects
Estimator, with District-Clustered Standard Errors.
**Control Variables omitted. Contact Author for Full Tables.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate

-.009*
(.004)

-.006*
(.003)

-.010**
(.004)

-.006**
(.003)

State Liberalism

.16
(.10)

.29*
(.10)

.30**
(.09)

.36***
(.08)

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2 (within R2 for FE models)
.38
.46
.62
.64
Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses,

n=1440

*p<.05
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**p<.01

***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)

Appendix D: Random Effects Determinants of District Total Downward
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY
1996-2011)
*Utilizing OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors.
*Control Variables Omitted. Contact Author for Full Tables.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Total
Judge-Initiated
Judge-Initiated
Downward
Downward
Downward
Downward
Departure %
Departure %
Departure %
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)
(Random Effects)
(Fixed Effects)
(Random Effects)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate

-

-.007***
(.001)

-

-.005***
(.001)

State Liberalism

-

.52***
(.08)

-

.41***
(.08)

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2
.42
.66
Note: panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses,

n=1440

*p<.05
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**p<.01

***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)

Appendix E: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY
1996-2011)
*Utilizing Matching FY and Calendar Year Variables
**Control Variables Omitted. Contact Author for Full Tables.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate

-.012***
(.003)

-.006**
(.003)

-.010***
(.003)

-.005**
(.002)

State Liberalism

.15
(.11)

.48***
(.07)

.28*
(.16)

.41***
(.08)

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2 (within R2 for FE models)
.38
.42
.62
.66
Note: Driscoll-Kray standard errors in parentheses,

n=1440

*p<.05
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**p<.01

***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)

Appendix F: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY
1996-2011)
*Including Year Dummies.
**Control Variables Omitted. Contact Author for Full Tables.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effect)

Total
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Fixed Effects)

Judge-Initiated
Downward
Departure %
(Random Effects)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________________________________
State Crime Rate

-.006*
(.002)

-.005***
(.001)

-.005**
(.002)

-.004***
(.002)

State Liberalism

.25*
(.09)

.54***
(.07)

.34*
(.13)

.41***
(.08)

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
R2 (within R2 for FE models)
.53
.45
.70
.66
Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses,

n=1440

*p<.05
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**p<.01

***p<.001 (one-tailed tests)

Chapter 4:
“In Their Words: The Sentencing Decisions
of Federal District Court Judges According to
Judges and Attorneys.”
Abstract:

Previous quantitative studies of federal district court judges have largely focused
on the impact of partisan or ideological preferences of judges. While a valuable inquiry,
I argue that these studies fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of district judge
behavior, due to the lack of attention to local contextual influences within district court
judges’ individual districts. In the context of the criminal sentencing, many scholars
acknowledge the import of local contextual factors but analyses are too often reduced to
generalities, such as “culture”, leaving several questions unanswered. To gain a deeper
understanding of district court judges’ criminal sentencing decisions, I conduct nineteen
semi-structured interviews with district court judges, former district court judges, and
experienced criminal attorneys in four selected districts. Interview subjects were asked
both to opine on district court judges’ sentencing behavior generally and to assess
whether four specific contextual factors impacted judicial sentencing decisions: 1) local
legal community opinion; 2) public opinion; 3) incarceration rates; and 4) crime rates.
Results were mixed for each factor and there was a lack of consensus amongst subjects
as to whether district court judges are influenced by the identified contextual factors.
However, the vast majority of subjects cited at least one contextual factor as influential in
shaping district court judges’ sentencing decisions. More broadly the results advance
understandings of district judge sentencing behavior by providing evidence both that
certain judges actually altered their sentencing preferences in response to changing
conditions and that partisan/ideological differences in district judges may be relatively
unimportant in explaining differences in sentencing decisions.

“[Criminal sentencing] is a very important task of judges. It takes a lot of
reflection. Families of victims and litigants are very concerned about what
happens. Judges have to take their time to get it right and do justice.”
-Former Federal District Court Judge

Introduction.
As the above-quote illustrates, criminal sentencing is one of the most important tasks
federal district court judges face. But not only are these decisions important, they are also
incredibly complicated. The complex federal sentencing process compels district court judges to
consider many different factors, most of which they have no personal control over. These
include the facts of each case, the personal qualities of individual offenders, the recommended
sentence range of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the application of
other relevant legal standards, and many additional considerations posed by both prosecuting and
defense attorneys. Each of these factors undoubtedly plays a role in sentencing outcomes. Yet
despite these external elements, in the majority of federal cases64, and as illustrated by the abovequote, the ultimate decision for the “appropriate” sentence rests with district judges’ themselves.
Given this important role, and given the increasing attention to the deleterious effects
mass incarceration has on society (Currie 2013; Alexander 2012; Pattillo, et. al. 2004; Western
2002), it is imperative to understand what factors district court judges consider when they make
their sentencing decisions. Many recent research efforts have studied the more general question
of what inputs account for sentencing disparities for similar crimes in the federal system (Lynch
and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002). Other research has framed the
issue in terms of how district judges’ partisan preferences interact with changing legal
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A substantial minority of federal offenders (between 20-30% depending on the year) are convicted of crimes that
carry a “mandatory minimum” penalty, in which district judges have no discretion to unilaterally sentence criminals
to shorter sentences than the proscribed statutory period (USSC 2011).
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constraints on their sentencing discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach
2011).
This research has provided improved understandings of why we observe disparities in
sentencing outcomes for similarly situated offenders (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn
2010; Kautt 2002; Mustard 2001). It has also shown how recent legal developments have
allowed district court judges to obtain authority to arrive at their preferred sentence (Epstein, et.
al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). However, I claim that this research has left two
major questions pertinent to federal sentencing policy largely unanswered: 1) the sustained
decline in the punitive behavior of district judges over time; and 2) the observed geographic
variation in the sentencing behavior of district judges.
I argue that these two phenomena are best explained not by simply the
partisan/ideological preferences of district judges or by changes in levels of judicial discretion,
but instead by certain district-specific contextual factors. Specifically, in this work, I study the
potential impact of four such contextual factors: 1) the punitive preferences of legal elites; 2) the
punitive preferences of the broader public; 3) crime rates; and 4) incarceration rates. The
theoretical basis for each of these factors is explained in greater detail both in Chapters 1-3 and
below. But the broader theory of contextual influence is based upon the logic that district judges
both care about their professional reputations within their respective district and the policy
consequences of their decisions in these districts. Thus, to the extent both punitive preferences
among certain groups and relevant objective conditions in communities vary across time and
space, these differences will partially explain differences in district judges’ decisions.
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation have used various quantitative methods to
empirically test variants of this central question of contextual influence. This chapter takes a
different approach. Namely, I employ qualitative phone-interviews with elite legal actors who
possess substantial experience in federal sentencing. Interview subjects include current district
judges, former district judges, former and current U.S. attorneys, federal public defenders, and
private practice criminal defense attorneys. As I will argue, this interview-based methodology is
particularly well-suited for a study of district judge behavior, because it can provide a deeper
understanding of the different contexts in which district court judges operate.
In this chapter, I proceed as follows. First, I briefly review and summarize different
theoretical perspectives of judicial behavior and explain their application to federal sentencing.
Second, I explore the two specific puzzles left unexplained by previous sentencing research.
Third, I discuss the value of using qualitative interviews as part of a mixed-methods approach to
uncover determinants of district court sentencing behavior. Fourth, I explain and defend the
methods used to gather interview subject and collect data. Fifth, I present the results of the
research, intermixing both descriptive statistics and specific quotes from interview subjects.
Finally, I assess how the results square with various theories and discuss potential avenues for
future research.
Theories of Judicial Behavior in the Context of Federal Sentencing
There is general scholarly consensus that trial court behavior is understudied in the subfield of judicial behavior (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Posner 2010; Kim, et. al. 2009). Part of the
difficulty with empirical studies of trial court behavior is that scholars have fewer tools at their
disposal for analyzing and comparing trial courts when compared with appellate courts. First,
appellate judges generally sit on panels with other judges. Thus, multiple judges vote on the
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outcome of the exact same case. In contrast, trial judges adjudicate cases solely, and it is rare for
any two trial judges to hear the exact same case. This feature obviously makes testing theories of
trial court behavior relatively difficult.
Another difficulty for scholars of trial courts is the dearth of written opinions. Appellate
cases almost always produce written opinions, wherein judges/justices justify and explain their
decisions. Accordingly, studies of appellate voting behavior (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Epstein
and Knight 1997) or citation decisions (Hinkle 2015; Hume 2009) can provide insight into how
jurists arrive at their decisions. In the absence of written opinions or voting data, studies of trial
court judge behavior must often use more creative approaches.65
Despite the potential research limitations facing students of trial judges, several scholars
have sought to explain the motivations behind trial court behavior. While general theories of
trial judges posit that judges are influenced by a multitude of factors (Kim, et. al. 2009; Rowland
and Carp 1996; Kritzer 1978), some determinants have received more scholarly attention than
others. To cite the most prominent example, several research efforts examine the impact of
judges’ personal partisanship and/or ideology on case outcomes. Some of this scholarship finds
that, like appellate judges, trial judges’ decisions are strongly influenced by their partisanship or
ideology (Sisk & Heise 2012; Stidham, et. al. 1996; Rowland, et. al. 1996). In contrast, other
research on trial courts has found little or no impact of partisan or ideological variables (Zorn &
Bowie 2010; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995). While certainly valuable to the study of trial court
behavior, a debate focused solely on whether partisanship or ideology impacts decisions
potentially overlooks other potentially important explanations.

65

For example, in their study of California trial judges, Blank, et. al. (1989) videotape judges presiding over
criminal trials and then code the judges’ verbal and nonverbal behavior along ten different paradigms (e.g. warm/not
warm, professional/non-professional).
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Specifically, I argue that contextual factors, related to the environments in which trial
judges sit, can ultimately shape these judges’ decisions. This is not a novel view. Several
scholars of judicial behavior have demonstrated that trial judges’ decisions often depend upon
the different contexts in which they make these decisions (Rowland & Carp 1996; Kritzer, et. al.
1993; Gibson 1980; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973; Peltason 1964; Vines 1961).66
But with respect to federal criminal sentencing, what type of contextual variables might
we expect to be influential? Stated differently, what different conditions might explain
differences in district judges’ sentencing decisions? I posit four potential sources of contextual
influence worthy of exploration.
Reputational Factors: Local Legal Community Influence & Public Influence
Both for reasons of career advancement (Morriss, et. al. 2005) and for the personal desire
to be liked and respected (Posner 2010; Baum 1994), many district judges desire to foster a good
reputation within the local legal community. Baum (2006) argues that judges with limited
jurisdiction, such as district judges, see lawyers whom they interact with as a key audience
whose opinions “may sway judges” (98).
In fact, I argue that federal criminal sentencing is one area we would particularly expect
to observe influence from the local legal community. This is first because the majority of
members of the legal community view the current federal sentencing regime as both incredibly
important and overly punitive (Hofer and Allenbaugh 2003; Sisk, et. al. 1998). Thus, district
judges’ sentencing reputations are likely to be a significant factor upon which legal community
evaluations of them are made. In addition, there is strong evidence that district-specific legal
norms affect sentencing outcomes in separate districts (Ulmer 2005). Likely due to measurement
difficulties, these works do not specifically study the connection between the punitive preference
66

For a more thorough review of these pieces, see Chapter 1.
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of the legal community and district judge sentencing. Yet the fact that district-specific legal
norms impact sentencing outcomes suggests that local legal communities may hold some
influence over district judges.
It is also quite plausible that the punitive preferences of the general public affect the
sentencing behavior of district judges. The extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court takes on a
“representational role” and responds to public opinion has been the subject of much debate in the
judicial behavior sub-field (Casillas, et. al. 2011; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Mishler and Sheehan
1996). Yet because district judges live and work within specific local districts, and because they
deal directly with members of their community every day, it is likely that these trial judges are
more representative of the local public than appellate judges (Rowland and Carp 1996).
Indeed, studies of district judges from past decades often tested the impact of public
influence on district judges (Silver and Shapiro 1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973, 1977; Peltason
1971; Vines 1964). Indeed, with respect to criminal sentencing, Cook (1973) finds that the
decline in public support for the Vietnam War caused district judges to be less punitive in their
sentences for draft dodgers. Yet recent Guideline-era sentencing scholarship has largely ignored
any role in public influence on district judges. This is in spite of the fact that the public’s
punitive preferences vary by region (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001) and have changed markedly
over time (Enns 2014). Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it is possible
that the public’s ideological preferences explain regional and temporal differences in judges’
sentencing behavior.67 Still, whether district judges actually consider public preferences when
making individual sentencing decisions remains an open question.
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There is serious debate regarding causality and reputational influences. Segal and Spaeth (2002) argue that any
public influence on unelected judges is likely indirect, as judges are simply members of the public. On the other
hand, Mishler and Sheehan (1996) and Casillas, et. al. (2011), argue that direct influence is present and that judges
are actually responsive to public opinion some degree. My theoretical perspective is consistent with aspects of both
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Objective Conditions: Crime Rates & Incarceration Rates
Aside from reputation-based factors, another source of potential contextual influence on
district court judges are the objective conditions related to crime and punishment in their local
community. The reasoning for why these facts might influence judges is based on the
assumption that judges seek to make their own view of good public policy (Epstein, et. al. 2013;
Posner 2010; Posner 2009; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Songer 1979). Undoubtedly, judges’ views
of “good policy” are shaped by individual factors, such as personal partisanship, political
ideology, and personal background (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Sisk and Heise
2012). However, I argue that these explanations are important but incomplete. Given district
court judges’ social connections with their geographic constituency, judicial views of “good”
policy are likely supplemented by salient conditions existing in their community.
Assuming judges sometimes seek to bring about the “best” consequences with their
decisions (Posner 2009; Songer 1979), it is at least plausible that judges’ normative evaluations
are informed by pertinent objective information, in addition to any preexisting partisan or
ideological biases. While social scientists have studied the impact of objective conditions on the
behavior of the general public (Page, et. al., 1987) and other policymakers (Jones & Baumgartner
2005; Cohen 1999), there has been little testing with respect to judges. Since trial judges
generally live and work in the communities where they have jurisdiction (Rowland and Carp
1996), it is likely that the conditions in these communities are an important determinant of
judges’ “preferences.”

sides of the debate. In other words I would expect judges to adjust their behavior to conform to the opinions of
those audiences they seek a good reputation with. However, in lieu of direct influence, to the extent judges simply
hold preferences that are consistent with local legal elites or the local public, this is consistent with my argument
that sentencing outcomes must be viewed through the prism of local contexts (see Chapter 1, Figure 1).
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The two objective conditions I address in this work are crime rates and incarceration
rates. The logic underlying crime rate influence on sentencing behavior is that higher crime will
prod judges to punish and deter criminal offenders through longer sentences. There is also some
evidence for this phenomenon. Both Gibson (1980) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that
state-elected judges sentenced criminals more harshly in higher crime rate areas. In addition,
several of the models presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation found a relationship between
high crime rates and fewer below-Guideline sentences. However, the question is not settled as
Johnson, et. al. (2008) found no relationship between crime rates and sentence length for certain
federal crimes at a given point in time. 68 In addition, there are many potential conflating factors
intertwined with crime rates (urban/rural areas, caseloads, etc.), which might explain correlations
between crime rates and sentences. Overall, all of the above suggests further inquiry into the
crime rate/judicial sentences connection is prudent.
The reasoning behind incarceration rate influence on district judges’ sentencing
preferences is slightly different. Here, the logic is that, despite their defined role as neutral
arbiters of the law, judges generally seek to arrive at decisions that provide the most workable
consequences (Posner 2009). This notion of judges as pragmatists suggests that they seek to
avoid or mitigate negative policy effects.
By 2016, it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that the policy of mass federal incarceration
is generally regarded as a failure in policy (Clear and Frost 2015). Large segments of both major
political parties in the United States are now supportive of sentencing reform efforts to reduce
the number of non-violent, incarcerated individuals.69 To a limited degree, district judges have
the opportunity to mitigate this policy of long sentences absent-congressional action. If district
68

For a further discussion of Johnson, et. al. (2008), see Chapter 3 of this Dissertation.
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See e.g. H.R. 3713; S. 2123
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judges truly see to make the best policy, it is likely that they would be influenced by the surge in
federal incarcerations and respond accordingly with more below-Guideline sentences.
To be sure, the effect of incarceration rates might depend on whether individual judges
see their role in government as active or passive (Scheb, et. al. 1993). Still, just as proponents of
the attitudinal model argue it is implausible to assume judges divorce their ideological
preferences from their decisions, I similarly argue it would be unreasonable to believe judges
will ignore pertinent objective facts. Stated differently, if some judges care about avoiding
negative policy consequences, it is likely those judges take account of pertinent facts relevant to
those policy consequences when making decisions.
Contextual Influence and Federal Sentencing
All of the above suggest that certain contextual factors could impact federal district court
judges’ sentencing decisions. Yet as discussed more thoroughly both in Chapter 3 and below,
most studies examining regional disparities in federal sentencing have tended to focus on
differences in prosecutorial practices while de-emphasizing the role of district judges (Lynch and
Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002). As to the studies that do focus on
judicial behavior, they are generally limited to “low hanging fruit” variables of judicial
partisanship and legal policy change, to the determinant of other potentially important contextual
factors, such as those itemized above (See e.g. Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach
2011).
Overall, these past studies have undoubtedly improved understandings both why we
observe sentence disparities within the complex federal sentencing system (Lynch and Omori
2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002) and how district judges have responded to
changes in their levels of discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).
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However, certain questions remain unanswered. In particular, there are two “puzzles” of federal
sentencing policy that persist. These are: 1) the gradual and continuing increase in belowGuideline sentences over time; and 2) extreme interdistrict variation in judges’ propensity to
grant below-Guideline sentences. As I argue in greater detail below, the answer to these two
“puzzles” may be explained by the above-discussed contextual influences.
Puzzle #1: Gradual Increases in Below-Guideline Sentences Over Time
Federal sentencing policy has changed drastically since the Guidelines were first
implemented in 1987. During the first few years after the Guidelines were implemented, federal
district court judges sentenced offenders below the Guideline recommended range in less than
20% of all cases (USSC 1995-2014). However, by Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2014, the last year data
was available, a majority of federal offenders were sentenced below the recommended range
(USSC 1995-2014). To be sure, part of the explanation for this marked change is the fact that in
a 2005 decision, the US Supreme Court clarified that the Guidelines were not “mandatory” but
rather “advisory” on federal district court judges (US v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Indeed, the
Sentencing Commission, along with several scholars, have provided strong evidence that the
Booker decision prompted district judges to sentence below the Guideline-recommended range at
increasing rates (Epstein, et. al. 2013; USSC 2012; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).
However, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, while Booker was clearly a
watershed moment that increased federal district judge sentencing discretion, Booker fails to
fully explain the dramatic and continued trend of district court judges sentencing offenders to
shorter sentences. If it were simply the case that district court judges were constrained in their
sentencing decisions pre-Booker but “freed” post-Booker to sentence their preference, we would
expect to see a dramatic increase in Guideline departures post-Booker, followed by a leveling off
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in the proportion of below-Guideline sentences. However, the raw data does not bear this fact
out, and below-Guideline sentences have continued to increase in later years.70 Current
explanations in the literature for the continued post-Booker increase in below-Guideline
sentences posit that judges are simply adjusting to the authority given to them by Booker
(Epstein, et. al. 2013).
This explanation, however, seems to underestimate the rationality of highly educated
district court judges. Booker clearly gave judges the freedom and authority to depart from
Guideline sentences. In FY 2006, the first full year after Booker was implemented, only 1.5% of
below-Guideline sentences were overturned by an appellate court (USSC 1995-2014). In other
words, as district court judges would surely be aware, there was a very small chance post-Booker
that any given sentence would be overturned on appeal for being “too lenient.” So assuming that
judges are rational actors who seek outcomes consistent with their preferences (Posner 2010), it
would seem strange indeed for judges to holster their authority to implement their ideal, more
lenient sentences for several years.
Puzzle #2 Inter-District Variation in Judicial Behavior
Despite the fact that the Guidelines are intended to be applied identically throughout the
country, there is extreme variation in sentencing outcomes among the ninety federal districts
(USSC 1995-2014). To be sure, several researchers have noted this phenomenon and conducted
empirical tests to uncover the sources of this variation in sentencing outcomes (Lynch and Omori
2014; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Ulmer 2005; Kautt
70

It is true that two Supreme Court decisions on December 10, 2007 further clarified that judges had wide discretion
to depart from Guideline-recommended decisions (United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); United States v.
Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)). However, these decisions were not of the same watershed character as Booker (2005).
Moreover, even we were to assume that the Kimbrough and Gall decisions gave judges the full power they needed
to sentence more leniently, these decisions not explain the continued increase in the proportion of sentences below
the Guideline recommended range from 39.1% in FY 2008 to 51.8% in FY 2014.
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2002). A central finding of these studies is that district differences in criminal sentences are
partially explained by the differing application and interpretation of sentencing procedures and
by district-specific prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer
2005; Kautt 2002). 71
This research focus on court-community norms and prosecutorial practices is important
and clearly helps explain much of the sentence-length disparity for offenders in different
districts. However this research has largely skirted the issue of why different judges might have
different sentencing preferences throughout the country.72 Yet an independent focus on judges is
important. Regardless of any district-specific differences in prosecutorial practices, there is still
marked district variation in how often district judges themselves choose to depart from the
Guidelines (USSC 1995-2014).73 If we truly want to understand these regional differences in
district judges’ sentencing, a deeper inquiry into the decision-making process of judges is
warranted.
Two Birds with One Stone: Local Contextual Influences
I posit that a potential explanation for both of the above described puzzles is local,
contextual influence. District judges are residents and members of local communities. It is true
that district court judges are unelected, enjoy life tenure, and are instructed by law to ignore
social and personal considerations. Despite these facts, as discussed in more detail above, there
is a wealth of evidence that district court judges care about their reputations in their communities
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For a more thorough summary of the findings of these individual pieces of research, see Chapter 3.
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Indeed, Kautt (2002) models judicial departure rates as an independent variable for explaining sentencing
disparity.
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See Chapter 3, Footnote 41. To be sure, not all of the differences in judge-initiated departures exemplified in said
footnote can be attributed to differences in district judges’ sentencing preferences, as the composition of offenses
and offenders also varies across districts. Still, this stark difference in judge-initiated departure rates exemplifies
how different prosecutorial policies are insufficient to explain differences between districts.
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(Rowland and Carp 1996; Kritzer 1978; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964). Relatedly, there is further
evidence that judges gain utility from arriving at what they believe to be “good public policy”
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Posner 2009; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Songer 1979).
Applying this theoretical perspective of local contextual influence to federal sentencing, I
argue both reputational concerns and salient objective conditions help explain the two puzzles of
federal sentencing outlined above. More specifically, I submit that the dramatic and continually
increasing rate at which offenders are given below-Guideline sentences (“Puzzle #1”) is partially
explained by increasing evidence of the pernicious consequences of over-incarceration, the
falling crime rate, and more recently, the softening sentencing preferences among both legal
elites and the general public. As district judges are almost assuredly aware, over the past two
decades incarceration rates have increased significantly while crime rates have decreased. Due
to these facts, combined with the growing attention to the problem of incarceration, it is likely
district judges began viewing longer sentences as ineffective policies. Relatedly, as opinions
began to shift in a relatively less punitive direction74, judges’ opinions shifted in tandem.
Therefore, because of both reputational concerns and concerns over the policy consequences of
their decisions, district judges began adjusting their preferences and imposing less-draconian
sentences.
As to countrywide variation in district judges’ propensity to issue below-Guideline
sentences (“Puzzle #2”), I argue that the source of this variation can be partially explained by
local contextual influences on judges. Specifically, there is clearly great nationwide variation in
the punitive preferences of both elites and the general public (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). If
judges care about their reputations amongst either of these communities, it is quite reasonable to
74

See Enns (2014). While punitiveness has risen markedly among the public over the past several decades, there is
evidence suggesting that public punitiveness peaked in the mid-late 1990’s.

115

assume that their own sentencing behavior would, at least somewhat, reflect the preferences of
these communities (Baum 2006).
In a similar vein, I argue that varying crime rates also help explain regional variation in
judges’ punitive sentences across the country.75 As discussed above, judges in areas with higher
crime might see it as their duty to punish and deter criminals through longer sentences. This
factor is likely also linked to reputational concerns, as judges would not want to be perceived as
either failing to deal with a serious crime problem, or as being overly-punitive in a community
that has very little crime.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the four sources of contextual influence
outlined above are the only factors that might influence judges. We know many sentencing
outcomes are influenced by facts related to the individual offender and crime (e.g. the criminal
history of the offender, whether violence was used). Further, as discussed above, recent research
has also evidenced the importance of both prosecution policies (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and
Spohn 2010) and different levels of discretion for district judges (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman
and Schanzenbach 2011) in shaping sentencing outcomes. However, the four contextual
determinants probed herein (local legal community preferences, public preferences, crime rates,
and incarceration rates) are all theoretically relevant factors that have yet to be sufficiently
examined and may help account for the two puzzles of federal sentencing outlined above.
Interview-Based Research
To test my theoretical perspective, and to gain further insight into judicial sentencing
behavior more generally, I employ the method of phone-interviews with experienced actors in
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For quantitative of the impact of crime rates on judicial sentencing behavior, see Chapter 3 of this Dissertation.
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federal criminal sentencing.76 There are several reasons why use of this methodology is
appropriate. The most pertinent justification for qualitative, interview-based research is that it
allows for further mixed-method77 testing of my central argument of contextual influence on
district court judges’ criminal sentencing decisions.
Another reason to conduct interview-based research is its ability to assess the relative
value of competing theoretical perspectives, by inquiring as to the opinions of actors who
possess first-hand experience with district court judges’ sentencing decisions. This method has
proved valuable to political scientists studying the behavior of other policymakers, such as
Congress (MacDonald 2007; Zegart 2011) and the President (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995). In the
context of the sentencing behavior of district court judges, the present research will assist in
determining the relative importance of local contextual influences, personal partisan/ideological
factors (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011), prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014;
Ulmer 2005), or top-down change to legal policy (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and
Schanzenbach 2011; Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007).
Yet another reason to utilize the elite interviewing method is the dynamic nature of
federal sentencing. Regardless of geographic differences, a central question of this research is to
determine why district judges issued below Guideline sentences about one-third of the time in
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This interview-based approach was also used by Ulmer (2005) as part of his mixed-method approach to
understanding district differences in federal sentencing. While Ulmer’s (2005) study clearly demonstrated the value
of interviewing sentencing actors, the present study differs in important ways. Ulmer (2005) uses interviews largely
to determine how legal actors interpreted certain terms in sentencing parlance (e.g. “substantial assistance”) and how
these different interpretations could result in disparate sentences. My area of inquiry is distinct, as I seek to probe
exactly what factors judges look to in their general sentencing behavior.
77

Recall that Chapter 2 found little evidence of national-level sociopolitical or public influences on district court
sentencing, while Chapter 3 found support for more localized influence of both the crime rate and citizen ideology.
Irrespective of these findings, there remains value in using a multitude of methods for theory testing (Martin 2013).
In addition, interviews allow for the probing of previously to the probing of untested potential influences, such as
local legal community sentiment on sentencing policy.

117

the wake of Booker but now issue these sentences in over half of all cases (“Puzzle #1). These
types of inquiries, often referred to as “process tracing” attempt to determine the casual chain of
how certain events led to a particular policy outcome (George and Bennet 2005). Interviews
with elite policymakers has been identified as an important tool in the process tracing method, as
they allow for researchers to gain first-hand perspectives of how a policy output evolved in the
fashion that it did (Tansey 2007).
Furthermore, targeted interviews of elite policymakers or persons with experience
working with these policymakers can provide new insights into the thought processes of how
decisions are made (Beckmann and Hall 2013). Regardless of any observed strength of
competing theories of judicial influence in quantitative models, probing interviews will provide
insight into the mechanism by which those theories derive their validity. Stated differently,
experienced interview subjects will be to opine as to why judges’ criminal sentencing decisions
are (or are not) affected by certain inputs.
Assuredly, interview-based research is not without difficulties78, and the opinions of
interview-subjects should be assessed critically for both their veracity and their reliability
(George and Bennett 2005). Yet, at minimum, the opinions of a diverse sample of actors with
years of experience in federal sentencing will provide additional insight into how sentencing
decisions are made and what factors are thought to be important to district court judges.
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See Bleich and Pekkanen (2013) for a more complete discussion of some the problems associated with interviewbased research. As will be explained in more detail, below, the present research design will attempt to mitigate the
effects of many of these difficulties.
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Methods
District Selection
The Federal Court system is made up of ninety79 federal districts. Due to time and
resource constraints, however, I chose to limit the pool of interview subjects to four districts80.
A random sampling of all ninety districts, while well-suited to make generalizations about
judicial behavior, would likely have led to only a single interview subject for each district
studied. This is not ideal for a research effort seeking to gain deeper understandings of local
contexts. On the other hand, a within-case study of a single district would also be problematic
due to issues of generalizability (George and Bennet 2005). In addition to the problem of
generalizability, a single case study could provide no insight into “Puzzle #2” relating to why
judges in different districts sentence differently. Thus, I choose a middle way between random
sampling and a single case-study.
In order to ensure the protection of subject confidentiality (Mosley 2013), the four
selected districts are will not be identified. However, in order to provide verifiable information
regarding case-selection, Table 1 provides aggregate and general information regarding the
selected districts. The purpose of Table 1 is to examine the extent to which the findings from the
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Not including the districts of the U.S. Territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana
Islands).
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Originally, I employed a most similar system (“MSS”) research design to select the four districts in question.
Application of the MSS method involves selecting cases that are similar in most fashions, but where we observe
variation in the proposed independent variables and in the dependent variable (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This
method allows researchers to control for many alternative explanations that might be causing the observed variation
in the dependent variable. However, due to the extremely small subset of interview subjects within each district, the
I was not able to make valid comparisons between districts. As a result, the analysis presented herein will largely
focus on the aggregate opinions of interview subjects as to whether contextual variables are affecting judges’
sentencing decisions, regardless of differences between the districts. In the future, I plan on expanding the subject
pool so as to be able to make stronger claims regarding judges operating in different environments.
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four selected districts can be generalized to federal district court judges in all ninety federal
districts
[Table 1 about here]
As can be seen from the center column of Table 1, many different areas of the country are
represented by the district pool. However, the right hand column of Table 1 also highlights
certain districts in the country not represented by the selection. Due to the limited number of
districts, the design was unable to include a small, rural district. There is also a lack of any
representation in this research of any Western districts, and not coincidentally, districts with
relatively large populations of Hispanic-Americans. Thus, to the extent district judges from
small/rural districts, Western districts, or districts with large Hispanic populations have unique
approaches to criminal sentencing, the present research will not be able to account for those
differences. The foregoing is certainly a limitation of this research, but future expansion of this
project will seek to address this issue through the inclusion of additional districts.
Identification of Subjects
Given that the present research is focused on the sentencing behavior of district judges,
the judges themselves are obviously an apt target for interviews. This tactic of interviewing
judges has been used before to test influences of judicial behavior (Levin 1972; Ulmer 2005;
Hilbink 2007). On the other hand, there are several reasons to not limit the inquiry to the
response of district court judges alone.
First, there are very real reasons to suspect that district court judges, especially sitting
judges81, would not be completely candid regarding their sentencing practices. Scholars of
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This concern of candidness is likely less problematic for retired district judges, who would doubtless be less
concerned with their reputations as jurists after leaving the bench. Still, due to the legal training and socialization
discussed below, it is still likely that retired judges might have a difficult time admitting any true extralegal
motivations for their sentencing behavior.
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judicial behavior have pointed out that judges are loathe to admit that any “extralegal”
considerations influence their decisions in individual cases (Carp & Stidham 1996). Perhaps
this is due to both legal formalistic training and legal socialization of judges, both of which
convince judges the law is blind to such considerations (Spaeth and Segal 2001). Perhaps
instead, judges understand that extralegal factors influence them, but due to the fact that they are
trained and instructed by law to ignore extralegal factors, it would hurt their reputation to admit
their influence. Regardless of the cause, these norms raise concerns that some district court
judges would not be candid about extralegal motivations, even in confidential interviews.
Secondly, judges themselves may not be able to accurately describe “why” they do the
things they do in criminal sentencing. Researchers of Congress have found that members have
difficulty explaining exactly why they vote the way they do (Kingdon 1981; Beckmann and Hall
2013). With respect to judges, many scholars associated with the legal realism movement are
skeptical that judges are able to attach their actual motivations to their behavior on the bench
(Tiller and Cross 1999).
Finally, limiting interviews to only federal district court judges would likely do damage
to the generalizability of the study. Recall that the aim of this research is to achieve a deeper
understanding of the sentencing behavior of district court judges who operate in different
contexts. Yet, given that district court judges decide cases individually and do not directly
observe the sentencing behavior of other judges within their districts, interviews with a small
proportion of judges or former judges from each district would not be appropriate for inferring
conclusions regarding the district generally. On the other hand, including perspectives from
persons with experience appearing before multiple judges within the district could more easily
generalize regarding “typical judges” in that district.
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Given these concerns, it is reasonable to supplement district court judge interviews with
interviews of non-judges. The non-judicial actors best situated to address judges’ sentencing
behavior are almost certainly attorneys. As argued recently by a prominent trial-court scholar,
researchers seeking to better understand trial court behavior would do well to incorporate studies
of attorneys into their approaches (Kritzer 2012). Indeed, as attorneys are often professionally
invested in the outcome of district court judges’ decisions, it seems as they would have some
insight into what factors affect judges in making these decisions.
The attorneys I specifically target as subjects are as follows: 1) attorneys working for
U.S. attorneys’ offices who prosecute offenders; 2) attorneys working for federal public
defenders’ offices, who provide criminal defense for indigent offenders; and 3) experienced
private-practice federal criminal defense attorneys. Given the potential for interested-parties to
have differing views on sentencing policy and judicial behavior (Ulmer 2005), it is important to
gain a broad perspective from both attorneys representing the government and those representing
the offenders. This tactic helps ensure results are not biased towards a particular source of
judicial influence based upon the experiences or incentives of a subset of actors (Bleich and
Pekkanen 2013).
In order for attorneys to be meet criteria as an interview subject, they must have
experience working in federal criminal sentencing within their district for over ten years. Ten
years of experience assures the subjects will have worked with enough judges in the district to be
able to make credible generalizations regarding district judge sentencing behavior. The ten year
time period is also not arbitrary. 2005 marks the year of the US v. Booker decision. As one
primary goal of this research effort is to explain the gradual, as opposed to abrupt, change in
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judicial Guideline adherence since 2005 (“Puzzle #1”), it is prudent to find subjects who could
speak to federal sentencing in the initial aftermath of Booker up through the present.
Contacting the Subjects82
I employ several different techniques to contact as many potential interview subjects as
possible. First, I contacted those individuals who unquestionably have knowledge and
experience in federal sentencing. In addition to being potential interview subjects, these subjects
are also “toehold” subjects who can lead to additional subjects (Beckmann and Hall 2013). The
toehold subjects I directly contacted in all four districts were: 1) the U.S. Attorney for each
district; 2) the Federal Public Defenders for each district; and 3) each retired83 U.S. district judge
in the federal districts. These subjects clearly meet the criteria of substantial experience in
federal sentencing, and twenty one subjects were contacted via this method.
As my initial means of contact, I sent written requests to all of the above persons, stating
the nature of the project, the purposes of the research, and a request for a 45 minute-1 hour phone
interview. The written letters also informed potential subjects that their confidentiality would be
protected and that I would be following up within one-two weeks by contacting recipients via
phone. After contacting these twenty one potential subjects by phone, I scheduled six interviews
with willing participants for a response rate of 29%. After scheduling the interview, I provided
subjects with both written and oral informed consent for their participation.
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This research design was approved and categorized as “exempt” by the West Virginia University Institutional
Review Board.
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Active district court judges in the four districts were not contacted directly due to their shared professional
addresses and concerns over subject confidentiality. In addition, active judges might be less likely to be candid, as
they are instructed by law to ignore many extralegal considerations that the interviews would probe (e.g. personal
partisanship or public opinion). However, as shown by Table 2, below, two active judges were eventually included
as interview subjects after being referred directly by other subjects.

123

Of course, there are several other persons who may have insight into federal sentencing
beyond the toehold respondents discussed above, such as private-practice criminal defense
attorneys. However, for this subject pool, I chose a purposive sampling method intended to
recruit subjects who could intelligently discuss as to the change and development of federal
sentencing practice over the past decade (See Tansey 2007). It would be imprudent to recruit
these subjects from a broad pool of attorneys who advertised federal criminal defense, as this
may include attorneys who had only recently or rarely appeared in federal court on criminal
matters.
Accordingly, in order to recruit additional qualified subjects, I used a second method: I
contacted all officers of the Federal Bar Association (“FBA”) chapters of each selected district
by e-mail correspondence and requested referrals. The FBA is an organization with over 17,000
members and 1,200 federal judges (FBA 2015). The FBA’s district chapters, among other tasks,
are charged with monitoring federal issues, providing opportunities for scholarship and
continuing education, and providing for professional and social interaction between attorneys
and judges (FBA 2015). The rationale for contacting the FBA officers is that the officers are
likely to have knowledge of the identities of the most experienced persons in the district with
respect to federal sentencing. The officers may or may not be involved in criminal law
themselves, but they likely will have served actively in their districts for long periods of time and
thus be able to refer experienced potential subjects. After making these contacts to sixteen
officers, I received eight e-mail responses and five referrals.84 Of these five referrals, two
subjects agreed to interviews, for a response rate of 40%. As with all subjects, these persons
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In order to protect subject confidentiality, I never communicated to any of the FBA officers whether their referral
resulted in an interview. Furthermore, specific quotes and results do not distinguish subjects based upon contact
method.
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were also provided both written and verbal informed consent of their participation in the
research.
Finally, at the conclusion of each interview, I asked all subjects if there was any other
person in their district that he/she believed could answer the interview questions or otherwise be
beneficial to this research effort. This strategy, known as “snowball sampling” is predicated on
the notion that persons with knowledge regarding a particular subject will be able to refer
researchers to other knowledgeable persons on the subject (Suchman and Cahill 1996). This
technique is especially fruitful in the area of federal criminal sentencing, where despite the large
amount of criminal cases adjudicated, there are often only a small number of “insider” attorneys
within each district (Narduli 1986).
One critique of snowball sampling is that it might lead to overrepresentation of a single
network of contacts, who share the same perspective (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013). Thus I made
clear to all respondents in my referral requests that I sought to get a wide range of interview
subjects and that I would welcome opposing or different perspectives from themselves. The
snowball sampling method led to sixteen referrals, and ultimately eleven subjects, with an
expectedly higher response rate of 69%. The overall response rate for all three methods of
contact was 45%.
Conducting the Interview & Coding Responses
When speaking with subjects, I used semi-structured interview techniques (Leech, et. al.
2013). I thus began with a list of prepared questions85, but left most questions open-ended for
subjects to answer them as they saw fit. I first asked general questions to gain insight into the
inputs of district court judges’ sentencing decisions. I also asked general probing questions,
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asking respondents to explain why they believed district court judges generally choose to apply
Guideline-recommended sentences or issue below-Guideline sentences. I asked similar general
questions regarding whether and why the subjects believed judges approached sentencing
differently over time, and what factors account for differences in judges in their sentencing
behavior.
After subjects gave general responses, I asked more specific yes/no questions regarding
potential influences86 of judicial sentencing behavior in the aggregate. For example, “generally
speaking, do you believe the political party of the sentencing judge (based upon the political
party of the appointing US President) affects departure decisions? If so, in what way?” It is the
responses to these questions, I utilized for testing competing theoretical perspectives
When coding results to specific areas of inquiry, I divided responses into three categories:
“agreement”, “qualified agreement” or “qualified disagreement/disagreement.” This coding
procedure became necessary as many respondents believed that certain factors were influential
on judicial sentencing decisions, but this influence were either secondary or conditional.
Examples of qualified agreement statements would be answers, such as “yes, for some judges
that matters” or “yes, in certain cases” or “yes, I think that plays some role.” Once the “qualified
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Notably, some interview researchers have critiqued questions intended to uncover the general influences on
policymaker behavior as too abstract and not necessarily likely to lead to valid and reliable results (Kingdon 1981;
Hall and Beckman 2013). The nature of the critique levied is that people do poorly at explaining why they do the
things they do or whether certain factors influence behavior, and it is better to ask respondents concrete questions
about specific results. However, as exemplified by the interview-research for MacDonald (2007) and Baumgartner,
et. al. (2009), when the substance of responses includes specific descriptions and examples of the issue being
probed, there is strong evidence that subjects’ yes/no responses to sources have influence have some facial validity.
As will be shown in the results below, subjects’ responses in the present study generally included this high level of
specificity. When subjects were asked about specific sources of influences on judicial sentencing policy, they would
often relay a pertinent anecdote or cite specific reasons as to why a factor was, or was not, important. Furthermore,
based on their responses, most subjects seemed to have previously considered whether inquired sources of influence
were relevant, providing further evidence that the subjects understood how sentencing decisions were made broadly.
Thus, in spite of critiques of questions on behavioral inputs, both the judge and non-judge subjects demonstrated
clear ability to competently opine on these sources of influence.
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agreement” category was added, it was fairly easy to categorize responses into one of the three
categories.
In reporting results, I incorporate both quotations from individual subjects and descriptive
statistics of aggregate responses to specific questions. The quotations are the primary focus of
the analysis, as they provide a more rich understanding of the thought process of district court
judges in making sentencing decisions. However, the use of descriptive statistics compliments
the quotes and allows for facial comparisons of different theories of judicial sentencing behavior.
Moreover, the use of the statistics alleviates qualitative research concerns of “cherry picked”
quotes that conform to the researcher’s theoretical perspective (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013).
Results
The Subjects
In total, I conducted nineteen approximately hour-long interviews with subjects. Each
district yielded at least four subjects and no district yielded more than six subjects. Some general
information regarding the subjects is set forth in Table 2 below.
[Table 2 about here]
As can be gleaned from Table 2, the pool of subject was extremely experienced. The
median subject had twenty four years of experience in federal sentencing practice in the district
and no subject has less than thirteen years of experience. In addition to this gross measure of
experience, qualitatively, all nineteen interview subjects characterized themselves as “very
familiar” with federal sentencing practice in their district.
As shown in the second row of Table 2, the interview subjects included six judges or
former judges and thirteen attorneys. Also of note there were seven subjects who practiced only
criminal-defense, two subjects working the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and four “hybrid” attorneys
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who formerly worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office but were now private practice defense
attorneys. Although unfortunate, this disparity of more defense attorneys was expected as the
U.S. Attorney’s Office is a hierarchical institution with published policies and opinions with
respect to federal sentencing (See. e.g. Holder 2010). Thus, U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S.
attorneys were expected to be more reticent about expressing personal opinions that may diverge
from these official positions.87 A mitigating factor that helps alleviate any concern of a defensebiased perspective is the four hybrid subjects who are former Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Thus, six
of the thirteen attorney interview subjects at least have some experience prosecuting cases for the
government.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 illustrate another major caveat to the results of this
research. The subject pool is disproportionately white and male. There are only three females,
two African Americans, and no Hispanic Americans in the subject pool. The pool is particularly
disproportionate as to gender (16% female), when considering the legal profession as a whole.
Based on the most recently available data, 34% of all lawyers and 33% of federal district court
judges are female (ABA 2014). Overall response rates were only slightly lower among women
(30% vs. 45%), but the real source of the gender disproportionality appears to be in the lack of
referrals to female subjects through the snowball sampling method (13% of referrals). This fact
perhaps underscores concerns that the snowball sampling method leads to overrepresentation of a
single, interconnected social group (Martin 2013).
However, the gender disparity in the subject pool might also be partially explained by the
requirement that subjects have at least ten years of experience in federal sentencing. Examining,
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As set forth below, all results reported herein reflect the personal opinion of the interview subject and the
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institution, or other entity.
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past data, the proportion of both practicing female attorneys and female district judges in 200388
was much greater aligned with the proportion of the females in the subject pool (ABA 2003).
Regardless of the causes of the disparity, interpretations of these results should bear in mind
potential biases from a disproportionately white, male perspective.
Individual Case/Offender Characteristics
As will be discussed throughout these results, there was very little consensus among the
interview-subjects as to what factors influence district court judges’ sentencing. There was
similarly little consensus as to what accounted for the two “puzzles” of sentencing identified
previously, namely: the continued increase in below-Guideline sentences after 2005 when the
Guidelines were declared “advisory (“Puzzle #1”); and interdistrict variation in judicial
application of the Guidelines (“Puzzle #2”). Thus, broad agreement amongst the interview
subjects was the exception, rather than the norm. However, there were certain aspects of federal
sentencing policy the vast majority of respondents agreed on and therefore merit some
discussion.
First, most respondents cited individual case facts as the most important, or one of the
most important factors, influencing a judge’s sentencing decision. Indeed, when asked the
general question of why judges choose to issue sentences below the Guideline-recommended
range, 89% of respondents cited factors specific to each individual case. Examples of these casespecific facts include the criminal history of the offender, whether violence was involved in the
offense, and whether the offender had familial responsibilities.
This finding that individual, case-specific factors are crucial to determining sentencing
outcomes is not at all surprising and is consistent with past sentencing research (Fischman and
Schanzenbach 2012; Ulmer, et. al. 2011; Mustard 2001).
88
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In 2003, 29% of all lawyers and 16.1% of all judges were female (ABA 2003).
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individual-case characteristics not because they are unimportant, but because many of these
factors are incorporated into the framework of the Sentencing Guidelines (e.g. whether violence
was involved, the criminal history of the offender, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility).
Thus, unless offender or offense characteristics have changed drastically over time, which does
not appear to be the case (USSC 1995-2014), these factors are very unlikely to be the cause of
the increasing trend of more lenient sentences over time (“Puzzle #1”).
However, some individual case characteristics, particularly offender traits such as the
race of the offenders, may partially explain interdistrict variation in judges’ sentencing behavior
(“Puzzle #2). There is strong evidence African Americans and Hispanic offenders ultimately
receive harsher sentences than similarly situated White offenders (USSC 2012; Mustard 2001).
Thus, to the extent district court judges hold these racial and ethnic biases, and levels of bias
vary throughout the country, it is possible these biases help explain differing sentencing behavior
among district court judges. Despite this possibility, recent research has largely rejected this
theory and found that racial disparities in sentencing outcomes are largely driven by
prosecutorial behavior rather than district court judge sentencing decisions (Hofer 2013;
Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012; Rehavi and Starr 2012).
This finding was supported by the interview subjects. When asked whether racial biases
impacted district court judges’ sentencing decisions in the aggregate, 74% disagreed. A subset
of the subjects who agreed dipartites existed argued that some district court judges were subject
to “unconscious biases89” that resulted in fewer below-Guideline sentences for African
Americans in the aggregate. However, the subjects90 responses in total support recent findings
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We should bear in mind, however, that 17 of 19 subjects were White, which could partially explain unwillingness
to acknowledge racial factors.
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that district court judges’ sentencing decisions are not the cause of the clear racial disparities that
exist in federal sentencing outcomes (See Hofer 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012;
Rehavi and Starr 2012; Mustard 2001).
On the other hand, subjects were much more willing to agree that the gender of the
offender affected judges’ sentencing decisions. 79% of all respondents and 80% of
judges/former judges admitted that, in the aggregate, women were more likely to receive a
below-Guideline departure.91 Taken together, the subjects’ responses suggest possibly that
gender but not race is a component of district court judges sentencing decisions. Another
possibility, however, is that subjects responses merely reflect the psychological propensity for
people to be more willing to accept and admit gender biases as opposed to racial biases (See
Czopp, et. al. 2003).
Judicial Discretion
Moving beyond individual-level factors, another area of consensus amongst subjects was
their policy agreement with the ruling in the 2005 case of US v. Booker that rendered the
Guidelines advisory. All but one subject (94%) expressed agreement with Booker and preferred
a system of “advisory” Guidelines to “mandatory” Guidelines. Indeed, only about half of
subjects supported the existence of the Guidelines at all. As to the proscribed sentence ranges in
the Guidelines themselves, one subject summarized the general sentiment of the subjects by
stating, “as a general rule, the Guidelines are perhaps a little too punitive.”92 While U.S. Attorney
and judges/former judge subjects were less likely to be critical of the Guidelines than defense
attorneys, many of them cited certain overly punitive Guidelines as grounds for why they agreed

91
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with Booker.

Not a single subject suggested the Guidelines were not punitive enough in

general. Nor did any subject give any example or anecdote of a Guideline sentence for a
particular crime that provided for insufficient penalties.
These results are important, because they indicate that there is some consensus in the
legal community that the Guidelines are too punitive. This is not a surprising finding, and is
consistent with past surveys of Guideline criticisms in the legal community (Hofer and
Allenbaugh 2003). The finding is, however, a necessary condition of the reputational aspect of
my theoretical perspective, which argues that judges’ reduced adherence to the Guidelines over
time is partially explained by the legal-community’s growing hostility to harsh, determinant
sentences. If we observed substantial disagreement regarding the wisdom of Booker or the
punitive nature of the Guidelines, it would be more difficult to claim that the legal community
was influencing judges in a less punitive direction. The fact that the subjects almost uniformly
expressed support for discretionary sentencing means that a theory of legal-community influence
retains plausibility.
Differences in Judges
A final point of consensus by the interview subjects was simply that different judges look
to different factors when making their sentencing decisions. The most common qualifier
amongst subjects in their responses to whether certain factors were influential was “for some
judges.” In other words, despite question framing using terminology such as “in general”
subjects were hesitant to lump all judges into one category and stressed the variability of judges.
One interview subject described judicial individuality by stating each judge has a “sentencing
persona” that he/she takes on, and the differences in these personas are clearly observable in
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sentencing outcomes.93 This finding of variability amongst district court judges will be discussed
in greater detail below, but as an initial matter, it clearly calls into question any parsimonious and
simplistic explanations of how district court judges sentence offenders.
Local/Contextual Influence
Before analyzing the subjects responses to specific questions on potential sources of
influence, it is prudent to get a senses of whether subjects agreed in general that judges could be
influenced by local contextual factors. Responses to this general question serve as a test of facial
validity of my theoretical perspective. If a strong majority of experienced subjects in federal
sentencing do not believe that district court judges responded to contextual influences in
sentencing decisions, it would be difficult to sustain support for the argument that these factors
are important.
Subjects, however, were generally supportive of the notion of local contextual influence
on sentencing decisions. 15 of 19 subjects (79%) expressed agreement or qualified agreement
that the local environment impacted district court sentencing decisions. As will be discussed in
greater detail below, there was much greater disagreement amongst subjects regarding the
source(s) or reasons for this contextual influence. But it is noteworthy that several subjects
believed that local, contextual factors played at least some role in shaping sentencing outcomes.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of subject agreement/disagreement with the four
queried sources of local contextual influence. As can be gleaned from Table 3, there was little
agreement among respondents as to whether these individual factors influence sentencing
decisions. None of the potential sources of influence was broadly supported by a large majority
of subjects. On the other hand, each variable had its fair share of proponents.
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[Table 3 about here]
As can also be seen from Table 3, there is fairly little difference in the levels of support
for each of the factors verified. Subjects were generally more likely to express unqualified
agreement that the “reputational” variables of local legal community or public impacted judges
than the “objective conditions” variables of crime rates and incarceration rates. But in general,
each potential source of influence was split fairly evenly between supporters and detractors.
This leads to the pertinent question of whether it was all the same subjects supporting the
importance of the various contextual influences. This was not the case. In addition to the
aforementioned result of 79% of subjects supporting the notion of general environmental
influences, 89% of subjects (17 of 19) agreed that at least one of the above four variables was
affecting judges. Thus, while there were two subjects in the sample who denied the impact of
contextual factors both in general and when asked specifically, a significant majority of
respondents agreed that at least one these influences had some impact on sentencing decisions.
a) Local Legal Community Opinion
As shown by Table 3, subjects disagreed whether judges’ ultimate sentencing decisions
were impacted by the opinion of the local legal community on sentencing policy. On the one
hand, many subjects expressed strong agreement that judges’ in their district were very much intune with the local legal community. One such subject stated as follows:
[This district] has one of the most active federal bar organizations in the country. The
Federal Bar consistently has the judges participate in events, come to lunches, head
discussion groups, host book conferences. [Judges] are very in tune of what is going on
in the legal community.94
Note, however, that the above quote does not specify whether this subject believes being
“in tune” with the legal community resulted in any change in judges’ criminal sentencing
94

Interview No. 3, August 6, 2015.

134

behavior. When asked this follow up, the subject responded, “I do think judges take into
consideration what is happening in [our district] when actually imposing sentences. It seeps
in.”95
Two other subjects reported that differences in local legal cultures were likely driving
any interdistrict variation in sentencing outcomes. One of said subjects argued there were
“cultures of practice96” related to sentencing within each district’s legal community, and judges
were a part of these cultures. The other subject stated that to the extent there remained
sentencing disparity across district this was probably due to different legal cultures.97
These subjects’ perspectives are supportive of my own theory that as members of a local
legal community, judges’ criminal sentencing will reflect that community. They are also
consistent with the findings of Ulmer (2005) and Lynch and Omori (2014) that different legal
cultures ultimately lead to different sentencing outcomes in different districts in similar cases.
However it should be noted, that not all subjects agreed the local legal community affected
judicial sentencing behavior.
One subject stated, “I think judges are actually more sensitive to other judges in other
jurisdictions. They don’t care what the local Bar thinks.”98 One former district court judge
acknowledged that judges’ are concerned about their reputation amongst the local legal
community, but denied that this concern had a tangible impact on their sentencing decisions.99
This former judge argued that judicial reputations in the legal community were linked to
perceptions of fairness and collegiality rather than the substance of the judges’ decisions.
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Notably, however, many attorney subjects belied this opinion and made normative judgments on
the quality of judges in their district based solely on their punitive tendencies in sentencing.100
Taken together, these results suggest that there is little consensus among actors
experienced in federal sentencing on the impact of the local legal community on judges’
decisions. Certain subjects explained how legal communities shape judges’ preferences, while
other subjects were more prone to view judges as uncaring towards local practices and opinions.
However, the fact remains that there is substantial interdistrict variation in how strictly judges
are applying the Guidelines (USSC 1995-2014). This variation is consistent across years and
cannot merely be the product of random chance (Ulmer 2005). Thus, to the extent interdistrict
variation is not explained by differing local legal cultures, it must be explained either by some
other district-specific factors.
b) Local Public Opinion
As shown by Table 3, there was slightly less agreement amongst subjects that sentencing
behavior was impacted by the public’s opinion on crime and punishment, as opposed to the
opinion of legal elites. One subject described the difference in his own district as follows,
“Judges are less influenced by the culture of the city or state. They are more influenced by the
courthouse community. [This District] is pretty progressive on criminal justice issues, but the
courthouse community is pretty dogmatic.”101
Despite this opinion, one former judge was happy to admit that the public’s view
impacted his decisions:
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I agree [that public views regarding crime influence judges]. Judges are part of
the community. We hear things and are very sensitive of the public. We read the
news. When we feel the public is outraged, we understand that. At the same
time, if there is perception that someone has been done an injustice, we are also
mindful of that.102
This statement perhaps reflects the strongest anecdote for how judges’ sentencing
behavior can be influenced by the public, especially it seems, when the public is paying
particular attention to crime or a particular offense. Interestingly, this subject was not alone in
volunteering the impact media coverage of crime might have on judges. Another defense
attorney subject when asked the question on public opinion influence, agreed that it was
influential and then gave an anecdote of how the judge justified his sentence:
Yes [the public influences judges’ sentencing], because [judges] live in the
community, most often. They read the papers, and they watch the news, and they
see the pain in the community. I just did a case that involved a weapon in federal
court and the judge slammed him. He went on a little speech and said ‘all you
have to do is listen to the news or read the paper to know that guns are illness in
our society, and you have to figure out a way to stop it.’103
While this anecdote may be more indicative of media influence and/or crime rate
influence on judges than it is demonstrative of direct public influence, it clearly shows how
judges’ connection to their communities can be important.
Yet another subject conditioned public influence on judicial sentencing decisions to “high
publicity cases.” These responses by the subjects regarding media attention and publicity
highlight an important issue regarding the mechanism by which the public may influence
sentencing decisions. If judges are concerned about their reputation in their community
regarding sentencing, it is very likely that there sentencing behavior may only be altered or
adjusted in cases of high media attention. This theory could be tested in future research by
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examining sentencing decisions by federal district courts in similar cases with varying levels of
publicity.
A related issue regarding public influence on the judiciary is the debate between scholars
like Mishler and Sheehan (1996) and Casillas, et. al. (2011) who argue that the public can
directly influence the judiciary, and Segal and Spaeth (2002) who instead claim that any public
influence is likely to be merely “indirect” as judges are members of the public. As discussed
above, some subjects supported the notion of indirect influence by describing judges as “people
too” whose opinions changed with changing conditions. However, it is noteworthy that at least
the quote of the former judge above seems to acknowledge some degree of direct influence (e.g.
“we are sensitive to that”). The debate is difficult to untangle and certainly not the focus of the
present study. Yet given recent evidence from Casillas, et. al. (2011), Nicholson-Crotty, et. al
(2009), it is worth exploring further whether or not the public directly influence district court
judges’ sentencing.
Finally, notwithstanding the views of several subjects, it is worth reiterating that a slight
majority of subjects (10 of 18) did not agree public views impact judges’ sentencing decisions in
general. As with many sources of influence examined, the results suggest a lack of consensus
and also that different judges pay attention to different inputs in their sentencing decisions.
While some judges surely are concerned with their reputation in both the broader community and
the legal community, some judges, in the words of one subject, “don’t give a shit104” about what
anybody else thinks.
c) Incarceration Rates
As shown by Table 3, results related to the incarceration rate were mixed. The relatively
high number of “qualified agreement” responses for this variable also suggests that many
104
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subjects believed the impact of high levels of incarceration on judicial sentencing was
conditional on other factors. One such condition might relate to the judges’ ideological
preferences. One subject stated,
It’s becoming more and more obvious we incarcerate more people in this country
than anywhere in the world, and it’s not accomplishing anything. But [the effect
of the incarceration rate on judges] depends on the ideological spectrum. More
conservative judges, still think ‘lock em up.’105
On the one hand, this view is consistent with my perspective of increased judicial
sensitivity to the social problem of incarceration. However, it is also supportive of the Fischman
and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) perspective that judges’ personal
partisan/ideological preferences are key to determining district judge sentencing behavior.
Future examinations of the potential effect incarceration rates have on judges’ sentencing
behavior should exhibit more closely whether liberal/Democratic judges might be more
influenced by the incarceration problem than conservative/Republican judges.
Another interesting aspect of the subjects’ responses to questions regarding incarceration
was its temporal nature. Specifically, many subjects described how only recently did they notice
judges becoming sensitive to the incarceration issue. One subject stated “more recently, judges
have become sensitive to [incarceration rates]. Historically, I don’t think they have, though I
don’t think judges cared about this at all.”106 This sentiment was echoed by another subject
stating, “A number of judges have been increasingly sensitive to [incarceration rates]. They are
seeing that locking these people up for a long time is not doing a thing.”107
The temporal nature of the effect of incarceration is further exemplified by the
comments of one federal district court judge describing his evolving views on sentencing,
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The longer I’ve been a judge, the more hostile I am to the system. My attitude
towards long sentences has significantly changed over time. I’m more conscious
of the lack of social utility of long sentences. If you want to really teach
[offenders] a lesson, you should do public shaming or lashes. That has social
utility….not just sending them to prison and forgetting about them. There is no
deterrent effect.108
This statement is somewhat striking in that it evidences a federal district judge supporting
the somewhat arcane form of punishment of public shaming. But the more relevant point is that
this judge is suggesting he engaged in some form of policy evaluation that altered his sentencing
preferences. This judge’s self-described change was apparently not aberrant. Another attorney
interview subject described a judge who had previously been an “unsympathetic former
prosecutor who put a lot of people in jail for a really long time.”109 However the judge “has now
seen the drug war is unwinnable” and “has become a much more lenient sentencer.”
These findings are supportive of my argument that judges’ views of good policy, and thus
their behavior, can change over time due to changing conditions (See Kritzer 1978). Based upon
the above two quotations, both of these district court judges used to believe that long sentences
were “good policy” but over the course of his years on the bench, they changed courses and
began to sentence offenders more leniently. The temporal aspect of the effect may help explain
why we continue to see lower sentences and more Guideline departures a decade after Booker
was decided (“Puzzle #1”).
However, it should not be overlooked that many subjects believed that district court
judges were not concerned with the broader social problem of incarceration. One former district
court judge described the lack of influence of incarceration rates as based on the role of judges,
“judges have an obligation to impose a sentence within a framework, in which the definition of
108
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crime and sentencing range are dictated by the legislative branch of the government.”110 Another
subject suggested that incarceration rates would likely influence judges in the future if they
became “part of the conversation” in the legal community, but in his view that had not yet
occurred in his district. Other subjects disagreed, and one assistant U.S. attorney subject
lamented that defense attorneys raise the issue of high incarceration “all the time” at sentencing
hearings, and that some judges have agreed with these attorneys and have justified lower
sentences by stating “the jails are overcrowded.”111
When viewed together, the mixed and conditional results of the effect of the
incarceration rate on sentencing behavior, likely reflect differences in judges. While many
judges might see incarceration as a social problem they can fix, some judges might restrain
themselves from exercising this role (Gibson 1978). Relatedly, some more conservative judges
may not see incarceration, in and of itself, as a problem at all and might be pre-disposed to agree
with Guideline sentences (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). Still, the responses in total
suggest that at least some judges under some conditions pay heed to social factors such as
incarceration when making their sentencing decisions.
d) Crime Rates
The second “objective condition” the subjects were asked about were crime rates. The
logic underlying crime rate influence on sentencing behavior is that higher crime will prod
judges to punish and deter criminal offenders through longer sentences. There is also some
evidence for this phenomenon found by Ulmer and Bradley (2006) and Gibson (1980) with
respect to state-elected judges, in addition to various models presented in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation.
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The results from the subjects’ responses on crime rate influence were mixed. As shown
in Table 3, the same percentage of respondents (53%) who believed incarceration rates were
impacting sentencing decisions believed crime rates were impacting sentencing behavior.112 One
notable difference in the responses to the two objective variables is that more subjects were more
willing to give unqualified support for the notion that crime rates affect sentencing decisions.
Curiously, however, the relatively unconditional support for the impact of crime rates on
sentencing decisions manifested itself in several different ways.
One U.S. attorney agreed wholeheartedly that high crime rates resulted in harsher
sentences by judges, and cheerfully attributed this judicial attention to the crime rate as the result
of the U.S. Attorney’s Office “pushing” the issue of societal crime into the judicial focus.113 One
defense attorney similarly agreed judges seek to address problems of higher crime through
longer sentences. Not surprisingly, however, this defense attorney had a different view on
whether judges should be doing this. He stated, “some judges foolishly believe the general
deterrence argument has some value.”114
This reference to “general deterrence” is the notion that longer sentences will deter future
individuals from engaging in similar behavior. The value of general deterrence is a largely
empirical question outside the purview of this research. However, the importance of the concept
to the present research is that this subject’s comments, implies that some judges do believe in
general deterrence.115 This suggests some judges view sentencing criminals as a task that goes
112

However, as noted above, these subjects were not all overlapping. Certain subjects believed the crime rate was
influential but not the incarceration rate, and vice versa.
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beyond arriving at individually just sentences, and consider their potential ability to control
future crimes.
On the other hand, one unexpected finding from subjects responding to questions on the
crime rate, was that some subjects expressed opinions that higher crime rates might actually
influence judges in a less punitive direction. One district judge acknowledged this possibility
with the following paraphrased116 statement related to drug crime in particular:
There is so much drug crime, it must have an influence. But it could work either
way. One way of looking at it would be judges in high crime areas don’t see the
point of incarcerating harshly, because the drug war is unwinnable. But another
way of looking at it is judges in these areas might sentence criminals more
harshly, because drugs are driving out business, and they want to punish and deter
perpetrators.117
Thus, this district judge suggested that high crime might pull judges in opposite
directions. This subject was not alone in proposing this alternative theory of higher crime
being associated with more lenient sentences. Indeed, two other subjects went further
and argued more forcefully that judges living in low-crime rural areas were less familiar
with serious crime, and thus were more prone to treat offenders as deviants and punish
them harshly.118 Notably, while these alternative theories for crime rate influence differ
from my expectation, they are consistent with my broader theoretical perspective of
contextual influence. In other words, many subjects agreed that the crime conditions in
judges’ communities will shape their sentencing behavior.
In summary, the crime-rate results were the very definition of mixed. While a majority
of subjects agreed the crime rates were influential on sentences in some circumstances, a
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substantial minority of subjects saw no impact. Moreover, those who did see an influence of the
crime rate disagreed about the direction of the effect.
Alternative Theoretical Perspectives
a) Partisan/Ideological Factors
In addition to probing potential exogenous contextual influences on district court
sentencing decisions, I also asked subjects regarding alternative sources of influence. One such
alternative theoretical perspective is that judges’ personal partisanship or ideology affects
whether they tend to issue relatively more or less punitive sentences. (Epstein, et. al. 2013;
Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012). However, the pool of subjects generally disagreed that
district court judges’ personal partisan or ideological preferences impacted their sentencing.
More precisely, the percentages of subjects who agreed119 district court judges’ party or ideology
influenced their sentences were only 26% and 37% respectively.
In their responses to these questions, many subjects volunteered specific examples. One
defense attorney stated, “probably the judge you want the most in my district is a Republican
appointee.”120 Another district court judge subject stated “political philosophy doesn’t always
translate to criminal sentencing” and explained that fiscal conservatives are now probably less
supportive of longer sentences.121 Similarly, other subjects described personal partisan or
ideological factors as “not accounting for a whole lot” of why judges approach sentencing
differently.122
Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, a lower proportion of subjects expressed general
agreement that either judges’ individual partisanship or ideology impacted sentencing outcomes
119
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than any of the four exogenous factors discussed above. Given the legal community’s reluctance
to admit the impact of partisan/ideological factors on outcomes even in the face of clear evidence
to the contrary (See e.g. Spaeth and Segal 1999), perhaps we should view subjects’ general lack
of agreement on the impact of partisan or ideologically factors with some skepticism. However,
given the relative lack of attention paid to contextual factors in past research, it is still an
important finding that subjects found partisan/ideological factors to be relatively less important.
b) Prosecutorial/Systemic Factors
On the other hand, consistent with recent studies (Lynch and Omori 2015; Ulmer 2005),
several subjects volunteered that the prosecutorial practices of district U.S. Attorney’s Offices
could ultimately impact sentences. When subjects were asked to elaborate on this point, many
cited the obvious fact that if the offender was convicted of an offense with the mandatory
minimum, then district court judges were unable to unilaterally123 sentence the offender to a
lower sentence. When questioned further regarding cases where judges do have discretion to
implement below-Guideline sentences, many subjects still believed that the prosecution’s
practices could impact judges.
One defense attorney discussed how defense attorneys were merely “reactors” to U.S.
attorneys.124 In other words, the parameters of a potential sentence are initially defined by the
U.S. attorney’s argument for why a Guideline sentence is appropriate. Thus, the likelihood of
judges granting a below-Guideline sentence was greatly dependent on whether and how
vigorously U.S. Attorneys initially sought Guideline sentences, even in non-mandatory minimum
cases.
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This finding of the importance of prosecutorial practices is consistent with previous
findings that individual districts have varying prosecutorial practices which impact sentencing
practice and help explain interdistrict variation in outcomes (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and
Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005). The finding also serves as a reminder of the constrained power of
district court judges within the federal sentencing system. While ultimate sentencing decisions
often do rest with district court judges, these judges still must operate within sentencing
institutions and are not free to simply impose their preferred sentences.
c) Increased Hostility towards Guideline Sentences: Judicial Habit
Regardless of any district-specific prosecutorial practices, the puzzle of ever-decreasing
Guideline adherence and shorter sentences since Booker (“Puzzle #1) suggests that there has
been a more national revolt by district court judges against relatively punitive, Guideline-range
sentences. Existing explanations for this phenomenon were simply that district court judges
were “getting used” to the authority granted to them under Booker (Epstein, et. al. 2013). Under
this theory, even after Booker, district judges were simply accustomed to granting Guideline
sentences and continued to do so in the years following Booker. As judges began realizing their
sentences would not be overturned on appeal from 2006-2015, they gradually imposed more
below-Guideline sentences.
As noted above, I was initially skeptical that district court judges would take such a long
time to react to the Booker decision. The alternative explanation I posited and inquired to
subjects was that district court judges became increasingly aware of the high costs of
incarceration and were responding to the failure of the policy of longer Guideline sentences.
Indeed, as discussed in detail above, many subjects expressed support for this explanation and
argued that judges were becoming more and more acceptant of the argument that long sentences
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for certain offenses were unjust and that many were willing to use their power to correct this
inequity.
However, and contrary to my own expectations, many subjects also expressed support for
the predominant “habit” theory. One subject described the post-Booker landscape as follows:
Booker began the revolution, but it took a little while for it to kick in. Humans
are creatures of habit. It’s also very judge dependent. Judges have different
attitudes about sentencing. Some see it as part of their job to use their discretion.
Others are more rule-bound and creatures of habit.125
Another subject described the lack of an immediate surge in below-Guideline sentences
after Booker as follows:
Booker was significant. It would be wrong to underestimate Booker. But judges
felt more constrained right after Booker. As they became more experienced and
other cases came down, the judges recognized their own authority.126
Thus, contrary to my expectations, many subjects with years of sentencing experience
agreed that the incremental increase in proportions of below Guideline sentences was due to a
gradual recognition by judges that they had the power to issue these types of sentences. Still, I
argue this finding should be read in tandem, rather than in opposition, with many subjects’
acknowledgment of judicial awareness to the incarceration problem and legal elites’ hostility
towards Guideline sentences. The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive and expanded
inquiries into their relative explanatory weight, perhaps through a comparison of judges
appointed pre-Booker and post-Booker, would advance understandings of why and how judges
adapt to dramatic changes in legal policy.
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Discussion
This study, while initial and exploratory, adds insight into how federal district court
judges render criminal sentencing decisions. The opinions of extremely experienced actors in
federal sentencing presented in this research, demonstrate the strengths and shortcomings of both
my own argument of local exogenous influence and alternative perspectives. In sum, there are
several general propositions that can be derived from the results of the interviews.
First, there is strong evidence that some judges are sensitive to certain exogenous local
contextual factors. Four factors were studied as part of this research: local legal community
opinion, public opinion, the incarceration rate, and the crime rate. The results as to all four
factors were clearly mixed. For each of the variables studied, more than one-third of subjects but
less than two-thirds of subjects agreed that the factor affects district judges’ sentencing.
However, and importantly, only two of the nineteen interview subjects believed that these
contextual factors were all generally unimportant to judges’ ultimate sentencing decisions.
This general finding is important, as it supports the notion that where/when judges make
decisions affects those judges’ decisions. While this general point might seem uncontroversial,
the specific sources of contextual influence on sentencing have been understudied in past federal
criminal sentencing research. There is no doubt however, based on the responses of some former
and current district court judges themselves, that certain judges take these matters into account
when sentencing individual offenders. This important finding is consistent with Ulmer (2005)
and Lynch and Omori (2014) suggesting that district court judges, while operating in a national
level system, cannot be compelled into behaving similarly by legal changes at the national level.
Not to overstate the results, the subjects’ general acknowledgement of the importance of
contextual factors, but their lack of consensus on the importance of each individual factor
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suggests that more empirical testing is needed regarding contextual influence. As discussed in
the Results sections, it is quite possible that some inputs, such as the crime rate and public
opinion, are conditional or contingent on other factors, such as media attention. Future studies
could address many of these possible conditions to help determine when contextual factors are
likely to be most important.
The lack of consensus among interview subjects on specific sources of influence is likely
also the product of the second important conclusion of this study: differences in judges. Nearly
all of the subjects went out of their way to emphasize how much variation there was in how
district judges approached sentencing, even within the same district. In the words of one subject,
“every judge is a unique individual. Their personal attitudes will always inform their sentencing
decisions.”127
When probed on the potential sources of these differences in judges, subjects were
hesitant to give simple and specific answers (e.g. partisanship, ideology, sensitivity to the
community) and often relied on generalizations such as different “world-view.”128 When pressed
further on these differences, several subjects cited many different variables including,
upbringing, education, and prior profession. In describing why contextual factors may influence
some judges but not others, some subjects suggested that its impact depended on whether judges
saw their judicial role as limited to applying the legal framework to the facts or each case or as
active participants in public policy.
The upshot of these varied responses is that students of judicial behavior must pay more
attention to variation amongst judges. While it is certainly valuable to make parsimonious
generalizations about judicial behavior, much individual judicial behavior can be missed. Stated
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differently, how judges behave depends on what they care about, and there is no doubt that
different judges care about different things (See Baum 2006). Future studies of sentencing
behavior and judicial behavior more generally should use more mixed-method and direct
observational studies to better understand differences that exist amongst district court judges.
This latest point on judicial variation relates to the third important takeaway from this
study: the potentially overrated impact of judicial partisanship on sentencing decisions. Subjects
were generally hostile to the notion that partisanship explained district court judges’ sentencing
behavior. This finding highlights the limitations of more simplistic models of district court
sentencing behavior, based largely on partisanship (See e.g. Epstein, et. al., 2013).
This is not to suggest that judges appointed by Democratic Presidents sentence identically
to judges appointed by Republican Presidents on average. Past findings suggest that, although
the effects are small, Democratic judges are more likely to grant Guideline departures (Epstein,
et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). Still, the findings of this study suggest that
partisanship and ideology are not always strong predictors of a judges’ sentencing preference.
The potential lack of import of district court judges’ personal partisanship/ideology on
sentencing behavior has major implications for judicial behavior and sentencing policy. First, it
might be that consistent with Zorn & Bowie (2010) and Ashenfelter, et. al. (1999), but
inconsistent with Rowland, et. al. (1996) and Sisk and Heise (2012) personal policy preferences
are not all that important in explaining district court decisions. If this is the case, dominant
theories of appellant judicial behavior, such as the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2002)
would be in need of serious modification when applied to trial judges. On the other hand,
another interpretation of limited partisan/ideological influence in sentencing is simply that
criminal justice policy is becoming a bipartisan issue that mitigates partisan/ideological
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differences between judges (See Zlotnick 2009). Indeed, as discussed above, many subjects were
sympathetic to this view. More global studies of district court behavior across different policy
areas could potentially test the relevant weight of these explanations.
The final point worthy of discussion relates to the extent the results improve upon past
studies of federal sentencing. Specifically, to what extent do the results shed light on the two
“puzzles” identified at the outset of this research: 1) the gradual and continued increase in belowGuideline sentences after 2005; and 2) inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes? The
answer to this question demonstrates both the strengths and limitations of the results.
As to the gradual increase in the proportion of below-Guideline sentences, the results
both provide support for “habitual” explanations and for the alternative theory of judicial policy
evaluation. In other words, it remains an open question whether district court judges are still
simply “getting used” to their authority to sentence as they please as opposed to them actually
altering their sentencing preferences as they observe the problems associated with long
sentences. As discussed previously, results from the interviews suggest that both theories have
some merit.
Even if not solely resolving the puzzle, the finding that at least some judges are softening
policy preferences in the face of evidence of the incarceration problem is important. This
conclusion implies that district judges have some power to rationally change policy, even in the
absence of explicit policymaking power. Whether this power for district judges is interpreted as
a normatively positive development probably depends on one’s view of the ideal role of the
judiciary. Yet strictly from an institutional standpoint, evidence of some policy evaluation and
adaptation by district court judges is independently intriguing.
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As to Puzzle #2, the results were less successful in explaining why sentencing differences
in districts persist. In general, many subjects agreed that local cultural effects explained district
differences. However, in general, it was difficult to detect any patterns of responses or clear
differences between subjects in one district vs. subjects in other districts. Part of the difficulty
was the small number of subjects within each district, making it difficult to generalize on district
differences. Another difficulty was the fact that many subjects had themselves only practiced it
their home district, which prohibited them from opining on how their district was (or was not)
different.
These limitations of the study should not undermine its contributions. The subject
interviews provide strong evidence that some judges in certain situations are sensitive to local
contextual matters when making sentencing decisions. This conclusion, while certainly
conditional and not entirely satisfying, is nevertheless extremely important. Federal district court
judges, even if unelected, remain members of local communities. A subset of district court
judges clearly care both about both their local reputations and the consequences of the policies in
these local communities. So long as these judges exist, district court behavior is unlikely to be
fully explained by either partisan/ideological factors or by top-down legal rules.
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Table 1: District Traits
District Trait
Region

Population

Urban/Rural
Partisan Composition of
Judges Last Decade
Racial/Ethnic
Demographics of Districts

Political Ideology of
Citizens in Districts

Traits of at Least one
Selected District
-Mid-Atlantic
-Southern
-Midwestern
-large (> 5 million residents)
-medium (>2 million but < 5 million
residents)
-majority urban
-majority rural
-majority Republican
-majority Democrat
-10-20% African American
population
-greater than 20% African American
population
-10-20% Hispanic population
-less than 10% Hispanic population
-conservative
-liberal
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Traits not Represented by
Selected Districts
- Northeastern
- Western
-small (<2 million residents)

n/a
n/a
-less than 10% African
American population
-greater than 20% Hispanic
population

n/a

Table 2: Aggregate Subject Characteristics
Experience

Median Subject Experience: 24 years
Minimum Subject Experience: 13 years
Maximum Subject Experience: 43 years
Total Years Experience: 460 years

Profession

4 former federal district court judges;
2 federal district court judges;
3 federal public defenders;
4 private practice criminal defense attorneys;
2 assistant U.S. Attorneys;

Gender

4 “hybrid” former U.S. Attorneys current
private practice criminal defense attorneys.
16 Males
3 Females

Race/Ethnicity

17 White
2 African Americans
0 Hispanics
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Table 3: Percentages of Subjects Agreeing that Contextual Variables Impact
Federal District Court Judges Sentencing Decisions
Contextual Source of
Influence
Local Legal Community
Opinion
Local Public Opinion129

Unqualified
Agreement
37%

Qualified
Agreement
26%

Total Agreement

33%

11%

44%

Incarceration Rates130

12%

41%

53%

Crime Rates131

21%

32%

53%

63%

129

Due to time constraints, one interview subject was unable to answer questions regarding local public opinion.

130

Due to time constraints, two interview subjects were unable to answer questions regarding the incarceration rates.

131

One interview subject insisted that while the actual crime rates were probably not important, judges’ “perceptions
of the crime rate” were influential. This subject was coded as “Qualified Agreement” as it is consistent with the
theory that judges are sensitive to local criminal issues, even if that concern is based on perception, rather than
reality.
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Appendix A: Question Bank
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today and answer some questions.
The interview should take 45 minutes to 1 Hour. Please remember that your
participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you can cease your
participation at any time. Please also feel free to add any thoughts and/or
impressions you may have.
First, I have some general questions about you and your experience in [Name of
Federal District Court]
1) Please state your name, job title, business address, and business telephone
number.
2) What is your experience in criminal law in [Name of Federal District Court]?
3) What job titles or positions have you held that give you this experience, and
what years were you in each position?
4) How familiar are you with general federal sentencing practice in [Name of
Federal District Court]?
5) How familiar are you with the application of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines in [Name of Federal District Court]?
6) Which judges, if any, in [Name of Federal District Court] do you have experience
appearing in front of, and/or working with?
Now I have some general questions regarding your opinion of sentencing practice in
[Name of Federal District Court]
7) What is your overall opinion of sentencing practice in [Name of Federal District
Court]?
8) What is your overall opinion of the US Sentencing Guidelines [Name of Federal
District Court]?
9) What would you say are the strengths of the US Sentencing Guidelines and their
application?
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10) What would you are the weaknesses of the US Sentencing Guidelines and their
application?
11) In general, would you say criminals are treated fairly or unfairly under the US
Sentencing Guidelines in [Name of Federal District Court]? Please explain.
12) In general, would you say that federal district court judges have too much
discretion, not enough discretion, or about the right amount of discretion in
making sentencing decisions?
13) How familiar are you with the procedure of “departures” from the US
Sentencing Guidelines?
14) Based on your experience in [Name of Federal District Court], do you generally
think there should be more departures form the Guidelines, less departures form
the Guidelines, or about right?
15) In your opinion, why do you think a given judge in [Name of Federal District
Court] may depart from the Guidelines in the case of some offenders, but not
other offenders?
16) What are some reasons you believe that some judges in [Name of Federal District
Court] might grant departures from the Guidelines more often than other
judges?
Now I’m going to list some possible explanations for why a judge may depart from
the Guidelines. For each, please tell me whether or not you believe the potential
explanations to be valid, and if so to what extent.
17) Generally speaking, do you believe the race of the offender affects departure
decisions? If so, in what way?
18) Generally speaking, do you believe the gender of the offender affects departure
decisions? If so, in what way?
19) Generally speaking, do you believe the race of the sentencing judge affects
departure decisions? If so, in what way?
20) Generally speaking, do you believe the gender of the sentencing judge affects
departure decisions? If so, in what way?
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21) Generally speaking, do you believe the opinions or preferences of the local legal
community impact district court judges in their departure decisions? If so, in
what way?
22) Generally speaking, do you believe the opinions or preferences of the general
public impact district court judges in their departure decisions? If so, in what
way?
23) Generally speaking, do you believe the type of crime the offender committed
(drug trafficking, firearms, etc.) affects departure decisions? If so, in what way?
24) Generally speaking, do you believe that whether the conviction is reached by
plea agreement or jury conviction affects departure decisions? If so, in what
way?
25) Generally speaking, do you believe the U.S. Attorney’s Office prevalence of
charging crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences affects departure
decisions? If so in what ways?
26) Generally speaking, do you believe the U.S. Attorney’s Office prevalence of
using “substantial assistance” departures, or other government-sponsored
departures affects departure decisions? If so in what ways?
27) Generally speaking, do you believe the political party of the sentencing judge
(based upon the political party of the appointing US President) affects departure
decisions? If so, in what way?
28) Generally speaking, do you believe the personal ideology of the sentencing judge
(based upon the political party of the appointing US President) affects departure
decisions? If so, in what way?
29) Generally speaking, do you believe the political ideology of the local area affect
departure decisions? If so, in what way?
30) Generally speaking, do you believe the prevalence of crime, or the crime rate in
the local area affect departure decisions? If so, in what way?
31) Generally speaking, do you believe the incarceration rate in the local area affect
departure decisions? If so, in what way?
32) Is there anything I haven’t mentioned that you believe impacts departure
decisions?
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Now I have some specific questions regarding your opinion of sentencing practice in
[Name of Federal District Court]
33) Do you believe [Name of Federal District Court]? is more punitive or less
punitive than average?
34) Why would you suspect this is the case?
Now I’m going to ask you some questions regarding how you think sentencing
practice has changed in [Name of Federal District Court] sine your experience began.
35) From a general perspective, how has life in the areas of jurisdiction of the [Name
of Federal District Court] changed since your experience began?
36) Do you think these general changes have affected sentencing practice in [Name
of Federal District Court]? If so, in what way?
37) In your opinion, how, if at all, did the 2005 US Supreme Court case of US v.
Booker alter sentencing practice in your district?
38) Do you agree with the portion of US v. Booker that holds that the US Sentencing
Guidelines cannot be mandatory on sentencing judges?
Finally, I’m going to conclude by asking you some general questions?
39) Is there anything you would like to add that we have not covered that you think
is particularly relevant to this subject-matter?
40) Is there any other person with experience in [Name of Federal District Court]
that you believe could answer some of these questions or otherwise be beneficial
to this research effort?
Thank you for your time. I truly appreciate your participation in this research.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

165

The major argument I advance in this dissertation is that the criminal sentencing
decisions of federal district court judges are dynamic and complex. These decisions cannot be
fully explained by district judges’ individual partisan preferences. Nor can different eras of
judicial discretion (e.g. pre-Booker or post-Booker) account for certain peculiarities in federal
sentencing policy, such as differences in districts or the continued increase in below-Guideline
sentences post-Booker.
Instead, I theorized in Chapter 1 that district judges’ decisions are likely impacted by
certain contextual conditions that exist in their community. In particular, I argued the punitive
preferences of both the local legal community and the general public would likely impact judges’
sentencing decisions. In addition, I argued that pertinent objective conditions, such as crime
rates and incarceration rates, had the potential to alter district judges’ sentencing preferences and
thus influence outcomes.
In this Conclusion, I assess the degree to which the findings of each empirical chapter
support this argument. First, I discuss the results for each of the four specific variables as well as
contextual determinants generally. Next, I relate the findings back to the societal problem of
incarceration and discuss some important implications for understanding the role of the judiciary
in addressing policy problems. Finally, I discuss potential avenues for future research, both in
federal sentencing policy and in other policy areas.
Do Contextual Factors Matter?
The theoretical basis for why district judges might be sensitive to certain conditions in
their communities when making sentencing decisions is discussed at length in Chapter 1 and
throughout this dissertation. In brief, I argue that federal district court judges are, to some extent,
products of their environment. They live and work within particular geographic districts, and
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like all individuals, district judges are to some degree shaped by these places. While district
judges certainly have personal views and personal preferences that impact their decisions, these
personal views cannot be divorced from “the sociological impact of the community” (Rowland
and Carp 1996, 74).
I argue this “sociological impact” of the community is extremely important when
studying district judges’ criminal sentencing decisions. While district judges’ sentences are
primarily guided by the circumstances of individual offenders, the evidence in the aggregate data
clearly shows that similarly situated offenders are sentenced differently both across the country
and over time (USSC 1995-2014; Lynch and Omori 2014; Tiede 2009). Contextual influences
largely explain why we see fewer district judges grant below-Guideline sentences in Southern
Georgia than in Western Washington (USSC 1995-2014). They also partially illustrate why we
observe the continued increase in below-Guideline sentences since they were first implemented
in 1987.
In operationalizing my theory of contextual influence, I attempt to move beyond abstract
and general concepts of “culture” or “sociological impact” and empirically test specific
variables. In particular, using a variety of different models and methods throughout the
dissertation, I tested whether: a) public opinion, b) legal community opinion, c) incarceration
rates, and d) crime rates affect the likelihood that district judges will issue below-Guideline
sentences. A summary of the results for each potential determinant is provided below.
Public Opinion
The theory that public preferences impact unelected district judges’ decisions is premised
on the idea that many judges’ are concerned about their reputation, despite being unelected. This
concern about reputation may be instrumental. District judges who seek to be promoted to

167

higher courts must be approved by elected policymakers132 accountable to the public. Thus, it
would make little sense for these ambitious judges to engender a poor reputation with the public.
However, many judges might consider a strong reputation with the public as a goal in and of
itself (Baum 2006; Miceli and Cosgell 1994). District judges are almost always long-time
residents of their particular district (Rowland and Carp 1996). It would be somewhat curious if
they were completely unconcerned with their public standing in a place they lived and worked
for a good part of their lives.
This connection between public opinion and district judge criminal sentencing was
studied fairly extensively in past decades (Silver and Shapiro 1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1977,
1971). However, more recent federal sentencing studies have not assessed the degree to which
district judges’ post-Guideline sentences are consistent with the “representational model” of
judicial behavior. The results from this dissertation provide some conditional evidence of a
relationship between public opinion and district judges’ criminal sentencing behavior.
The findings of the panel models in Chapter 3 suggest that judges from districts with
relatively liberal populaces are more likely to issue below-Guideline sentences than judges from
districts with relatively conservative populaces. The findings held both in random and fixedeffect models133, suggesting that, even within districts, changes in the ideology of the local
population over time were reflected in the sentences issued by district judges. It is an open
question whether this observed relationship evidences direct public influence on judges or
whether it simply indicates that, as members of the public, judges’ preferences move in-step with
public opinion (See Casillas, et. al. 2011; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).

132

U.S. Senators from district judges’ home state are particularly important elected figures whom district judges
likely need the approval of in order to achieve promotion (Morriss, et. al. 2005).
133

Although the magnitude of the effects was smaller in fixed-effect models.
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Nonetheless, the result is broadly supportive of the “representational model” of judicial behavior,
holding that judges’ decisions will reflect the preferences of the public (Cook 1977).
In addition to the quantitative results, results from the phone interviews conducted in
Chapter 4 provided conditional support for representational behavior by district judges. A
significant subset of both attorneys and former district judges stated that judges were sensitive to
public concerns about crime and punishment. Many of these subjects also noted that public
opinion was more likely to play a role in sentencing outcomes in cases with high levels of media
attention. This emphasis on media attention is consistent with a “reputational” theory of district
judge decision making. If unelected federal district court judges derive utility from having a
good reputation amongst the public (See Miceli and Cosgel 1994; Posner 1993), it makes a great
deal of sense that they would be most likely to be influenced by public sentiment in criminal
cases when they knew the public was paying attention to the outcome (i.e. high-publicity cases).
Other dissertation results were less supportive of the connection between public
preferences and sentencing outcomes. For instance, the national-level analysis conducted in
Chapter 2 failed to establish a relationship between the country’s general punitive preferences
and district judges’ sentencing behavior. One potential interpretation of the seemingly
inconsistent results regarding pubic influence is that district judges are responsive to the
preferences of the public within their own geographic jurisdiction, but not to the general public
throughout the country. This interpretation is consistent with conceptions of district judges as
representatives of local areas, rather than as agents of a national legal system (Ulmer 2005;
Rowland and Carp 1996; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964). Moreover, this interpretation is generally
supportive of the above-discussed “reputational” theory of why judges might respond to public
preferences. Since few district judges are known by the public outside their district (Goulden
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1974), it makes a good deal of sense that any public influence on district judges’ sentencing
decisions would be local rather than national.
Legal Community Opinion
The effect that the preferences of the local legal community have on district judges’
criminal sentencing was also examined in this dissertation, albeit only in Chapter 4. The logic
underlying local legal community influence is also based on district judges’ desire to foster a
strong reputation. District judges often have a close working relationship with the attorneys who
practice in their courts (Nardulli, et. al. 1988). Like all individuals, judges desire the respect and
esteem of the people with whom they work (Schauer 2000). Given the large proportion of
attorneys who view the Guidelines as overly punitive (Hofer and Allenbaugh 2003), it is
reasonable to query whether district judges would be influenced by attorney sentiment in their
sentencing decisions in order to foster a better reputation.
The results from Chapter 4 lend qualified support to the argument that some district
judges are influenced by local legal community views regarding criminal sentencing. Consistent
with the findings of Ulmer (2005) and Kautt (2002), several subjects interviewed in Chapter 4
cited local legal community practices as a likely cause of different Guideline departure rates
between districts. In addition, one subject noted that district judges’ attendance at out-of-court
functions (e.g. bar lunches) that involved sentencing matters ultimately ended up affecting
district judges’ sentencing decisions. Finally, other subjects stated that district judges’ individual
reputations in the legal community were tied to whether judges were relatively punitive in their
sentencing. Thus, there is some qualitative support for the argument that judges’ sentencing
decisions are impacted by local legal communities.
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Still, all the evidence did not point in this direction. Several subjects questioned whether
district judges were influenced by local legal community views. Some of these subjects
suggested that judges didn’t really care about their reputations among attorneys when making
decisions. Other subjects suggested that, while district judges care about their reputation in the
legal community, they don’t let this concern affect their substantive decision-making.
The mixed results from Chapter 4 suggest that while some district judges can be impacted
by the policy preferences of legal communities, other judges are disinclined to pay heed to this
group. To more precisely understand how many district judges are influenced by local legal
communities and to what degree, there is a need for an expansion of the interview-based research
design in Chapter 4 to include more subjects. In addition, there is a need for better quantitative
measures of local legal community preferences. This could potentially be achieved in future
research by sending questionnaire/surveys to attorneys’ with sentencing experience in various
federal districts.
Incarceration Rates
In addition to testing whether district judges’ sentences are influenced by the opinions of
certain constituencies, this research also probed whether certain objective conditions could
impact district judges’ sentences. Social scientists have previously analyzed whether certain
policymakers’ positions could be impacted by changing facts (Jones & Baumgartner 2005;
Cohen 1999). Yet there is little to no research on whether objective facts could also influence
judges’ policy preferences. Instead, “policy preferences” in the judicial behavior literature is
generally treated as conceptually identical to “ideology” (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Epstein &
Knight 1998). Yet ideology is not static, and there is recent evidence that even conservatives
have become increasingly hostile to the notion of long sentences for federal criminal offenders
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(Act, et. al. 2015). Accordingly, it is very plausible that changing objective facts related to crime
and punishment are a partial cause of district judges’ reduced adherence to Guideline sentences
in recent years.
The federal incarceration rate is one such objective factor that potentially impacts district
judges’ sentencing decisions. This rate has exploded since the Guidelines were adopted (U.S.
DOJ 2015). Somewhat ironically, however, the explosion largely coincided with a marked
increase in the proportion of federal offenders’ receiving below-Guideline sentences (USSC
1995-2014).134 I argue that the former trend partially caused the latter. As many district judges
observed the damaging societal effects of mass incarceration, they adjusted their sentencing
preferences in a less punitive direction.
Results from the dissertation suggest many district judges have become attentive to the
incarceration problem. The time series results of Chapter 2 evidenced a relationship between
higher federal incarceration rates and a higher proportion of downward departures. The
relationship was observed in models of both total downward departures, and models of
departures excluding substantial assistance cases.135
Due to the lack of regional variability in the federal incarceration measure, the variable
was not tested in the panel designs of Chapter 3. However, the qualitative results in Chapter 4
provided further evidence that many district judges have altered their sentencing behavior in the
face of climbing incarceration. Several subjects, including some current and former district
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This apparent irony is largely explained by increases in the criminal case-loads for federal courts, the growth in
cases with mandatory minimum sentences, and more aggressive law enforcement practices by the federal
government (USSC 2012). There is also a “lag-time” effect as shorter sentences in a given year will take some time
to be reflected in overall incarceration rate statistics. Still, it appears the increase in below-Guideline sentences is
finally having some effect on the objective data, as the federal incarceration rate began declining in 2012 (U.S. DOJ
2015).
135

Recall that in these models, a certain subset of government sponsored below-Guideline sentences were excluded.
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judges, cited anecdotes of judges justifying below-Guideline sentences by citing the problem of
over-incarceration.
As with other determinants studied, the degree to which the incarceration rate is
influential is not perfectly clear. Objective incarceration statistics are doubtless intertwined with
public and elite evaluations of the incarceration problem, which could also impact judges.
Furthermore, as set forth in more detail in Chapter 4, district judges’ sensitivity to the
incarceration problem may be related to their personal political ideology or to their individual
conceptual framework for judges’ policymaking roles. Still, the findings regarding the impact of
incarceration levels on district judges’ sentencing preferences is perhaps one of the more
important and timely of the dissertation. It suggests many district judges play an active role in
addressing policy problems, even when legal standards remain static.
Crime Rates
Finally, the dissertation sought to examine any connection between crime rates and
district judges’ punitive sentencing habits. There are several reasons district judges would likely
be aware of crime rates. First, they are residents of the community and may have direct
experience with crime. Second, judges are well-educated and ambitious individuals who are
very likely closely follow local media reports about crime. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, they are professionally exposed to the problem of crime through their role as judges
in federal criminal cases.
Assuming judicial awareness of crime levels, the basis for why these levels would impact
district judges’ sentencing preferences bears similarities to the aforementioned argument for the
effect of incarceration rates on judicial sentencing behavior. Essentially, I argue that judges are
not solely driven by ideological or reputational concerns but are also individuals who seek to
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attain the “best” consequences with their decisions (Posner 2009). Since both punishment and
general deterrence are stated goals of federal sentencing136, it’s likely that district judges’
conceptions of “appropriate sentences” are shaped by their evaluation of the crime problem in
their community. Thus, the larger this problem (the higher the crime rate), the more likely
judges will seek to punish criminals and deter future criminals by issuing more punitive
sentences (See Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980).
Evidence from the dissertation regarding the crime rate’s effect on district judges was
mixed. The national-level model in Chapter 2 failed to show any significant relationship
between crime rates and punitive sentences. On the other hand, the panel design of Chapter 3
provided fairly strong evidence that district judges in higher crime areas issued more punitive
sentences. Evidence from interviews conducted in Chapter 4 was ambiguous. Several subjects
agreed that district judges in high-crime areas are more likely to embrace deterrence. Thus they
would be more prone to issue longer sentences to offenders in order to “send a message” to
future criminals. However, other subjects suggested that judges were not concerned with the
problem of local crime when sentencing individual offenders and were content to leave this issue
up to law enforcement.
Still other subjects suggested high crime rates might have the opposite effect and actually
increase the likelihood of below-Guideline sentences. These subjects surmised that judges who
reside in lower-crime rural areas would be less familiar with serious crime, and thus more likely
to issue harsher sentences. However the models presented in Chapter 3, which control for type
and seriousness of crime in each district, did not support this alternative theory presented by
subjects. In sum, further testing is clearly needed to determine whether or not crime rates truly
impact district judges’ sentencing decisions, and if so, in what direction and to what degree.
136

See 18 U.S.C.§3553
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The Important Role of Contextual Influences
Overall, what is to be made of the admittedly mixed results regarding contextual
influence on district judges? Probably the most reasonable interpretation of the findings as a
whole is that while no one contextual factor is of paramount importance to district judges, many
judges will take into account certain conditions in the community when make sentencing
decisions. Thus, contextual variables should no longer be excluded from studies of district
judges’ sentencing behavior (See Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). The
importance of these contextual determinants in general is demonstrated by several findings of the
dissertation.
First, the explanatory power of quantitative models of district judges’ departure decisions
presented in both Chapters 2 and 3 were improved once the exogenous environmental variables
were included. The relative strength of quantitative models that include these variables implies
that more simplistic models of district judges’ sentencing are likely to underestimate important
community-based influences. In other words, past research studies of federal sentencing trends
that only assessed the impact of judicial partisanship, policy change, or prosecutorial practices
are capable of providing only partial explanations for sentencing outcomes (See Lynch and
Omori 2014; Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).
In addition, results from Chapter 4 of the dissertation, while mixed as to each individual
factor, demonstrated fairly strong support for contextual influence in general. Very few subjects
(2 of 19) believed that all four of the environmental influences studied were unimportant in
shaping district judges’ sentencing decisions. This finding further bolsters the claim that the
contextual conditions existing in the community are an important aspect of understanding why
district judges’ derive their sentencing decisions.

175

Admittedly, the impact of contextual variables on district judges sentencing also appears
to be highly conditional. There is variability among district judges as to the degree to which
community influences are important. Some district judges are undoubtedly very concerned with
the local public or the local legal communities’ views on sentencing, while other district judges
pay less heed to these groups (Schauer 2000). Similarly, some judges clearly care about broader
social conditions, such as crime rates or incarceration rates, when making sentencing decisions,
while other judges will be unaffected. This finding confirms that judicial sentencing decisions
are inextricably a reflection of the frame of reference of a given judge.
As discussed in more detail below, the conditional nature of contextual influence
suggests future studies of district judges should seek to determine which judges are likely to
internalize environmental conditions and in what type of cases those conditions are likely to be
most important. Still, the findings in this dissertation strongly imply that it would be a mistake
for scholars to limit future sentencing studies to judicial partisanship or legal rules and ignore the
differing contextual backgrounds in which sentencing decisions are made. In many instances,
these community-level factors will play an important role in determining the ultimate outcome
for federal offenders.
District Judges’ Roles and the Incarceration Problem
Moving beyond the importance of various contextual variables, the results of the
dissertation also advance understandings of district judges’ role within a punitive federal
sentencing framework. There is no doubt the federal sentencing framework that was adopted in
1984 and implemented in 1987 created a regime that drastically increased the length of prison
sentences for federal offenders. This rise in federal incarceration has been disproportionately felt
by African-American and Hispanic communities, and now over 1 in 300 males of color in the
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United States are currently serving time in federal prison (DOJ 2015). Given the problem, an
important question to ask relates to district judges’ role in this system. Namely, are district
judges contributing to the systemic problem of over-incarceration? Or, alternatively, do district
judges act as bulwark against even more punitive outcomes?
From the perspective of critics of punitive sentencing, this dissertation unequivocally
finds that district judges are part of the solution rather than part of the problem. First, the raw
data demonstrates that more than half of offenders in FY 2014 received below-Guideline
sentences, and offenders are now nearly 25 times more likely to receive below-Guideline
sentences than above-Guideline sentences (USSC 1995-2014). These facts demonstrate that
district judges clearly question the baseline appropriateness of Guideline-level sentences in a
large segment of cases.
Secondly, evidence from Chapters 2 and 4 suggest the increase in below-Guideline
sentences was not merely the byproduct of any increase in the proportion of Democratic judges
that sat on the District Court. Instead, the increase in below-Guideline sentences is at least
partially explained by changes to sitting district judges’ own preferences for optimal sentences.
Specifically, quantitative evidence from Chapter 2 and qualitative evidence from Chapter 4
demonstrate district judges’ gradual acknowledgement that long sentences were not only an
ineffective criminal justice policy, but were also damaging to society.
Finally, some findings from the dissertation suggest that any connection between public
punitive preferences and policymaker behavior may soon result in a more dramatic revolt against
Guideline-level sentences. Results from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that district judges’ punitive
behavior may be related to the local public’s preferences.137 Unlike the previously discussed
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Although recall that in Chapter 3, general ideology was used as a proxy variable for public punitive preferences.
To the extent this relationship between conservative ideology and punitive preferences is weakening in recent years
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results, this finding is not necessarily indicative of district judges’ resistance to an overly
punitive sentencing regime. Indeed, recent scholars of criminal justice policy have attributed the
decades-long policy of long prison sentences to the effect that a fearful public has on
policymakers (Enns 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009).
Yet, the public’s attitudes are changing. For instance, a 2014 Pew Poll finds that 63% of
the public now oppose mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders, up from
47% in 2001 (Pew 2014). More broadly, Enns’ (2014) measure of general public punitiveness
peaked in the early 1990s. Thus, while the connection between public preferences and
policymaker behavior has generally been regarded as being partially responsible for the rise in
incarceration in this country, recent trends suggest that any connection may produce less punitive
outcomes in the future.138
Future Areas of Research
Finally, the results of this dissertation provide several opportunities of further study of the
contextual influence on district judges. One such opportunity is to expand the interview project
conducted in Chapter 4 to include more interview subjects from more districts. This would serve
several purposes. First, it would increase the sample of subjects and potentially allow for
stronger causal statements regarding the effect of contextual variables on district judges’
sentencing decisions. Relatedly, a larger and more diverse array of subjects would improve the
generalizability of the results. Two clear limitations of the research conducted in Chapter 4
were the underrepresentation of female subjects and the total lack of perspectives from attorneys

(See e.g. Act, et. al. 2015), the ability of the findings of Chapter 3 to forecast a future link between public punitive
preferences and district judges’ sentences is also weakened.
138

Although as discussed in Chapter 3, the connection between public preferences and judicial sentencing also has
the potential to exacerbate racial disparities in sentencing. This is especially likely if Southern populaces are less
likely to have changed their views on punitive sentencing than other Americans.
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and judges in Western or small, rural districts. Third, an expanded project could more
appropriately analyze any differences in opinion among sub-groups (e.g. defense attorneys vs.
U.S. Attorneys) as to what factors are most important in explaining sentencing outcomes.
Another opportunity for future studies of contextual influence on district judges is to use
direct observation. Both Kritzer (1998) and Blank, et. al. (1989) argue that observation of both
lawyers and judges is a particularly useful method for studying trial courts. These scholars
suggest that since many of the important decisions of trial courts are made in the courtroom,
social scientists should observe how both attorneys and trial judges behave during court
proceedings. This type of observational research could be used to evaluate how district judges
respond to attorneys’ arguments that judges should consider broader community concerns when
sentencing individual offenders. Results from Chapter 4 suggest that many attorneys do in fact
appeal to societal issues such as the crime rates or incarceration rates when making arguments to
district judges regarding appropriate sentences. Direct observation of sentencing hearings could
evaluate how often these appeals made by attorneys and how they are received by district judges
during hearings. These observations could then be supplemented with analyses of decisions to
assess whether district judges are more or less likely to ultimately rule in favor of the attorneys
making these socially-framed arguments.
Another opportunity for future research is related to a key finding of this dissertation:
variability among district judges. As discussed at length by Baum (2006), failure to account for
differences in judges’ hierarchy of goals is one of the weaknesses of the dominant models of
judicial behavior. Some judges’ decisions will be guided largely by their ideology and personal
preferences. Other judges might primarily be concerned with their reputations among certain
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groups and thus decide cases with the goal of preserving this reputation. Still other judges might
be concerned with making the best public policy in light of the available information.
But empirically, how large is each of these groups of judges? In addition, is there
anything systematic about each type of judge that would allow us to better understand why they
are different? From a research perspective, perhaps the best way to answer these questions with
respect to district judges is to conduct intensive studies of individual districts. This type of
design would allow researchers to determine how different judges potentially respond differently
to the same environments. It would also make a strong supplement to the expanded interview
project discussed above, which would focus on the differences of judges operating in different
contexts.
Finally, another potential opportunity for future research is to test the theory of contextual
influences on district judges in other policy areas. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several
ways in which salient social or political concerns could impact the content of district judges’
decisions. For instance, does income inequality make it more likely that district court judges
make rulings favorable to individual litigants in suits against business or wealthy litigants? Does
the local legal community’s position on tort reform have an impact on judges’ rulings for tort
plaintiffs vs. tort defendants? The weight of the evidence from this dissertation is that district
judges’ criminal sentencing decisions cannot be divorced from the environments in which those
decisions are made. But it remains to be seen whether or not this conclusion holds for other
policy areas.
Conclusion
In summary, this dissertation has demonstrated that many district judges’ sentencing
behavior must be viewed in the context of both local attitudes and local conditions pertinent to
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crime and punishment. To scholars who study district courts, and indeed to anybody familiar
with the heterogeneity that exists in the United States, this conclusion might hardly seem
revolutionary. Few persons would likely be surprised to learn that a district judge living and
working in rural Arkansas would approach criminal sentencing differently than a district judge
from Chicago. Indeed, past researchers of district courts have generalized district judges
throughout the country behave differently due to different “cultures” or different “sociological
impacts” (Lynch and Omori 2014; Ulmer 2005; Rowland and Carp 1996).
Still, the findings of this dissertation extend beyond a mere confirmation of regional
differences among district judges. Evidence suggests that several district judges have actually
altered their sentencing preferences over time in the face of changing conditions. It is this
finding that has far-reaching implications for how we understand the role of district judges. If
changing facts and circumstances lead many district judges to alter their preferences, then the
argument that many trial judges behave pragmatically is bolstered. This finding also calls into
question the conception of district judges as behaving solely ideologically (See Sisk and Heise
2012). One of the stronger findings of this dissertation is that the combination of changes to
legal rules and judicial partisanship were collectively unable to fully explain variation in district
judges’ sentencing behavior over time. Instead, judges’ preferences changed in the face of
changing conditions.
Thus, the broader implication of this dissertation is that proponents of the attitudinal
model may be only half-right (See Segal and Spaeth 2002). Consistent with a legal realist
conception of judges, individual policy preferences clearly impact the content of decisions.
However, at least for district judges in the area of criminal sentencing, those preferences cannot
be simply understood in terms of left/right ideology.
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Other factors, such as preferences of

salient groups and relevant environmental conditions, also have the ability to impact judicial
decisions.
Finally, far from being definitive, the results also raise several new questions. Many of
the individual factors studied produced mixed results. In addition, while the findings suggest
that different judges will attach different levels of importance to contextual conditions, the extent
and nature of those differences remains somewhat of a mystery. Yet as discussed above, these
new questions create exciting opportunities to conduct further research and ultimately improve
understandings of how district judges make decisions.
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